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Abstract
Oil price fluctuations have been prominent in economy since World War II. Researchers
have been busy exploring the possible transmission mechanisms from these fluctuations
to the economy, with their task being complicated over the years by a changing
economic environment and transforming dynamics in the oil industry.
This thesis uniquely brings on board the study of three topical research areas
pertaining to the oil market that have attracted attention both in academic and
industrial circles. The first chapter explores the role of financial participants in the oil
futures market by applying Markov-switching vector autoregressions. A popular view
has been that significant oil price changes cannot be explained solely by fundamentals.
Investigating whether oil prices convey information about supply-demand forces, or
they are a result of ‘speculative effects’, can be of importance for the economy as their
information content constitutes a key input in a variety of decisions, from businesses
to governments and regulators. The second chapter studies the relationship between
public debt and economic growth for hydrocarbon-rich developing economies. The
v
dependence of these countries on oil and gas revenues can raise serious concerns
about their fiscal sustainability, especially during the oil industry’s bust cycles. By
employing threshold analysis, this work examines whether a common threshold debt
level exists for these countries beyond which debt can adversely affect the economic
performance. The third chapter is a case study for Saudi Arabia, the largest exporter
of crude oil in the world. The internal economic and social conditions of Saudi Arabia
are, indirectly, important for the world as the Kingdom has the ability to decrease
or increase oil production levels during supply interruptions or high demand growth,
which in turn can affect global oil prices. While the natural resource endowment
has been translated into more financial wealth for the Kingdom, placing the Saudi
economy to the 19th position of the global rank, it remains questionable to what
extent this wealth has further been translated into economic development and social
progress for the Saudi population.
Our findings suggest that oil prices are driven by the forces of demand and supply,
with trader positions having little impact on oil prices. The Markov-switching
model with two regimes proves to be a good description of the behaviour for the
majority of the futures market participants. Next, the results of the debt-growth
relationship confirm existing empirical evidence that debt can stimulate growth,
with the impact turning negative and having a detrimental effect on the country’s
economic activity when debt crosses a certain tipping point. Finally, the case study
analysis on Saudi Arabia shows that oil prices have had significant repercussions on
the economic development and social progress of the country. Saudi Arabia, heavily
reliant on hydrocarbon revenues, has failed to successfully utilise its oil wealth and
convert it into development and welfare levels equivalent to those economies with
similar-sourced incomes.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Preamble
The growth rate of an economy is conditioned on its exposure and resilience to shocks
in the economy (Balassa, 1986; Romer & Romer, 2004; Martin, 2012), with the oil
market being seen as one of the main catalysts for economic activity since World
War II. Almost all recessions in the United States (U.S.) have been preceded by
substantial changes in the oil price. Similarly, slumps in global economic growth
in the past decades have coincided with sharp increases in the price of crude oil
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 2012).
The price of oil remained relatively stable at $U.S. 2.5 per barrel over the period
between 1945 and 1973 – a period marked by substantial economic growth, low
inflation, economic stability and full employment. The scenery, though, changed
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dramatically in 1973, when the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) – controlling half of global oil production at that time – proclaimed an
oil embargo. The decision to boycott the U.S. and western countries, which were
perceived as supporting Israel in the Yom Kippur war against Egypt, caused the
crude oil price to rise up to $U.S. 15 per barrel by mid-1974. The 1973-74 oil crisis
adversely affected the global economy, with the impact being felt immediately in the
form of high inflation and unemployment.
Soon, economists started exploring the oil shock effects on the economy. Early
on in the debate, Nordhaus (1980b,a) analysed those avenues through which the
economy can be affected by changes in the oil price, explaining that when prices
increase, energy expenditure also rises, which in turn pushes the price of goods
produced higher whilst decreases consumption. Further, the gross domestic product
(GDP) is restrained and inflationary pressures are generated. Along the same lines,
Kilian (2009) showed that both a supply- or demand-driven oil price spike can be
determinative on output and inflation.
The literature boom looking at the relationship between oil prices and economic
growth was initiated by Hamilton (1983), who treated oil price as an exogenous
variable and found a significant correlation between oil price increases and economic
recessions over 1948-1981. Several studies confirmed his finding: Burbidge & Harrison
(1984), Gisser & Goodwin (1986), Mork (1989), Mork et al. (1994), Ferderer (1996),
Papapetrou (2001), Cunado & Perez de Gracia (2005) and Lardic & Mignon (2006)
all estimated a negative impact of the oil price increase on GDP for industrialised,
industrialising, oil-importing and oil-exporting economies.
While previous work considered oil price shocks as exogenous, Kilian (2008) challenged
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this perception, stimulating a new approach in the oil-GDP debate. He proposed
an endogenous model, which incorporated oil production, real economic activity
(using a business cycle indicator) and oil prices, and disentangled shocks based on
those caused by oil supply disruptions, aggregate demand and oil-market specific
demand shocks. The latter are also known as precautionary demand shocks as they
are generated by the expectation of future events that will force prices to change.
Along this attempt to decode the relationship between oil prices and economic growth,
another topic came into focus. A number of papers began investigating the growing
presence and impact of financial participants in the crude oil markets that occured
after 2000. The popularity of oil futures contracts expanded very fast as they proved
to perform two important economic functions: first, producers and consumers were
allowed to hedge price risks, and second, the price-setting process was facilitated
thanks to the high degree of standardisation and transparency offered by oil futures
markets. In addition to that, futures contracts performed a price-signalling function
for spot markets. However, lots of criticism arose, questioning the extent to which
price signals from futures markets reflect pure supply-demand fundamentals, as
well as the market power of those who could potentially manipulate prices in order
to make profit from the resulting price movements - also known as speculators.
Many studies advocated that oil price hikes were not demand- or supply-driven, and
documented speculative effects as the main cause of market destabilisation.
1.2 Research questions and thesis contribution
This thesis uniquely brings on board the study of three topical research areas related
to oil prices that have attracted attention both in academic and industrial circles.
These include the role of financial participants in the oil market, the sovereign debt
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sustainability of economies reliant on high oil prices and a case study of the largest
oil exporter, Saudi Arabia.
The first essay addresses the issue of ‘financialisation’ in the oil futures market. The
increased inflow of investors’ cash in the futures market for commodities in recent
years has caused growing concerns about its impact on prices. Given the controversial
nature of this narrative, we consider it an important area for research. The main
question concerns whether oil prices convey information about the fundamental
forces of supply and demand or they are a result of ‘speculative effects’. This chapter
examines the dynamic correlation between trader futures positions and the price of
Brent oil, whilst capturing the regime switches that may occur in the process over
time and which may affect the said correlation. The importance of this study lies in
the fact that this public debate about the role of financialisation has been seen in
tighter constraints imposed on commodity trading futures, which in turn can have an
impact on a variety of decisions, from business investment to government regulators.
The second essay focuses on another topical issue, namely the sovereign debt
sustainability of resource-rich developing economies. The oil price crash in the
summer of 2014 raised concerns about the fiscal sustainability of economies that
are heavily reliant on oil, as weakening finances due to the falling oil prices led to
substantial debt increases. However, a limited amount of research has been conducted
so far in the literature. Hence, this essay consists of a preliminary analysis of the
relationship between debt and growth through a threshold analysis.
The third essay consists of a case study of Saudi Arabia, the second largest crude
oil producer in the world. The country has also the largest output capacity which
enables it to adjust its oil production levels during supply interruptions or increased
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demand growth and, thus, help balance the global oil market. At the same time,
though, Saudi’s economy is heavily dependent on oil prices, implying that any
price fluctuations can also have significant repercussions for the country itself. The
objective of this paper is to provide insights into what Saudi’s economy looks like
today, whether the country has been affected by the resource-curse phenomenon and
the challenges that lie ahead as the government attempts to transform its economy
to one that depends less on oil. The internal economic and social conditions of the
Kingdom are important not only for itself, but also, indirectly, for the world.
1.3 Methods
To unravel the relationship between trader positions in the futures market and
oil price, linear and Markov-switching vector autoregressions are applied. This
framework is suitable for answering questions of an entirely empirical nature, such as
this one. In the linear vector autoregression (VAR) model that is set up, each variable
is explained by lags of itself and the other variable (plus a constant). The working
procedure involves making decisions about the VAR’s lag structure, the ordering of
the series in the VAR, and any long-term relationship between them, which itself
presupposes knowledge of their degree of integration, i.e whether they have a unit
root or not. The unit root tests employed in the study allow for structural breaks.
In addition, we explore whether a non-linear VAR, in the form of a regime-switching
VAR, provides further information about the interaction of oil prices and traders’
futures positions. Testing a model that permits an additional regime against the
restricted, one-regime model with likelihood ratio statistics can be problematic due
to the presence of a nuisance parameter. Here, the Schwartz Bayesian criterion is
used to select the best model, as there is evidence in the literature that it works well
in these circumstances. Regime-dependent impulse responses are used to quantify
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the impact of shocks to prices or positions.
For the empirical essay on debt sustainability, panel estimation techniques are
employed. We investigate the linear and non-linear effect of debt on economic growth
by applying pooled ordinary least squares (OLS ) and panel fixed-effects. We correct
for endogeneity through the use of instrumental variables. Threshold analysis is
employed to search for the existence of a debt level beyond which debt can adversely
affect growth in resource-rich developing countries. We determine this tipping point
endogenously by including a quadratic functional form for the growth-debt estimation
equation.
A macroeconomic analysis is conducted for the third essay, which focuses on the
impact of oil on Saudi Arabia’s economy and, more specifically, on whether the country
has achieved substantial development for its economy and welfare for its population.
The internal economic and other conditions of Saudi Arabia are, indirectly, important
for the world as the Kingdom has the ability to decrease or increase production levels,
which in turn can affect global oil prices. We study the country’s economic evolution
by analysing the performance of indicators beyond GDP, including parameters
such as GDP per capita, unemployment, life expectancy, education, productivity,
competitiveness, corruption, governance ranking, among others. The work is carried
out on a comparative level, paralleling the Kingdom with similarly structured
economies, such as the rest Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, as well as
other high-income resource-intensive nations, like Canada, Norway and the U.S. The
paper also explores issues related to the nation’s aspiration, as recently proclaimed
by Vision 2030, to be transformed from a hydrocarbon-dependent economy to one
that is much less reliant on oil.
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1.4 Outline
The thesis unfolds as follows. Chapter 2 explores the relationship between trader
futures positions and oil price. It first provides a detailed description of oil futures
markets and outlines the research that has been conducted so far. Following a
detailed discussion of the econometric methods used, results are presented and
findings interpeted. Chapter 3 studies the debt-growth nexus. The theoretical
background of sustainability and the various growth theory models developed are
outlined, based on which the econometric model of the chapter is designed. Existing
findings on the debt-growth and resource wealth-growth correlations are presented,
before this paper’s empirical outcomes are discussed. Chapter 4 provides an analysis
of the economy of Saudi Arabia. In particular it looks at how the country evolved
over the years, whether the Kingdom avoided the resource curse, as well as the
challenges that lie ahead as Saudi Arabia implements its diversification plan, Vision
2030.
CHAPTER 2
Trader Futures Positions and the Price of Oil
2.1 Introduction
Sharp increases in commodity prices often give rise to concerns about a possible
misalignment between the affected commodity’s fundamental value and its price. The
purported misalignment is commonly attributed to speculative activity in commodity
markets. According to this view, the increased inflow of investors’ cash in the futures
markets for crude oil over the last two decades (as shown in Figure 2.1), also known
as the financialisation of oil markets, increases volatility and distorts the price’s
ability to convey information about the fundamental forces of demand and supply.
Statements from Michael Masters and George Soros – both renowned hedge fund
managers, presenting expert testimony to the U.S. Congress – that financial investors
were taking speculative positions which resulted in rising crude oil futures and spot
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prices, also helped strengthen the view that increasing prices, especially between
2003 and 2008, have been facilitated by financialisation.
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Figure 2.1: Open Interest of WTI Crude Oil Futures Contract and Oil Price
Data Sources: CFTC (2018); EIA (2018) – Note: The figure depicts the open interest
of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil futures contract and WTI crude oil
nominal price.
Given the controversial nature of this narrative, it is unsurprising that there has been
extensive research in the relationship between speculation and commodity prices.
Equally predictable is, perhaps, the variety of outcomes reported in the relevant
literature. In a meta-study of 100 research papers, Haase et al. (2016) find that
the number of papers documenting destabilising speculative effects is “about the
same” as the number of papers that do not. In contrast, Boyd et al. (2018) find
little evidence of such effects in the literature and, instead, highlight the more widely
acknowledged beneficial effects of speculative activity, namely the additional liquidity
it brings about.
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In this paper, we confine ourselves to addressing issues pertaining to financialisation in
the oil market and do not consider other commodities, such as agricultural products,
metals, etc. This narrower focus is motivated by considerations of both practicality
and substance. With reference to practicality, it is more straightforward to gather
evidence in favour or against a proposition for a more limited segment of the market.
With reference to substance, the market for oil futures is the largest among all
commodity futures markets by any measure, such as volume and open interest.
Besides, futures oil prices and their relationship with the spot price are of significance
for the world economy, as their informational content constitutes a key input in
a variety of decisions, from business investment to government budgets and regulators.
Indeed, the importance of this public debate has been seen in the tighter constraints
imposed on some commodity trading futures that have not been explicitly used for
hedging purposes, with many European banks also having ceased selling commodity
related products (Haase et al., 2016).
In particular, Michael Masters had contributed to this public unanimity of urging
regulation tightening of oil derivatives by making the following statement:
“Passive speculators are an invasive species that will continue to damage the
markets until they are eradicated. The [Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(henceforth “CFTC” or “Commission”)] must address the issue of passive
speculation; it will not go away on its own. When passive speculators are eliminated
from the markets, then most consumable commodities derivatives markets will no
longer be excessively speculative, and their intended functions will be restored.”
(Masters, 2010)
Along those lines, Joachim von Braun, Director of Germany’s Center for Development
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Research, had supported the following:
“We have good analysis that speculation played a role in 2007 and 2008...
Speculation did matter and it did amplify, that debate can be put to rest. These
spikes are not a nuisance, they kill. They’ve killed thousands of people.”
(Ruitenberg, 2010)
In this study, the relationship between trader positions in the futures market and oil
price is examined in the context of linear and Markov-switching vector autoregressions.
Sentiment in the oil market is captured by the net positions of different categories of
traders. The trading activities of each category is, in general, related to the traders’
underlying business (e.g. production of oil or managing money for clients) and widely
correspond to the hedging of risk or speculation. As such, we consider positions
by both hedgers and speculators on the Brent Crude Futures (BCF) contract of
the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), one of the most liquid futures markets in
the world. The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) is used to decide whether
the additional regime in the Markov-switching setting is warranted by the data
and regime-dependent impulse responses, as in Ehrmann et al. (2003), are used to
quantify the impact of shocks to prices or positions when it is.
The paper unfolds as follows. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 outline the literature review and
provide a detailed description of oil futures markets, covering the main crude oil
contract specifications, trading categories and publication process of futures trading
information, respectively. Section 2.4 delineates the methodology used in the analysis
and section 2.5 implements the several steps in estimating the models and discusses
the findings. Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 What we know so far
The impact of speculation on financial markets has been of interest to economists since
the 19th century1. Prominent economists, such as Hicks, Friedman, Kaldor, Keynes,
Telser and Working, elaborated on it, making it a “subject of rigorous theoretical
analysis” in the second part of the 20th century (Haase et al., 2016). However, it
was the increased involvement of financial investors in the oil market, especially
after 2003, that triggered the extensive public debate about the consequences of
financialisation and drove a vast body of the economic literature looking at this
phenomenon.
Irwin & Sanders (2012) identified three main structural changes that took place
within futures markets and helped in the expanding participation and trading activity.
First, the shift from a 150-year old open-outcry trading mechanism to electronic
trading lowered costs and improved information flow. Second, the technological
wave of advanced communication tools (software, hardware), as well as financial
instruments increased direct and indirect avenues to futures markets. Institutions
and individuals are faced with a huge variety of new products, such as futures,
options, index funds, exchange-traded funds (ETF)2, over-the-counter (OTC) swap
agreements and other structured products, that allow them to invest in commodities
(Irwin & Sanders, 2010; Fattouh & Mahadeva, 2014). Third, the evolvement of
passive investment, with many institutions and pension funds usually adopting a
buy-and-hold behaviour by relying on an indexing approach and having no active
involvement in terms of trading. Tang & Xiong (2012) also mentioned that falling
1The debate can be traced back to 1890s in German speaking Europe, in view of the new Stock
Exchange Law and the regulation of the Berlin Produce Exchange (Haase et al., 2016).
2ETF is a collection of securities, such as equities and bonds, and options, that is traded like
a stock on a stock exchange. ETFs normally aim to replicate the performance of an index or a
commodity.
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returns on other traditional financial assets were another driving force behind this
growing presence.
At about the same time, crude oil prices remained in an upward trend, reaching a
record level of more than $U.S. 140 per barrel by mid-2008. A popular view has
been that rising prices have been facilitated by financialisation. In addition to that,
statements from Michael Masters and George Soros that financial investors were
taking speculative positions, which resulted in increasing futures and spot prices,
also helped strengthen these views.
A general definition about speculation in the physical oil market was given by Kilian
& Murphy (2014) who supported that anyone buying crude oil not for current
consumption but for future use is a speculator from an economic point of view.
Speculators’ motives could be described by their expectations of gaining significant
returns, which implies that when they expect price increases they buy futures
contracts, whereas when they anticipate price decreases they sell them (Cootner,
1967). In this paper, we define speculation as the ‘manipulation’ of prices from the
trading of financial instruments, in order to make profit from the resulting price
movements.
The existing academic research studies different aspects of the relationship between
futures market participants and oil prices. A first strand of research claims that
there is little evidence that commodity prices are affected by speculative activities.
Brunetti et al. (2016) analysed daily positions of both hedge funds and swap dealers
in crude oil, natural gas and corn markets from 2005 to 2009, trying to assess whether
speculators can destabilise financial markets. Using lead-lag and contemporaneous
relations between positions and both market volatility and prices for a number of
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periods when price trends were strong, they found little evidence of an impact. In
contrast, their paper proved that hedge funds help reduce volatility, provide liquidity
and stabilise futures markets. Kim (2015) reached the same conclusion by applying
cross-sectional analysis and GARCH models on a number of agricultural and energy
commodities.
Chen & Chang (2015) looked at the role of positions held by hedgers (producers,
merchants, users), speculators (commodity pool operators, trading advisors, hedge
funds) and swap dealers in the price formation process in agricultural, metal and
energy futures markets. Using the pricing error approach adopted by Hasbrouck
(1993), they documented that speculators and swap dealers have a positive impact on
the efficiency of futures prices as they correct pricing errors and enhance liquidity. In
contrast, the trading activity of hedgers can be less information motivated and harm
market efficiency. Fattouh et al. (2013) reviewed the existent academic literature
supporting that financialisation played a major role in determining crude oil spot
prices between 2003 and 2008, and concluded that there is actually no indication
that speculation was affecting crude oil prices after 2003.
Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin & Harris (2011) used proprietary CFTC data on daily positions of market
participants from 2000 until 2009 to determine any lead-lag relationship between
prices and trading positions in the crude oil futures market. Employing Granger
causality tests, the paper supported that there is no Granger causality from positions
to returns. In contrast, price changes seem to Granger cause positions, arguing that
traditional speculators (hedge funds, floor brokers) and swap dealers are generally
trend followers. Their findings confirm the results of Brunetti & Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin (2009).
Within a Granger causality framework, Stoll & Whaley (2009) studied the effects of
the relation between changes in open interest and prices. The paper revealed that
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there is little or no association between index investment and commodity prices.
Irwin & Sanders (2010) also applied bivariate Granger causality tests to prove any
lead-lag relation between index fund positions and either returns or price volatility
in 14 grain, livestock, soft and energy futures markets from 2006 to 2009. The paper
argued that positions held by index funds do not impact futures markets. To the
contrary, increasing index fund positions contribute to declining market volatility.
Tokic (2012) analysed the participants’ oil futures positions during the 2008 oil
bubble. Using the De Long et al. (1990) theoretical model, he observed the trends
and patterns of the long, short and net long positions. The paper found no indication
of speculation by any group of traders. In particular, the analysis showed that money
managers perfectly “played” the oil bubble, got in early and started selling shortly
before the bubble peak; swap dealers earned while the price of oil was rising, whilst
incurred heavy losses as prices collapsed; and producers were covering their short
positions into the peak of bubble. Sanders et al. (2009) argued that positions for
any group in commodity markets do not consistently cause futures price changes.
Kilian & Murphy (2014) with the help of oil inventories ascribed the 2003/08 oil
price increase to global demand shifts rather than speculative demand changes. A
considerable number of papers worked along those lines. Kilian (2009) decomposed oil
price shocks between oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks and precautionary
demand shocks and concluded that the main driver of oil price changes has mainly
been demand. With respect to oil supply disruptions, Kilian (2008) showed that
they account for only a small quantity of the price fluctuations during crisis periods.
Hamilton (2009b) attributed the oil price increase after the 2003 period to the
scarcity of rents following the strong demand growth from China, the Middle East
and other newly industrialised economies. Also, Hamilton (2009a) supported that
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while physical supply disruption has been historically the major driver of oil price
increases, the 2007/08 oil price jump can be justified by both strong demand and
oil supply stagnation. Similarly, Smith (2009) realised that oil price increases after
2004 can be mainly explained by unexpected demand growth from China and other
developing countries along with a decrease in global oil production. Mu & Ye (2010)
agreed that demand played a crucial role, but they showed no evidence that the
shocks to China’s oil demand have a significant impact on oil prices. Fattouh &
Mahadeva (2014) also argued that the co-movement between spot and futures price
changes reflects common supply-demand fundamentals rather than speculation of oil
markets.
Heidorn et al. (2015) attempted to investigate the extent to which fundamental
traders (producers, merchants, processor, users) and financial participants (swap
dealers, managed money) affect WTI futures curve, as well as the spread between
WTI and Brent between 2006 and 2012. To prove that, they decomposed the term
structure of WTI and Brent-WTI spread into a level, slope and curvature factor.
Then, they employed autoregressive distributed lag models to test how the trading
positions of fundamental and financial traders could affect the term structure. The
paper confirmed that there is no evidence of a systematic impact of financial traders
on the price level, while fundamental traders seem to have a measurable impact on
the level of the futures curve. Finally, they showed that financial traders drive the
WTI-Brent spread.
A second strand of literature challenges the idea that recent changes in oil price
dynamics have been caused by speculative positioning. Kolodziej & Kaufmann (2013)
showed that trader positions play an important role in price discovery, suggesting a
bidirectional adjustment between crude oil prices and trader positions. Singleton
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(2014) investigated the impact of investors’ flows and financial market conditions on
crude oil futures markets. Following the methods of Verleger (2007) and Masters
(2008), Singleton imputed oil futures positions of index investments and examined
the futures spread positions of managed money investors for the period 2006 to
2010. He concluded that there were significant effects of investor flows on futures
prices, and the largest impact was due to the rapid growth of index and managed
money traders around the 2008 boom/bust in oil prices. Gilbert (2010) also tested
whether higher commodity prices recorded during 2006/08 could be attributed to
either speculative behavior – mainly looking at the activity of the commodity trading
advisors and commodity pool operators – or index fund investment. The paper found
limited evidence of speculative bubbles, but it supported that index fund trading
activity might have been responsible for a significant and bubble-like increase of
energy prices. In particular, the paper estimated the maximum price impact of index
funds on these markets at 15 percent, noting that when oil prices jumped to more
than $U.S. 140 per barrel in July 2008, the price might have been around $U.S. 130
per barrel in the absence of index fund trading.
Tang & Xiong (2012) argued that the dramatical increase of index investment in
commodity markets has been accompanied by a significant correlation between prices
of non-energy commodities from 2004 onwards. The trend was firmer for commodities
in two major commodity price indices, the Standard & Poor’s - Goldman Sachs
Commodity Index (S&P-GSCI) and the Dow-Jones - UBS Commodity Index (DJ-
UBSCI). Thus, as a result of the financialisation process, the price of a commodity
is not determined by the market’s fundamentals alone, but it is also affected by
a set of financial factors, such as the risk appetite and the interest of investors
in diversification. Manera et al. (2016) modelled volatility in four energy futures
markets and found that speculation presents a negative and significant sign. Ding
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et al. (2014) examined the relationship between net financial position and crude prices
by employing three types of Granger non-causality tests. Their results provided
evidence of causality from the net financial position to the spot price of crude oil.
On a slightly different approach, Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin et al. (2011) explored whether trading
positions of hedge funds and swap dealers can have an impact on the conditional
probability of switching between bull and bear markets in the crude oil, corn and
mini S&P500 futures markets. Applying Markov-switching models conditioned on
detailed information on traders’ positions between 2003 and 2009, they revealed
that positioning can be useful in predicting whether price trends will continue or
reverse. In particular, the paper inferred that hedge funds add more information to
the probability of switching between bull and bear markets, whereas swap dealers’
positioning is largely unrelated. Similarly, Hamilton & Wu (2015) investigated
whether positions of index investors can predict returns on the near futures contracts.
Although the paper found no evidence of such a relation on the 12 agricultural
commodities, it concluded that positions of crude oil futures markets might help
predict changes in oil futures prices over the period 2006/09. Also, Foster &
Viswanathan (1995) found that past trading volume can predict price changes in
both WTI and Brent crude oil futures markets. Further, Hache & Lantz (2013)
supported the influence of non-commercial traders on the probability for switching
to the “crisis state” when large fluctuation in crude oil prices were recorded.
So far, most of the review has focused on two polarised views to decode the recent
price changes in commodity markets, namely the financialisation and the fundamental
supply-demand relationship. However, Cheng & Xiong (2014) claimed that the truth
should be between these two extreme views, with Kaufmann & Ullman (2009)
proving that the increase in oil prices in early 2008 was a result of both market
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fundamentals and speculation changes. They claimed that higher demand, combined
with unchanged non-OPEC production levels, underpinned oil prices. This change
in market fundamentals, though, was recognised by speculators who, assuming that
prices might increase further, took positions accordingly. That in turn pushed prices
beyond levels justified by the existing supply and demand balance. Juvenal &
Petrella (2015) used a dynamic factor VAR and showed that speculative shocks are
the second most important determinant behind demand shocks. Within the factor
VAR framework, Morana (2012) decomposed oil price changes into macroeconomic
and financial shocks, concluding that the latter contributed to oil prices to a much
larger extent since the mid-2000s.
Kesicki (2010), on the other hand, suggested that the speculation effect during
the 2008 oil bubble was rather small and short-term, compared with fundamental
trends in supply and demand for physical crude oil. Liu et al. (2016) confirmed his
finding by decomposing oil price changes into oil supply shocks, U.S. and China’s
demand shocks, precautionary demand shocks and derivative market speculation
shocks. They used a structural VAR specification and found that oil price responses
to China and the U.S.’s demand shocks were the strongest and most persistent,
accounting for around 70 percent of oil price variations. In contrast, the speculation’s
contribution did not exceed 10 percent of oil price fluctuations. Similarly, Einloth
(2009) argued that speculation drove the increases in oil price changes in the 2007/08
period but the main cause of crash was the anticipated decrease in aggregate demand.
Most of the academic papers reviewed above apply either conventional linear models
or Granger non-causality tests to unravel the relationship between oil futures positions
and oil price. However, both techniques face some limitations. The usual linear
models might fail to capture the behaviour of the series, while the latter may not be
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free from some potential pretest bias as the stationarity of the considered variables
should be evaluated before conducting the test (Ding et al., 2014). This paper
examines the dynamic non-linear relationship between traders’ positioning in crude
oil futures markets and oil prices, offering a unique bidirectional study, whilst at
the same time capturing the regime-switching interaction between the two variables.
Additionally, this study focuses on near-month (or first-month) oil futures price series,
in contrast to other papers which consider spot prices. Several studies have shown that
price discovery3 for crude oil occurs in futures markets (Schwarz & Szakmary, 1994;
Kaufmann & Ullman, 2009; Silve´rio & Szklo, 2012; Kolodziej & Kaufmann, 2013),
which could open a mechanism for the phenomenon of financialisation because many
participants in the futures market usually do not take physical possession of crude oil.
In particular, Kolodziej & Kaufmann (2013) argued that price discovery occurs in
first-month futures markets, with Silve´rio & Szklo (2012) backing that these markets
became more weighty in the price discovery process over 2003-2008. Also, futures
prices are more transparent than spot prices as there is no requirement for public
disclosure of the latter. Further, spot prices are published by price reporting agencies
that use different methodologies (Fattouh, 2011).
2.3 Crude oil futures markets: Overview
The activity of commodity derivatives has been substantially expanded in the last
two decades. Examples of common derivatives are forwards, futures, options, swaps
and contracts-for-difference (CFD). Derivatives are traded on futures exchanges and
OTC markets.
3Price discovery is defined as the ability of a market to promptly translate the arrival of new
information into price changes.
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A futures exchange is a central financial exchange, where people agree to buy or
sell an asset at a certain time in the future for a certain price. There are many
exchanges in the world. Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) Group, which is
comprised of four designated contract markets (DCMs) – CME, Chicago Board
of Trade (CBOT), Commodity Exchange (COMEX) in New York and New York
Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) – is currently the largest futures exchange in the
world. ICE (headquartered in the U.S.), Eurex (based in Germany) and National
Stock Exchange (NSE) (located in India) are following.
Futures markets were initially developed to meet the needs of farmers and merchants,
with futures contracts being traded using the open-outcry system. The latter involved
traders meeting physically on the floor of the exchange, known as the trading pit,
and using a complicated set of hand signals to indicate the trades they would like
to carry out. However, futures exchanges have been gradually expanded, including
metals, energy, currencies, equity indices and interest rate products, while they have
been replacing the open-outcry system by electronic trading. This involves traders
participating by using their computer. Many exchanges throughout the world are
entirely electronic, while futures contracts on CME are traded both electronically
and on the floor.
Crude oil has also active OTC markets used by index funds, hedgers and other
speculators (Irwin & Sanders, 2010). The OTC market, which has become very
popular, is an alternative to exchanges. OTC derivatives are contracts that are
traded directly between two parties, usually two financial institutions or between
a financial institution and one of its clients (corporate treasurer or fund manager),
without going through an exchange and without physically meeting. Trades in the
OTC market are typically much larger than trades in the futures exchange market,
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as contracts are not standardised as those in an exchange. However, credit risk is
higher in the former, where there is a risk that the contract will not be honoured. In
contrast, futures exchanges have been organised in such a way to eliminate all credit
risks.
2.3.1 Contract specifications
Our study focuses on crude oil futures contracts traded on futures exchanges. The
three most liquid crude oil contracts are WTI light sweet crude oil merchandised
on NYMEX, and Brent crude oil and WTI light sweet which are both marketed
on ICE Futures Europe4. In this study, we consider positions by both hedgers and
speculators on the ICE BCF contract, one of the most liquid futures markets in
the world, where limited research has been conducted so far. However, the contract
specifications of the other two crude oils are also discussed for comparative purposes.5
Brent crude oil futures contract on ICE
The ICE Brent crude oil futures contract was developed on IPE, known as ICE today,
in 1988. The contract assigns 1,000 barrels of crude oil for delivery in a certain
time in the future. It is a cash-settled contract, where the value of the position
is assessed relative to the settlement price and a corresponding financial payment
is made. However, there is also the option of physical delivery through Exchange
for Physicals (EFP). The latter enables participants to swap a futures position
with a physical one. The EFP trades as a differential between the futures market
and the underlying physical market. Other trading methods, such as Exchange
4ICE Futures Europe was founded in 1981 as the International Petroleum Exchange (IPE) of
London, and was acquired by ICE in 2001. ICE Futures Europe is the largest regulated energy
futures exchange in Europe and the second largest in the world.
5A summary of the three contracts’ specifications is given in Table 2.1.
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of Futures for Swaps (EFS)6 and Block Trades7, are also available. The contract
allows the delivery of the North Sea Brent-Forties-Oseberg-Ekofisk (BFOE) crude oils.
Contracts are traded for up to 96 consecutive months forward. From March 2016
trading ceases on the last business day of the second month preceding the relevant
contract month, if such a day is a business day. Otherwise, trading terminates the
next preceding business day. For example, a January contract month will expire on
the last business day of November.
WTI light sweet crude oil futures contract on NYMEX
The WTI light sweet crude oil futures contract has been trading on NYMEX since
1983. The contract assigns 1,000 barrels of crude oil to be physically delivered, which
domestic types of crude (WTI, Low Sweet Mix, New Mexican Sweet, North Texas
Sweet, Oklahoma Sweet and South Texas Sweet), as well as foreign types of crude
(Brent Blend, Bonny Light, Qua Iboe, Oseberg Blend and Cusiana). The delivery is
made free-on-board at any pipeline or storage facility at Cushing, Oklahoma in the
U.S. and should hold no earlier than the first calendar day of the delivery month
and no later than the last calendar day of the delivery month.
Contracts are traded for up to 108 months forward. Trading in the current delivery
month expires on the third business day prior to the 25th calendar day of the month
preceding the delivery month. For instance, the January WTI futures contract expires
on the 22nd of December as the 25th calendar day of the month is a non-business
6A privately negotiated transaction in which a position in a physical delivery futures contract is
exchanged for a cash-settled swap position in the same or a related commodity, subject to the rules
of a futures exchange.
7A block trade is a privately negotiated futures, option or combination transaction that is
permitted to be executed apart from the public auction market. Block trades are permitted in
specified products and are subject to minimum transaction size requirements which vary depending
on the product, the type of transaction and the time of execution.
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day.
WTI light sweet crude oil futures contract on ICE
ICE Futures Europe has been delivering WTI light sweet crude oil through the ICE
WTI light sweet crude oil futures contract since February 2006, offering participants
the opportunity to trade WTI crude oil in a European electronic marketplace.
Similarly, the contract specifies 1,000 barrels of crude oil for delivery and it is cash-
settled on a monthly basis against the prevailing market price for U.S. light sweet
crude.
Contracts are traded for up to 108 consecutive months forward. Trading terminates
at the close of business on the fourth U.S. business day prior to the 25th calendar
day of the month preceding the contract month. If the 25th calendar day of the
month is not a U.S. business day, the final trade day shall be the next preceding
business day.
2.3.2 Futures positions
Trading information on ICE’s Brent crude oil futures is stored by ICE Futures Europe,
which is supervised by the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) –
responsible for the monitoring and regulation of all trading activity. Likewise, daily
data of WTI light sweet crude oil traded on the NYMEX futures market, as well as
position information of traders, clearing members, foreign brokers, exchanges and
futures commission merchants (FCM) are all collected by CFTC. The Commission
was granted with regulatory authority over the commodity futures markets upon
its creation as an independent agency in 1974 following the enactment of the U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act.
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Table 2.2: Reporting Levels of Selected Energy Futures Contracts as Set for NYMEX
and ICE Futures Exchanges
ICE Commodity Reportable Contracts
Brent Crude Oil 350
WTI Crude Oil 350
Gas Oil 250
NYMEX Commodity Reportable Contracts
Crude Oil, Sweet 350
Crude Oil, Sweet – No.2 Heating Oil Crack Spread 250
Crude Oil, Sweet – Unleaded Gasoline Crack Spread 150
Natural Gas 200
No.2 Heating Oil 250
Unleaded Gasoline 150
Unleaded Gasoline – No.2 Heating Oil Spread Swap 150
Data Sources: CFR (1938); ICE (n.d.) – Note: The table depicts reporting
levels of selected energy futures contracts (crude oil, natural gas and oil products)
published for ICE and NYMEX futures contracts.
The position information shows traders with end-of-day futures and option positions
above specific levels established by the regulation. The reporting levels vary,
depending on the size of traders’ positions in the commodity market, total open
positions, the size of physical delivery and the history of each market. The reporting
levels of selected energy futures contracts (crude oil, natural gas and oil products)
published for ICE and NYMEX futures markets are shown in Table 2.2. Trading
positions of 350 or more contracts are reported each day for the Brent crude oil
futures contract. Similarly, the reportable threshold for WTI light sweet is defined
at 350 contracts.
Trading information
ICE Futures Europe makes available any trading information in its Commitments
of Traders (COT) reports. Their publication began in June 2011 in an attempt to
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provide additional market transparency of traders’ participation in the markets. ICE
COT reports are designed in line with the format and content of CFTC long format
disaggregated COT reports – henceforth “DCOT” – and are generated and published
on a weekly basis, as of Tuesday of each week.
The Commission has been regularly publishing COT reports since 1962. From 2000
onwards, COT reports have been published weekly. These provide a summary of
traders’ positions for commodity markets as of the close of business on Tuesday in
which at least 20 traders hold positions equal to or above the reporting level.8 In
what is now called the “legacy” form, a COT report used to separate reportable
traders into two broad categories: commercial and non-commercial. The legacy COT
commercial category definition spanned producers, merchants, processors and users
with a commercial interaction or an exposure to a physical commodity and risks
that they seek to hedge in futures markets. It also included commodity swap dealers
using the futures market to offset risks incurred in their over-the-counter commodity
swap business.
Although the Commission classified swap dealers as commercials, their trading
activity may in fact be considered speculative, since it lacks direct exposure to the
underlying commodity (Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin et al., 2011). An in-house staff report published
in September 2008 had already urged the swap dealers’ secession from the commercial
category and the creation of a new swap dealer classification.
Consistent with that, in September 2009, CFTC introduced a less coarse categorisation
of traders, by separating them into four categories: 1) producer / merchant / processor
8Those positions that do not meet the specific reporting limits are also included in the COT
report.
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/ user (henceforth “producers”); 2) swap dealers; 3) money managers9; and 4) other
reportables10. This became the DCOT report.
CFTC COT and DCOT reports are published in both short and long formats
(CME Group, 2018).11 A COT short report includes open interest positions for
both reportable and non-reportable positions. In the case of reportable positions,
additional data is provided, covering commercial and non-commercial holdings12,
spreading13, number of traders, changes from the previous report and percentage
of open interest by category and number of traders. A COT long report further
shows the concentration of positions held by the largest four and eight traders. In
contrast, the short format of a DCOT report shows total open interest held by
the four categories of reportable traders, as well as trading positions, changes from
previous reports, percent of open interest and number of traders for each specific
category of traders. The long format also provides the concentration of positions
held by the largest four and eight traders, as well as the total size of positions held
by non-reportable traders.
The weekly reports are available in two versions: the Futures-Only and the Futures-
and-Options Combined Commitments of Traders. The former shows futures market
open interest only, whereas the latter also reports option positions. Open interest
9Money managers include registered commodity trading advisors and commodity pool operators,
as well as unregistered funds identified by the Commission.
10CFTC decides about each trader’s classification into the different categories based on their self-
reported trading activity on the CFTC Form 40, further information available to the Commission,
as well as conversations with traders. Classification of a trader may change over time.
11ICE Futures Europe does not provide any such formatting.
12CFTC classifies a trader as commercial if the trader uses futures contracts in that particular
commodity for hedging. A trading entity generally gets classified as a “commercial” trader by filing
a statement with the Commission, on CFTC Form 40: Statement of Reporting Trader, that it is
commercially “...engaged in business activities hedged by the use of the futures or option markets”.
(CME Group, 2018)
13The extent to which each non-commercial trader holds equal long and short futures positions.
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is aggregated across all contract expiration months. For the Futures-and-Options
Combined report, option open interest and traders’ option positions are calculated
on a futures-equivalent basis using delta14 factors provided by exchanges. Long-
call and short-put open interest are converted to long futures-equivalent open
interest. Likewise, short-call and long-put open interest are converted to short
futures-equivalent open interest. For example, a trader holding a long-put position
of 500 contracts with a delta factor of 0.50 is considered to be holding a short
futures-equivalent position of 250 contracts. A trader’s long and short futures-
equivalent positions are added to the trader’s long and short futures positions to
give “combined-long” and “combined-short” positions. (CME Group, 2018)
Commodity Index Traders supplement
In addition to COT reports, the CFTC initiated the publication of the weekly
Commodity Index Traders (CIT)15 supplement to COT in January 2007 in an
attempt to provide additional information on index investment. The index trader
category includes swap dealers that do commodity index business, as well as pension
and other investment funds that, instead of going through a swap dealer, place their
index investment directly into the futures market. CIT reports describe combined
Futures-and-Options positions of commercial, non-commercial and index traders in
12 agricultural commodities, including corn, soybeans, wheat and soybean oil on
CBOT; wheat on Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBT); cotton no.2, coffee C, sugar
no.11 and cocoa on the U.S. ICE Futures; and live cattle, lean hogs and feeder cattle
on CME.
Energy or metals futures markets are not included in the report due to doubts over the
14The delta term is defined as the rate of change of the option price with respect to the price of
the underlying asset.
15ICE Futures Europe does not produce any such report.
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accuracy of the information about firms engaged in commodity index trading activity.
More specifically, many swap dealers enter into other OTC derivative transactions in
addition to their commodity index-related OTC activity. Also, some swap dealers are
engaged in cash markets. Hence, the futures positions of these market participants
reflect their overall positions in various markets and derivative transactions, and not
necessarily their hedging activity of OTC commodity index transactions in particular.
Thus, including those futures positions would not accurately reflect the index trading
activity for energy and metals markets. In the case of the agricultural futures markets,
the positions of the index traders mainly reflect hedges related to their index-based
trades (although that is becoming less true over time). Sanders & Irwin (2011) argue
that calculations from CFTC (2008) indicate that for commodities, such as wheat,
over 90 percent of the swap dealer long positions represent index traders, compared
with crude oil markets where it may be as low as 41 percent. In energy futures
markets, pension and investment funds are classified as managed money or other
reportables in DCOT reports.
2.3.3 Potential limitations of COT reports
The Commitments of Traders report contains useful information providing a unique
perspective of futures markets. However, it is worth mentioning that COT data are
lacking along some dimensions, including:
• A trader’s classification may differentiate over time. A market participant may
change the way it uses the markets or trade more/less commodities, etc. These
changes might have an impact on the different trading classifications, as well
as the commodities merchandised.
• The classification of traders is less clear-cut (Kolodziej & Kaufmann, 2013).
For example, participants of NYMEX futures markets are mainly self-classified
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into the various trading categories based upon Form 40 disclosures, with
some exercise of judgement occasionally taking place from the part of the
Commission. CFTC classifies traders not their trading activity. For example,
the Commission staff will know that a trader is a “producer” but they cannot
know with certainty that all of that trader’s activity is hedging, as some of them
might engage in some swaps activity. Ederington & Lee (2002) revealed that
in the futures market for heating oil, most traders whom the CFTC identifies
as non-commercials are indeed speculators, but many in the commercial group
appear to be speculators, too.
• Another potential limitation is the data frequency as reports are released on
a weekly basis. Daily data on traders’ positions is available, but is kept for
internal only use (i.e. CFTC’s Daily Large Trader Reporting System (LTRS)16).
• Limited information and guidance with respect to “Other reportables” category
is currently provided. According to Tokic (2012), the term “other” is too
ambiguous and deserves more attention.
• Regarding the CFTC pulication of COT reports, historical data are provided
for the DCOT report back to June 13, 2006. However, the Commission does not
maintain a history of positions between June 2006 and September 2009, and
thus recent classifications had to be used to categorise them for each reportable
trader. As a result, this approach might reduce the data’s accuracy as it goes
further back in time.
16The LTRS data is more detailed than that included in the simple COT reports. In particular,
each reporting trader is classified into one of 28 trading categories, rather than a few as published
by COT reports. The LTRS data, recorded on a daily basis rather than a weekly one, is also
contract-specific, allowing the traders’ activities to be disentangled at different contract maturities.
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2.4 A first look at the data
The dataset of this study spans the period between 4 January 2011, the year when
ICE Futures Europe started publishing for the first time the relevant dissagregated
trading information, and 1 May 2018. That gives us 383 weekly observations to work
with. We collect data for Brent oil first-month price17 and the ICE BCF contract,
where limited research has been conducted so far. Most of the current literature
focuses on NYMEX BCF. ICE BCF is a deeply liquid futures contract. It had an
open interest of less than 900 thousand contracts in early 2011, but soon became the
most actively traded crude oil contract, where open interest reached more than 2.5
million contracts by early May 2018, thus making it a market worth investigating.
The widely used classification method, which is facilitated by the fact that weekly
COT reports classify traders as commercial and non-commercial, considers speculators
and hedgers as non-commercial and commercial traders, respectively (Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin
& Harris, 2011; Alquist & Gervais, 2013; Ding et al., 2014; Li et al., 2016). This
paper adopts the same classification and uses the commercial and non-commercial
categories to capture the behaviour of hedging and speculation, accordingly. From
Table 2.3, we can see that the legacy commercial segment of the market (producers
and swap dealers’ positions) is on average 135 thousand contracts short (net), whereas
the legacy non-commercial segment (overwhelmingly consisting of positions in the
managed money category) is on average 213 thousand contracts long (net).
The legacy commercials’ net position is the result of an average net short position
of more than 400 thousand contracts by producers and a net long position of 265
17This study focuses on first-month oil futures price series, in contrast to other papers which
consider spot prices. Several studies have shown that price discovery for crude oil occurs in futures
markets. For further information see page 20.
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thousand contracts by swap dealers. Producers’ net positions in the sample are
negative, whereas swap dealers’ net positions are positive (see Figure 2.2).18 These
are typical characteristics of a commodity futures market. A producer expecting
to sell oil in the future, ‘locks in’ the price (subject to basis risk) by entering short
positions.19 In contrast, swap dealers hedge their risk from their activities in the
swap market by taking long positions in the futures market.20 The bottom graph
in Figure 2.2 confirms that the non-commercial segment of the market more or less
coincides with managed money, as other reportable positions are very small in size.
2.4.1 Market participants
Managed money traders
A money manager is a registered commodity trading advisor (CTA)21, a registered
commodity pool operator (CPO)22, or an unregistered23 fund identified by CFTC,
who manages and conducts organised futures trading on behalf of their clients. Hedge
funds are usually included in the latter category, regardless of whether they are
18This is also confirmed in Mixon et al. (2018) who report that commercials are short in both
futures and swaps markets. Financial-end users are long in both markets.
19For example, if a producer expects to sell 1,000 barrels of oil to a client in six months’ time at
the spot price, they can short a six-month futures contract for the delivery of 1,000 barrels of oil.
Assuming that the spot and futures prices of oil fully converge at delivery date, any increases in the
spot price will be offset by the loss in the futures position and any reductions in the spot price will
be offset by the profit in the futures position. The producer effectively receives the current futures
price for delivery of oil to the client (the futures position is closed out without making delivery).
Non convergence of the spot and futures prices at delivery to the client gives rise to basis risk.
20A swap dealer would typically sell a swap to a client requiring certainty over their outgoings.
For example, an oil-consuming firm agrees to pay a fixed amount per barrel of oil to the swap dealer
and receive the spot price per barrel of oil for a period of time. The risk has now been transferred
from the firm’s liabilities to the firm’s asset side. The swap dealer now has liability risk, which it
can offset through long positions in oil futures.
21A commodity trading advisor is an individual or organisation, whose services are related to
trading in futures contracts, commodity options and swaps to funds or individual clients.
22A commodity pool operator is an individual or organisation that receives funds to use in the
operation of a commodity pool, investment trust or other similar fund for trading in commodity
futures, swaps and options.
23An unregistered fund may have a Part 4 exclusion from CPO/CTA or may be a non-U.S. entity
that is unregistered (CFTC, 2018).
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Figure 2.2: ICE Brent Crude Oil Net Futures Positions and Brent Oil First-Month
Price
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registered. These market participants use futures markets to earn higher rates of
returns. They provide effective diversification of their clients’ investment portofolios
and use a number of risk management tools to minimize volatility and enhance
profits. In return, they usually charge a management fee, while some of them also
ask for a performance fee.
Managed money traders are considered as speculators, entering on the opposite side
of producers due to their nature of pursuing profit out of favourable price movements.
However, these market participants typically bring information into the futures
markets as they apply complicated modelling techniques for trading (Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin
et al., 2011). They also enhance price discovery as they gather information about
the underlying commodities (Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin & Harris, 2011) and provide the bulk of
market liquidity, which allows other market participants to enter and exit in an
efficient manner.
Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin & Harris (2011) find a positive and significant relationship between price
changes and net positions held by money managers, with this trend being stronger
on long positions (Jickling & Austin, 2011). Hence, their net positions move in the
same direction as prices. In other words, when crude oil prices increase, managed
money traders tend to buy. But when prices fall, they tend to increase their short
positions (sell).
Money managers accumulated a record net long position of more than 600 thousand
contracts in BCF contracts by mid-April 2018, with a notional value of about $40
billion (see Figure 2.3). Traders’ long positions on ICE kept their upward momentum
over the entire sample period, as seen in Figure 2.4, with positions moving from 130
thousand contracts to 600 thousand contracts.
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Figure 2.3: Managed Money Net Positions on ICE Brent Crude Oil Futures Contract
and Brent Oil First-Month Price
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Figure 2.4: Managed Money Long and Short Positions on ICE Brent Crude Oil
Futures Contract
Trader Futures Positions and the Price of Oil 38
Swap dealers
A swap dealer is an entity that predominantly deals in swaps for a commodity and
uses the futures markets to manage or hedge the price exposure associated with either
their OTC business or their swap transactions with commodity index traders. In
other words, the swap dealer, often attached to a bank or large financial institution,
acts as a bridge between OTC and futures markets. Figure 2.5 illustrates how risk is
usually transferred between futures and swap markets.
End UserSwap Dealers
Futures
Markets
Short Tenor
Medium
Tenor
Long Tenor
Figure 2.5: Risk Transfer between Futures and Swaps Markets
Source: Mixon et al. (2018)
In the preliminary survey conducted by CFTC in 2008 to analyse the total OTC and
index trading, it was shown that of the total net notional value of funds invested in
commodity indices on 30 June 2008 in the U.S. market, approximately 24 percent
was held by index funds, 42 percent by institutional investors, 9 percent by sovereign
wealth funds and 25 percent by other traders. The other category was reportedly
made up of retail investor holding ETFs, exchange-traded notes (ETN)24 and similar
24Exchange-traded notes are unsecured debt obligations of financial institutions. The return on
an ETN is based on the performance of a reference index or benchmark, such as security indices
or indices tied to emerging markets, commodities, an industry sector (e.g. oil and gas pipelines),
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instruments that are publicly traded.
Swap agreements have become a particularly popular vehicle as they are more
attractive compared to futures contracts. Although futures markets offer a high
degree of liquidity due to the high number of participants, they lack flexibility. They
involve more standardised contracts, which might not precisely meet the needs of
market participants. In contrast, swaps are not exchange-traded instruments and
have the ability to offer contracts with tailored terms to their clients.
Additionally, transactions through swap dealers can help bring both over-the-counter
and commodity index order flows, as well as rich private information into the
organised exchange, while their net OTC positions also reflect distilled information
from knowledgeable clients (Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin et al., 2011; Chen & Chang, 2015).25
According to Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin & Harris (2011), the correlation between swap dealers’
positions in nearby contracts and price movements is zero due to the nature of
their investment, implying that they do not react to short-term price movements.
However, despite this prior belief that swap dealers would transact longer-term
contracts, Mixon et al. (2018) showed that 71 percent of WTI swaps (the vast
majority) had a tenor less than one year, whilst swap positions with tenors of one
to two years accounted for another 21 percent of the open interest. The remaining
eight percent was for positions of two years or more.
Over the sample period of this study, swap dealers’ positions remained net long
foreign currencies or other assets. Whilst both ETNs and ETFs are typically designed to follow
benchmarks, trade and settle on an exchange, and can be used to go long or short on an asset, they
differ in the following: ETFs are open-ended funds, while ETNs have a maturity.
25There might be, though, the possibility that swap dealers mimic the positions of CITs (Irwin
& Sanders, 2012; Tokic, 2012).
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Swap Dealers Net Position Oil Price (right axis)
00
0'
s 
of
 C
on
tr
ac
ts
U
.S. D
ollars per B
arrel
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Figure 2.6: Swap Dealers Net Positions on ICE Brent Crude Oil Futures Contract
and Brent Oil First-Month Price
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Figure 2.7: Swap Dealers Long and Short Positions on ICE Brent Crude Oil Futures
Contract
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(Figure 2.6), with long positions stepping up from 180 thousands to 480 thousands
(Figure 2.7).
Box 1: Commodity Index Traders
CITs emerged in 2000 and is a new class of traders, who are seeking
diversification of their portfolios by investing in commodities. In practice, they
follow the path of an index of commodities by acquiring index swap contracts
from swap dealers, rather than taking long positions in individual commodity
futures. The most widely followed index benchmarks are S&P-GSCI and
DJ-UBSCI.
S&P-GSCI is a world production-weighted commodity index. Each commodity
included in the index is determined by the average quantity of world
production in the last five years. S&P-GSCI contains 24 commodities from
all commodity sectors: six energy products, five industrial metals, eight
agricultural products, three livestock products and two precious metals. On
the other hand, commodity weightings in DJ-UBSCI are based on production
and liquidity, while the index consists of 20 commodities. DJ-UBSCI aims
to promote a diversified representation of commodity markets by adding
weighting restrictions. No related group of commodities constitutes more than
33 percent of the index and no single commodity constitutes more than 15
percent. In contrast, S&P-GSCI is largely exposed to the energy sector. The
table below summarises the commodities’ market value target weights by
sector in S&P-GSCI and DJ-UBSCI for 2018.
Investors’ demand for CITs is driven by commodities’ negative correlation
Trader Futures Positions and the Price of Oil 42
with traditional investments (Greer, 2000; Gorton & Rouwenhorst, 2004; Erb
& Harvey, 2006). That can be partly explained by the inflation factor. During
periods of rising inflation, traditional assets, such as bonds and stocks, perform
poorly, whereas commodities fare better. Rising inflation implies increased
demand for goods and services, which in turn indicates higher demand for
commodities used in the production of the former. Hence, commodity returns
are often positively correlated with inflation, a fact that helps investors hedge
against rising inflation.
Sector S&P-GSCI DJ-UBSCI
Agriculture 18.25% 30.04%
Energy 58.58% 30.43%
Industrial Metals 10.91% 17.53%
Precious Metals 4.73% 15.62%
Livestock 7.53% 6.39%
Data Source: Berkenkopf (2017); Bloomberg (2017)
Note: The table summarises the commodities’ market value target weights by
sector in S&P-GSCI and DJ-UBSCI indices for 2018.
Producers/merchants/processors/users
The updated DCOT reports define a “producer/merchant/processor/user” as an
entity that gets involved in the production, processing, packing or consumption of a
physical commodity and uses futures markets to manage or hedge risks associated
with those activities. Traders that fall under this category are often considered
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traditional hedgers and are primarily short, consistent with their hedging objectives26.
Producers/merchants are expected to liquidate their positions when hedging because
this reduces their exposure to the risk of falling commodity prices. Thus, by being
short, they can ‘lock in’ a price for their product. In contrast, users should be
long when hedging as that would reduce their exposure to the risk of rising prices.
Therefore, we could assume that long positions in the reports represent primarily
users, whilst short positions could be attributed to producers/merchants’ trading
activities. In this study, when referring to ‘producers’, positions of merchants and
users are also included.
Producers accumulated a record net short positioning in BCF of about 900 thousand
contracts by early May 2018, becoming the largest category in the ICE BCF contract
(Figure 2.8). The latter reveals Brent crude’s significance as a hedging tool for this
particular futures market. In particular, short positions jumped from 550 thousand
contracts to more than 1.5 million by early May 2018 (Figure 2.9).
Other reportables
Every other reportable trader, not placed into one of the above groups, enters the
“Other reportables” category. The category typically includes institutional money
managers, such as pension funds, insurance companies and sovereign wealth funds
(Mixon et al., 2018). Other reportables is also the default category for the positions
26To better understand the concept of hedging, we could consider a company that knows it will
gain $U.S. 5,000 for each one cent increase in the price of a commodity over the next six months
and lose $U.S. 5,000 for each one cent decrease in the price during the same period. To hedge,
the company should take a short futures position that is designed to offset this risk. The futures
position should lead to a loss of $U.S. 5,000 for each one cent increase in the price during the period
and gain $U.S. 5,000 for each one cent decrease. Assuming that the price of the commodity goes
down, the gain on the futures position offsets the loss on the rest of the company’s business. If the
price moves up, the loss on the futures position is offset by the gain on the rest of the company’s
business.
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Figure 2.8: Producers Net Positions on ICE Brent Crude Oil Futures Contract and
Brent Oil First-Month Price
Long Short
00
0'
s 
of
 C
on
tr
ac
ts
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
250
500
750
1000
1250
1500
1750
Figure 2.9: Producers Long and Short Positions on ICE Brent Crude Oil Futures
Contract
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of participants whose main activity is not publicly-available. For example, a high-
frequency trader or proprietary trading houses27 are included in this classification.
Trading behaviour of the other reportable category is shown by Figures 2.10 and
2.11.
2.5 Methodology
To untangle the relationship between the oil price and traders’ futures positions, we
set up a VAR model, where each variable is explained by lags of itself and the other
variable (plus a constant). This framework is suitable in answering questions of an
entirely empirical nature, such as this one – albeit they can also be used in different
settings as well, e.g. for testing theoretical models with the appropriate structure
put in place.
Our working procedure involves making decisions about the VAR’s lag structure,
the ordering of the series in the VAR, and any long-term relationship between them,
which itself presupposes knowledge of their degree of integration, i.e whether they
have a unit root or not. In addition, we explore whether a non-linear VAR, in the
form of a regime-switching VAR, provides further information about the interaction
of oil prices and traders’ futures positions. Ultimately, with the ‘right’ model in place
we want to answer the two following questions: First, by how much and in what
direction do traders’ positions change as a result of a dollar increase in the price of
oil? And, second, by how much and in what direction does the price of oil change as
a result of an increase in traders’ positions by 1,000? Do these results differ across
regimes and are the relationships statistically and economically significant?
27Proprietary trading houses are large financial institutions – usually brokerage firms or investment
banks – that use the organisation’s own capital to conduct financial transactions, rather than the
capital of their clients. These trades might be speculative in nature.
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Figure 2.10: Other Reportables Net Positions on ICE Brent Crude Oil Futures
Contract and Brent Oil First-Month Price
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2.5.1 Unit root tests
In order to obtain a clearer picture about the series and inform the subsequent
analysis, we conduct a number of Lagrange Multiplier (LM) unit root tests. The
null hypothesis of a unit root is first tested using Schmidt & Phillips (1992). This is
similar to a Dickey & Fuller (1979, 1981) test but features a different parameterisation,
which allows for a trend under both the null and the alternative hypotheses. We use
a general-to-specific approach to select the number of lags in the regression, allowing
for a maximum of three quarters of observations (13 weeks). Results shown in the
first column of Table 2.4 indicate a rejection of the null at the five percent level for
managed money, producers, other reportables and non-commercials. The null of a
unit root cannot be rejected for swap dealers, commercials and the oil price.
We explore the non-stationarity of these series further by accounting for structural
breaks. The apparent break in the price of oil in 2014 (Figure 2.2) can serve as
an example: how does a break in the level of a series influence the unit root test
outcome? Of course, not all breaks are easily identifiable by looking at the plot of
a variable against time. Breaks may be more nuanced and relate not just to the
level of a series but also to its trend. When several series are involved, as is the case
here, it is therefore preferable not to treat the break as known, but rather look for
procedures that allow any breaks to be identified endogenously.
Suitable LM tests to check for unit roots in the presence of (endogenously determined)
structural breaks have been devised by Lee & Strazicich (2003, 2004). Breaks are
allowed under both the null and alternative hypotheses, which means that rejection
of the null (of a unit root with breaks) constitutes clear statistical evidence of trend
stationarity. Results from these tests for one and two breaks – in level or in both level
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and trend – are presented in Table 2.4. Accounting for a single break in level allows
the rejection of the null for commercials. With two breaks in both level and trend,
the null is also rejected for the price of oil. The positions of swap dealers represent
the only series for which the presence of breaks does not alter the conclusion of
non-stationarity derived from the unit root test without breaks.
2.5.2 Setting up the VAR model
Given the unit root test results, we set up four VARs, each one featuring the oil
price and the net positions of one of the trader classifications.28 The oil price is
expressed in U.S. dollars, whereas trader positions are in thousands of contracts. A
two-variable VAR with p lags can be succinctly expressed as:
yt = c + Φ1yt−1 + Φ2yt−2 + . . .+ Φpyt−p + εt (2.1)
where yt is a (2× 1) vector containing the values of oil price and trader positions at
time t; c is a (2 × 1) vector of constants; Φk is a (2 × 2) matrix of autoregressive
coefficients for k = 1, 2, . . . , p; and εt ∼ i.i.d N(0,Ω). In order to obtain estimates of
c, Φ and Ω from this system of equations, we need to decide on the number of lags,
p. This task is simplified by the fact that the Akaike, Schwartz and Hanan-Quinn
criteria all indicate a lag length of 2, irrespective of the variable ordering. Henceforth,
the analysis will be carried out with p = 2.
The moving average representation of a stationary VAR (i.e. a VAR with constant
mean and variance) can be used to construct impulse responses. We will use these
to address our research questions directy. A stationary VAR can be written as:
28These include the producers, swap dealers and managed money categories – but not other
reportables, given the small size of positions in this category. They also include legacy commercials
(i.e. the sum of the positions of producers and swap dealers) because we want to investigate the
possible implications of the CFTC’s – and further the ICE’s – decision to disaggregate this category.
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yt = µ+
∞∑
s=0
Ψsεt−s (2.2)
where, for p = 2, µ = (I2 −Φ1 −Φ2)−1; and ε is an innovation process for y.29 To
see the relationship between Ψ in (2.1) and Φ in (2.2), we define a (4 × 4) block
matrix30
F =
Φ1 Φ2
I2 0

It holds that Ψs is the (2× 2) upper left block – more generally, rows 1 through n
and columns 1 through n – of matrix F raised in the sth power.31 A plot of the row
i, column j element of this matrix is the impulse response function and shows the
effect of a unit increase in the jth variable’s innovation at time t on the value of the
ith variable at time t+ s. So, an impulse response function is a plot of ∂yi,t+s/∂εjt
against s.
From the assumptions of (2.1), we know that the errors are uncorrelated over
time or with lagged values of y. In order to obtain meaningful impulse responses,
we also need to orthogonalise the innovations (i.e. we need to ensure that the
errors are contemporaneously uncorrelated across equations). One way to do this
is via the Choleski factorisation, which involves finding the unique solution A (a
lower triangular matrix with positive elements along the principal diagonal) to the
factorisation problem AA′ = Ω (which is a symmetric, positive-definite matrix) and
inverting it. Then, the new innovations are:
νt = A
−1εt (2.3)
29Note that Ψ0 = I.
30More generally, the block matrix is (np× np), where n is the number of equations in the VAR
and p is the order of the VAR.
31For more details, see Chapters 10 and 11 in Hamilton (1994).
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and E (νtν
′
t) = I. The diagonal elements of A are the standard errors of the two
equations’ regression residuals.
The Choleski factorisation, and consequently the impulse responses, depend on the
ordering of the variables in the VAR. Of course, given our research questions and with
only two equations in each VAR model, it is straightforward to estimate each system
of equations twice: one with the oil price first, and one with the oil price second.
Indeed, this is what we do. However, and in addition, we also infer a ‘benchmark’
ordering of the variables from the data using statistical methods.
First, we examine the variance decompositions of the series from estimated VARs
with alternative orderings. In all four VAR systems, the bulk of the variance
is attributed to whichever variable is placed first and, thus, this method is not
informative for our purposes. In contrast, the second approach – Granger causality
tests – is more elucidating. Here, in three of the systems, we can reject the hypothesis
that the estimated oil price coefficients are collectively zero in the equation where
trader positions is the dependent variable but cannot reject the hypothesis that the
coefficients of trader positions are collectively zero in the oil price equation. The
system with the swap dealers is an exception, as we can reject both null hypotheses.
Still, the F statistic for the oil price coefficients being zero is more than five times as
large as the respective statistic for the positions statistic. Hence, from a statistical
perspective, it is sensible to place the oil price variable first followed by the trader
positions variable. We call the VAR system with this ordering of the variables the
‘benchmark’ model.
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2.5.3 Regime-switching VAR
The parameters of the model outlined so far are constant. It is possible, however, that
there are regime changes in the process over time that are driven by an unobserved
variable. We will assume that the latter follows a two-state Markov chain, that is,
the probability of the unobserved variable being in one ‘regime’ or the other depends
only on where it was in the most recent period, i.e. whether it was in the same regime
or the other.32 We allow all parameters of the model (the mean, autoregressive
parameters and variance) to be regime-specific and estimate the model with Bayesian
methods. The VAR becomes:
yt = cm + Φ1,myt−1 + Φ2,myt−2 + Bmεt (2.4)
where m = 1, 2 and εt ∼ N(0,Ωm) and Bm is a matrix that makes Ωm regime-
dependent.
In addition to the additional model parameters of a second regime, we also need to
estimate the (exogenous and constant) transition probabilities, i.e. the probability
of switching to regime 2 (conditional on being in regime 1) and switching to regime
1 (conditional on being in regime 2). The new parameters may add to the predictive
ability of the model but they also add to its complexity. We need a method to test
the regime-switching VAR against the linear model.
2.5.4 Choosing the number of regimes
The problem is that likelihood ratio tests, that could otherwise be used for model
selection, are not suitable for choosing the number of regimes as regularity conditions
32Markov-switching models were pioneered by Hamilton (1989, 1990, 1996). Krolzig (1997)
extended this class of models to a VAR framework.
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on which the χ2 distribution relies fail here because of the presence of a ‘nuisance’
parameter, which does not exist under the null (Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter, 2006, ch. 4, pp.
114-5). One possibility is to use the test introduced by Davies (1987), as implemented
by Garcia & Perron (1996). The latter, though, makes assumptions that may turn
out to be quite restrictive so we opt for using BIC instead.
There is evidence (Leroux, 1992) that minimising BIC does not lead to a model
with fewer regimes than the true model’s, i.e. it does not underestimate the model’s
dimensions. Practically, one can confidently prefer a two-regime model to a one-
regime model if the former has a lower BIC.33 In addition, Roeder & Wasserman
(1997) find that BIC does not overestimate the number of regimes either. Only in
one of the 10 models they simulate the BIC selects a greater dimension than the true
model.
The criterion in a regime-switching, multivariate setting can be expressed as:
BICm = −2logLm +m
[
NeqNreg +
Neq(Neq + 1)
2
+ 1
]
log(Nobs) (2.5)
where logLm is the log likelihood from the model with m ≥ 2 regimes, Neq is the
number of endogenous variables (equations) in the VAR, Nreg represents the number
of regressors in each equation and Nobs is the number of observations.
A lower BIC indicates a better tradeoff between goodness of fit, captured by the first
part of Equation (2.5), and parsimony, captured by the second part. The latter is a
function of the dimension of the model, which can be broken down into mNeqNreg,
the total number of regressors in the system, mNeq(Neq + 1)/2, the total number of
33Leroux & Puterman (1992) is an example of the application of different criteria, including the
BIC, in the estimation of mixing distributions.
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variances and covariances to be estimated, and m, which represents the number of
transition probabilities. The latter does not appear under the null hypothesis and
constitutes the nuisance parameter here. Since we want to minimise BIC, higher
model dimensions incur a penalty. This means that adding an extra regime to a
VAR may not compare favourably to a non-switching VAR if the increase in the
goodness of fit is more than offset by the dimensionality penalty.
2.5.5 Estimation and regime-dependent impulse responses
Finally, we produce regime-dependent impulse response functions (Ehrmann et al.,
2003). As noted previously, we use Bayesian methods (Gibbs sampling) to estimate
the switching VAR, as this type of estimation does not rely on asymptotic normality.
From a more practical perspective, it also allows the generation of error bands for
the impulse responses without the need to resort to more complicated bootstrapping
methods. The chain is initialised by guessing the regimes (using the standardised
residuals for oil price). Conditional on the guess regimes and the priors, we draw the
various parameters of the model and eventually re-draw the regimes themselves.
We do not have a particular prior for the common variance and, hence, we choose
a non-informative one. This does not introduce any problems, as the series are
long enough to provide sufficient information on the common variance. In contrast,
a non-informative prior may be problematic for the regime-dependent variances,
as, during the Gibbs sampling process, there may be instances in which a regime
may have few data points making the sampled variance unreliable. This is a more
conspicuous issue in a multivariate setting. For these variances, a ‘hierarchical’
prior is used instead, which eliminates the problem as it tends to shrink the regime
variances to a common value. The common variance-covariance matrix is drawn
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from a Wishart distribution, whereas the regime-dependent ones are drawn from the
inverse Wishart. We expect the regimes to show some persistence and use (weak)
Dirichlet priors to reflect that. Finally, the regressor priors are non-informative.
With the regime guesses and priors in place, we initiate the Gibbs sampler to simulate
the posterior distribution:
p(m,θ|y) ∝ p(y|m,θ)p(m|θ)p(θ) (2.6)
where m = (m1,m2, . . . ,mT ) is a vector with the regime classification for time
observations t = 1, 2, . . . , T , θ = (cm,Φ1,m,Φ2,m,Ωm, ξ) are the regime-specific
parameters (ξ represents the transition probabilities matrix).
We perform 7,000 replications (of which we discard the first 2,000 as burn-in) of the
following process: draw the variances conditional on the regression coefficients and
regime classification (first draw the common variance-covariance matrix given the
regime-dependent variance-covariance matrices and then draw the regime-dependent
matrix given the common one); draw the regression coefficients conditional on the
variance-covariance matrices and the regimes; finally, (re)draw the regimes and
transition probabilities. The average sampled values of the elements of θ have
converged to the true means of the joint distribution.
With the model’s estimated parameters obtained from the Gibbs sampling process
just described, the regime-dependent impulse responses of variable i to an innovation
in variable j over a period of time s can be expressed as:
∂yi,t+s
∂εjt
∣∣∣∣
m
(2.7)
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As discussed earlier, a Choleski factorisation has been used. Variables’ responses to
own innovations have been standardised to one.
2.6 Results
The regimes are split based upon the variance of the oil price, since it enters all
VARs. The time-varying probability of the system being in the low-variance regime
is shown for producers, swap dealers, managed money and legacy commercials in
Figure 2.12. With the exception of swap dealers, we can see that the probabilities
follow a similar pattern defining an initial high-volatility regime until the last quarter
of 2012, followed by a low-volatility regime that lasts until autumn 2014, which in
turn is followed by a more unsettled period up to the end of 2015 / beginning of
2016. The system enters a tranquil period after that.
This confirms that choosing the variance of oil price to define the regimes is sensible
and provides an early indication that, in the majority of cases, a Markov-switching
VAR may be more appropriate for modelling the dynamic relationship between
the oil price and trader positions than a non-switching VAR. Indeed, the results
for producers, managed money and legacy commercials in Table 2.5 are consistent
with this observation. In these cases, the BIC is minimised when allowing a second
regime.34
34The BIC statistic for our two-variable VAR with two regimes and two lags (plus an intercept
in each equation) with 381 usable observations is
BIC2 = −2logL2 + 2×
[
2× 5 + 2× (2 + 1)
2
+ 1
]
log(381).
With m = 1, the BIC is
BIC1 = −2logL1 + 1×
[
2× 5 + 2× (2 + 1)
2
]
log(381)
and the nuisance parameter disappears.
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The second regime is characterised by greater oil price volatility – but lower volatility
of the trader positions – and is almost as persistent as the first regime, even though
it tends to have a shorter duration.
The picture for swap dealers is very different, as there are very few instances where
the system is in the high-volatility regime. This is clear from the relevant graph in
Figure 2.12 and confirmed by the findings reported in Table 2.5. The probability of
remaining in the second regime once entering it is very low at 57 percent, something
also confirmed by the very low duration (one week on average). It comes as no
surprise that the BIC is minimised by the non-switching model.
Having established that a switching model is preferred for the VARs involving
producers, managed money and legacy commercials, whereas a non-switching VAR is
preferred for the VAR involving swap dealers, we show the relevant impulse responses
for the benchmark ordering in Figure 2.13. The responses from the VAR featuring
producers’ positions are plotted in Figure 2.13a and show that a one U.S. dollar shock
increases short positions (or reduces long ones) by about 7,500 contracts (on impact)
in the low-volatility regime and by around 2,500 contracts in the high-volatility
regime. The more aggressive reaction of producers’ positions in regime 1 makes sense,
as a one-dollar shock is more potent when prices don’t move much. In contrast,
in times of higher price volatility the same one-dollar shock has less potential to
surprise hedgers who may already have built their positions accordingly. The effect
of the unexpected rise in the oil price lasts for about two months in regime 1 but
fades rather quickly in regime 2.
Swap dealers positions, whose responses are not regime-dependent, also move in
the same direction, as a result of a shock to the oil price. Swap dealers appear to
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increase their short positions (or reduce their long ones) by about 1,000 contracts
within two weeks after the price increase – see Figure 2.13b. The modest response
increases to about 3,000 short contracts in the weeks following the price shock. It
is interesting to note, that even though the net positions of swap dealers are long
in our sample – in contrast to the short positioning of producers – they behave like
producers in response to an oil price shock.35
In contrast to producers’ and swap dealers’ reactions, managed money add to their
long positions in response to the dollar increase, as shown in Figure 2.13c. Again, the
shock is more potent during the low-volatility regime, quickly leading to additional
long positions (or closed-out short ones) in excess of 10,000 contracts. The response
is more muted, but statistically significant, in regime 2.
Finally, the responses of legacy commercials behave in the same way as producer
positions, and the increase in short positions is, as expected, magnified by the
inclusion of swap dealers’ positions.
In contrast to the significant response of their positions to price innovations, traders,
and more interestingly managed money, do not appear to have any predictive ability
with regard to oil prices. If they had, we would anticipate a shock to their positions
to be followed by a change in the oil price in the same direction. For example, an
increase in managed money’s long positions would predict an increase in the oil price.
Clearly, this is not happening in the benchmark models, which by construction have
a response of zero upon impact.36
35More details on the commodity swaps market and its relation to the futures market can be
found in Mixon et al. (2018).
36Of course, nothing prevents subsequent values of the impulse responses to significantly deviate
from zero.
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Note: 95% posterior bands obtained with 5,000 Monte Carlo simulations. Regime 1 is the low-variance regime.
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Figure 2.13: Impulse Responses – Benchmark Ordering
Notes: Left column: response to a one U.S. dollar shock; right column: response
to 1,000 contracts shock. 95% posterior bands obtained with 5,000 Monte Carlo
simulations. Regime 1 is the low-variance regime.
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The impulse responses from the VARS with the alternative ordering (i.e. positions
first, oil price second), presented in Figure 2.14, tell a different story.37 In this setting,
a shock increase to producers’ positions is followed by a statistically significant
reduction of the oil price by between five and eleven cents depending on the regime
the system is in – see Figure 2.14a. The same increase in managed money’s positions
is followed by an increase in the price of oil in a similar range – see Figure 2.14c.
Shocks to the positions of swap dealers do not affect Brent’s price significantly.
Overall, we find that a positive shock to producers or managed money’s positions
by 10,000 contracts is followed by an increase in the price of oil around 50 cents
(and this price increase persists over time) in regime 1 or about one dollar (with the
result quickly fading) in regime 2. Quantitatively, these results are not far from those
corresponding to the impulse responses of positions to price shocks in the benchmark
VAR.
The ordering of the variables has implications for the response profiles of trader
positions to price shocks, as well. In some cases, these are counter-intuitive. For
example, Figure 2.13a shows that an unexpected increase in the price of oil by
one dollar is followed by an increase in producers’ long positions (or reduction of
short positions) in the high-volatility regime (impulse responses in regime 1 are
insignificant). Managed money responses are insignificant and similarly headed
in the ‘wrong’ direction within weeks. The results are more in line with these in
the benchmark model with swap dealers and legacy commercials, even though the
response magnitudes are dampened.
Our results support those of Li et al. (2016) who, using a commercial/non-commercial
37Note that, since we base the regime classification based on the variance of the oil price, the
regime probabilities are identical to those presented in Figure 2.12.
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Note: 95% posterior bands obtained with 5,000 Monte Carlo simulations. Regime 1 is the low-variance regime.
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Figure 2.14: Impulse Responses – Alternative Ordering
Notes: Left column: response to a one U.S. dollar shock; right column: response
to 1,000 contracts shock. 95% posterior bands obtained with 5,000 Monte Carlo
simulations. Regime 1 is the low-variance regime.
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breakdown of the trader positions data from the CFTC, find that with rising oil
prices speculators tend to take long positions and hedgers tend to take short ones.
With declining prices the positioning of speculators and hedgers is the opposite.
They also find that hedgers and swap dealers tend to go against the prevailing trend
in prices, whereas speculators reinforce it.
The sensitivity of results to the ordering of the variables in the VAR system indicates
that prior beliefs are important. If, for example, one is inclined to think that
financialisation distorts prices or that money managers have superior knowledge
of the market and can predict price movements in a way that others cannot, then
they can find supporting evidence in Figure 2.14. Others, with a firmer belief in
the prevalence of the efficient market hypothesis, at least in very liquid markets
such as the market for BFC, would look to Figure 2.13 for evidence. An objective
observer would place more credence to the results from the benchmark VARs, whose
ordering is based on the outcomes of Granger causality tests. These models produce
insignificant responses of price to trader positions. A limited role for speculation
is reported by Liu et al. (2016) who find that the oil price reacts overwhelmingly
to fundamental factors rather than speculation, with the latter’s contribution not
exceeding 10% of the price variation.
2.7 Conclusions
In this paper, we use vector autoregression systems to quantify the effects of oil price
shocks on traders’ positions in the Brent oil futures contract. We do the same for
the effects of shocks in trader positions on the oil price. We use the disaggregated
Commitments of Traders reports available by ICE Futures Europe to get insights on
the investment behaviour of producers, swap dealers and money managers.
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We allow the data to be from two different distributions based upon the variance of
the oil price and, for each model, we test whether this leads to an increase in goodness
of fit that exceeds the penalty associated with the increase in the dimensions of the
model. We use the Bayesian information criterion to select the dimension of the
models and report regime-dependent impulse responses whenever the test results are
conducive with the presence of two regimes.
We find that a Markov-switching model with two regimes is a good description of
the data for systems involving producers, money managers or the legacy commercial
positions along with the oil price. Based upon minimising the BIC, a single regime is
recommended for the system featuring swap dealers. Applying a Choleski factorisation
in the VARs with alternative orderings we produce impulse responses (which in the
case of producers, money managers and legacy commercials are regime-dependent).
These show that producers and swap dealers reduce their net positions as a result of
a positive oil price shock while money managers do the opposite. The evidence that
trader position shocks affect the oil price is weaker. The findings presented in this
study are in favour of market efficiency.
CHAPTER 3
Public Debt and Economic Growth in Developing
Resource-Rich Countries
3.1 Introduction
The oil price crash in 20141 has raised concerns over the sovereign debt sustainability
of resource-rich economies which have been struggling to accommodate declining oil
revenues since. The lower oil price environment has substantially weakened their
public finances, with higher debt levels and declining foreign reserves being common
since 2015. Figure 3.1 illustrates the vicious circle between growth and debt when
falling oil prices affect the finances of a resource-rich country.
1The oil price started a free fall in July 2014 driven by weak fundamentals, dropping from $U.S.
110 per barrel to around $U.S. 80 per barrel in November 2014. OPEC – which controls nearly 40
percent of the world market – failed to reach an agreement on collective production cuts at Vienna
meeting on 27 November 2014, sending the price further decreasing. Prices kept on falling, reaching
$U.S. 30 per barrel in January 2016.
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Figure 3.1: Flow Diagram of Possible Causal Pathways between Growth and Debt:
Vicious Circle
Source: Based on Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and Irons & Bivens (2010)
This study investigates the relationship between public debt and economic growth
in developing resource-rich countries, for whom very limited research has been
conducted so far. It explores whether a common threshold debt level and any
differential impact of debt on growth below and above such a tipping point exist.
The analysis also takes into account the impact of hydrocarbon resources on the
growth of these economies. This relates to the ‘resource curse’ phenomenon or
‘paradox of plenty’2. The sample period extends from 1990 to 2017, which includes
significant oil price shocks, namely the Gulf War in 1990/91; the Asian Financial
Crisis in 1998; the Venezuelan Crisis and the Iraqi War in 2002/03; the Global
2The resource curse refers to the failure of many resource-intensive countries to fully benefit
from their natural resource wealth and, thus, to respond effectively to public welfare needs (NRGI,
2015). The resource curse as a concept is traced back to the 1970s and it became a popular research
area in the 1980s and 1990s especially after the episodes of oil price collapses (Nakhle, 2017).
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Financial Crisis in 2008; and the Arab Uprisings in 2010/11. More importantly,
the work presented in this chapter takes into consideration the 2014 oil shock that
put substantial pressure on the public finances of these economies and led to rising
fiscal deficits (Figures 3.2 and 3.3), which were financed by debt issuance, asset
drawndown or a combination of both. As a result, serious concerns have been raised
over the sovereign debt sustainability of developing hydrocarbon-dependent countries.
In particular, the debt of Saudi Arabia, the second largest global oil producer3,
increased by more than 1,000 percent, moving from 1.5 percent in 2014 to 17 percent
of GDP in 2017. At the same time, its foreign reserves dropped by more than
25 percent between 2014 and 2016 – nearly 200 billions of U.S. dollars. That is
equivalent to almost 30 percent of Kingdom’s 2017 nominal aggregate output. Many
other developing resource-dependent countries exhibited a similar pattern during
this period, seeing their international reserves declining significantly (Figures 3.4 and
3.5). Indeed, Bahrain has been under pressure, with investors becoming concerned
by the country’s mounting public debt level, which is projected at 95 percent of GDP
in 2018 by the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2018c), as well as the impact of
rising U.S. interest rates on its debt due to the pegged exchange rate to the U.S.
dollar (Barbuscia & Torchia, 2018). Venezuela, the country with the largest crude oil
reserves in the world, is officially in default on sovereign debts after missing $U.S. 200
million of interest payments on two government bonds in November 2017. While the
latter has been a result of decades of mismanagement (Nelson, 2018), the nation’s
economy deteriorated further during the 2014/17 oil bear market. Qatar has been
largely relying on issuing domestic and external debt to finance the deficit (IMF,
2018b). Russia, the third largest oil producer (BP, 2018), didn’t show any significant
increase in its gross government debt-to-GDP ratio between 2014 and 2017, which
3As of 2017, after the U.S. (BP, 2018).
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Figure 3.2: Fiscal Balance and Oil Price in Resource-Rich Developing Economies,
2014-2017
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Figure 3.3: Continued: Fiscal Balance and Oil Price in Resource-Rich Developing
Economies, 2014-2017
Data Sources: IMF Article IV Consultation Reports; EIA (2018) – Notes: Fiscal
balance figures show the general government net lending/borrowing as percent of
GDP, excluding interest payments. Oil price depicts Dated Brent crude oil spot
price. 2016 and 2017 are projection years for Brunei. 2017 is projection year for
Russia. *Central government. **Central government and National Development
Fund including Targeted Subsidy Organisation. ***Consolidated accounts of the
federal government and the emirates Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah. From 2010,
includes extra-budgetary funds.
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rose by only two percentage points over the period, but that was due to the fact that
the government decided on using assets from its Reserve Fund to finance its deficits.
Credit-rating downgrades from the three major agencies of Moody’s, S&P and
Fitch have been very common over the years 2016-2018. In early 2017, both S&P
and Fitch downgraded Saudi Arabia arguing that low oil prices were worsening
the country’s public and external finances. Similarly, Moody’s cut Oman’s credit
rating several times over this period, with the most recent one in March 2018, citing
larger fiscal deficits and projecting an ongoing weakening of the government’s debt
and its affordability in the coming years (Khan, 2018). S&P had also downgraded
the country’s rating into junk territory twice in 2017 on the back of rising debt
(Everington, 2017). S&P and Fitch lowered Bahrain’s rating in December 2017 and
March 2018, respectively, on high deficits and rising government debt. The lower
oil price environment and the subsequent debt accumulation have increased the
vulnerability of these countries and have heightened the concerns about long-term
fiscal sustainability.
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows: Sections 3.2 provides the theoretical
background on sustainability, explains how fiscal policy can affect sustainable
development and concludes with the long- and short-term growth theory models
developed over the years. Section 3.3 presents the existing work on the debt-growth
nexus, as well as the resource-growth relationship. Section 3.4 takes stock of what has
been discussed in the previous sections and explains how that informs the subsequent
work. Section 3.5 outlines the econometric methods that are used in investigating the
impact of debt and natural resource wealth on the economic growth of resource-rich
developing countries. Section 3.6 describes data and presents the empirical findings,
and section 3.7 concludes.
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Figure 3.4: Total International Reserves in Resource-Rich Developing Economies,
2014-2017
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Figure 3.5: Continued: Total International Reserves in Resource-Rich Developing
Economies, 2014-2017
Data Sources: World Bank (2018b) – Notes: 2017 figures not available for Saudi
Arabia and Bahrain. Total reserves comprise holdings of monetary gold, special
drawing rights, reserves of IMF members held by IMF, and holdings of foreign
exchange under the control of monetary authorities. Oil price depicts Dated Brent
oil spot price.
3.2 Sustainability, growth theory and business cycles:
Theoretical framework
3.2.1 Sustainability
The concept of sustainability is not new. It dates back to 1713, when Carl von
Carlowitz published the forestry treatise Sylvicultura oeconomica (Von Carlowitz,
1713), in which he discussed for the first time the principle of “continuously enduring
and sustainable use”. Von Carlowitz used the term at a time when wood shortages
were becoming an imminent threat in Europe after being heavily used for mining.
Von Carlowitz warned that, without wood, people would “suffer great hardship” and
called for the forests to be conserved. Soon, sustainability started being used, as
a more vague concept, for the long-term consequences of the depletion of natural
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resources.
Along those lines, Thomas Malthus (Malthus, 1798) developed his theory about the
threatening effect of mass starvation due to inability of the available agricultural land
to feed an expanding population. Another theory, developed by Harold Hotelling in
1931, was on the optimal rate of exploitation of non-renewable resources. According
to Hotelling, there is an optimal rate of exhaustion, where the social cost of losing
the resource is outweighed by the social benefit – expressed as rent – that it produces.
Hotelling’s theory was later used by Robert Solow (Solow, 1974), where he supported
that these resource rents (or Hotelling rents) must be invested in productive capital
so they can compensate future generations for their loss of the natural resource
(Solow, 1992).4 In the same context, in 1993, Solow wrote that “if sustainability
is anything more than a slogan or expression of emotion, it must amount to an
injunction to preserve productive capacity for the indefinite future” (Solow, 1993, p.
163).
However, it was the United Nations (UN) through the World Commission on
Environment and Development’s (WCED) crucial 1987 report which adopted the
concept of sustainability and gave it the general widespread recognition it has today.
The report – also known as the Brundtland Report5 – was highlighting the collision
among the aspirations of human towards a better life, the limitations imposed by
the nature and the dangers of environmental abasement. The document defined
development as sustainable when it satisfies the requirements of intergeneration
equity and availability. In other words, development is sustainable when it meets
4Such thoughts have been the basis of sovereign wealth funds that some resource-rich countries
set up to invest the revenues of their hydrocarbon resources for the future.
5In recognition of former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland’s role as Chair of
the World Commission on Environment and Development.
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the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs (WCED, 1987).
A plethora of definitions has existed since the Brundtland report, making sustainability
a blurry and inconsistent concept ever since (Malito, 2014). As Kidd (1992) nicely put
it, the sustainability concept has evolved over time affected by different “intellectual
and political streams of thought”. Finally, the definition was re-interpreted as
encompassing three prevailing dimensions6, namely economic, social and environmental,
with the interdependence among all the components being widely acknowledged.
The significance of the interdependence between economy and environment dates
back to 1972, when members of the Club of Rome7 published “The limits of growth”,
showing scenarios that were proposing that boundless population growth, pollution
and natural resources’ depletion would provoke the collapse of physical growth on
earth (Higgins, 2013). This need of mutuality was also expressed by Drexhage
and Murphy (Drexhage & Murphy, 2010, p. 20), who stated that we need to
take “sustainable development out of the environment “box” and [consider] wider
social, economic, and geopolitical agendas”. The authors further pointed out that
“sustainable development embodies integration, and understanding and acting on the
complex interconnections that exist between the environment, economy, and society”
(Drexhage & Murphy, 2010, p. 6). UN also emphasised this need in its Agenda for
Development in 1997, supporting that economic and social development, as well as
environmental protection are interdependent and mutually reinforcing components
of sustainable development (UN General Assembly, 1997).
6The Sustainable Development Solutions Network adds a fourth discourse, that of good
governance.
7Club of Rome was a group of thinkers in politics, business and science founded in 1968.
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Achieving sustainable development remains a big challenge for the international
community. However, an ever-increasing number of countries has been embracing the
Sustainable Development Concept and is working on establishing national frameworks
that can work in favour of that achievement. The 17 Sustainable Development Goals
of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is a good example. The agenda,
which came into force in January 2016 and is based on the Millennium Development
Goals8, aims to end all forms of poverty and inequalities, and tackle climate change.
It calls for action by all countries – poor or rich – to promote prosperity, either
economic or social, while at the same time caring about the environment.
On a national level in resource-rich economies, the Sustainable Development Agenda
usually takes the form of a vision, which calls on economic diversification and reflects
the need to reduce dependence on hydrocarbon revenues, and consequently restrict
exposure to oil price volatility. It also calls on improvement of the quality of life of the
local population. This includes policies such as energy-subsidy cuts, privatisations,
reduction of gender and income inequalities, and creation of jobs, among others.
Fiscal policy sustainability
The term sustainability has been also widely used in the assessment of fiscal policies,
especially after the 2007/08 global financial crisis when more theoretical effort
was put to examine the impact of budgetary imbalances on economic growth and
stability (Ghosh et al., 2013). Since 2014, when oil prices started their downward
momentum, fiscal sustainability has become an even often-voiced concern in resource-
rich countries.
8The Millennium Development Goals were eight goals set by the 189 UN member states in
September 2000 to improve the lives of the world’s poorest people and agreed to be achieved by the
year 2015.
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However, the concept of fiscal sustainability has scarcely been related to the multifaceted
dimensions of sustainability (Malito, 2014), as described in the previous section.
The various definitions provided for fiscal sustainability have been usually centered
around arguments and theories of government budget constraints (Burrnside, 2005;
Friedman, 1957) that do not really espouse the broader concept of sustainable
development. Also, sustainability incorporates a long-term perspective which comes
into contradiction with that of fiscal sustainability that acknowledges short-term
risks that require direct interventions (Malito, 2014). In particular, Shick (2005)
highlighted that “fiscal sustainability is more than projecting the future, it is about
the urgency of policy change”.
Nevertheless, fiscal policy, defined as the government’s decisions about taxing and
spending budgets, can still indirectly have an impact on sustainable development
through its effects on growth, environment and human resource development. A
prudent fiscal position can promote economic growth because low and stable levels of
government deficits and debt are typically associated with higher rates of economic
growth. That automatically stresses the importance of studying the role of fiscal
sustainability in the economic performance of a country.
In resource-intensive economies, fiscal policy faces specific challenges in the long-run
with regards to intergenerational equity and fiscal sustainability, as well as in the
short-run with regards to macroeconomic stabilisation and fiscal planning. For
example, most oil-exporting countries follow fiscal expansion that adds to inflationary
pressure, while monetary policy is constrained in tackling inflation due to prevailing
exchange rate regimes (Omojolaibi & Egwaikhide, 2014). Sturm et al. (2009a)
describe fiscal sustainability for oil-exporting countries as the guarantee that in
the “post-oil period the same amount of public goods or level of expenditure can
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be provided as in the oil period without resorting to deficit financing or public
expenditure”.
Buiter et al. (1985) described a sustainable fiscal policy as the policy that maintains
the ratio of government net worth to output at its current level. Then, he calculated
the constant primary deficit which is required to achieve this objective. Blanchard
et al. (1991), using a quite similar definition, delineated a fiscal policy sustainable
if the ratio of debt-to-GDP converges back to its initial level. They also supported
that the difference between the interest rate and the growth rate should remain
positive9. Their definition, though, linked fiscal sustainability to the solvency criterion,
inevitably causing some disagreements over its acceptance.
Whilst some scholars doubted the equation of solvency to sustainability, supporting
that the latter should be extended beyond the limits of the solvency criterion (Artis
& Marcellino, 2000), many institutions, such as the European Union (EU) and IMF,
continue to equate fiscal sustainability with solvency or debt sustainability. The
Blanchard et al. (1991) definition came under strong criticism for an additional
reason, that of being quite arbitrary. In particular, Krejdl (2006) argued that there
is no theoretical reason why the debt ratio should be required to return to its initial
level and not to any other – higher or lower – stable level. Table 3.1 summarises
different definitions of fiscal sustainability across various authors and organisations.
The most widely acceptable empirical approach has been the intertemporal budget
constraint (IBC) analysis (Box 2). The latter considers fiscal policy sustainable if the
9The differential between the interest rate paid on government debt and the growth rate of the
economy is a key parameter in assessing the sustainability of government debt: the higher the
interest rate-growth differential, the larger the fiscal effort necessary to place the debt-to-GDP ratio
on a downward path, or even to stabilise it.
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Table 3.1: Definitions of Fiscal Sustainability
Domar (1944)
‘Burden of the debt’, like the tax rate (or rates) which must
be imposed to finance the service charges, and that
the will rise is far from evident’ (Domar, 1944, p. 798).
Buiter et al. (1985)
‘A sustainable policy is one capable of keeping the ratio
of public sector net worth at its current level’
(Buiter et al., 1985, p. 37).
Blanchard et al. (1991)
‘The ratio of debt to [Gross National Product (GNP)]
eventually converges back to its initial level...’
but ‘...the present discounted value of the ratio
of primary deficits to GNP...is equal to the
negative of the current level of debt to GNP...’
(Blanchard, 1990, p. 12).
UN (2001)
‘The total amount of outstanding debt (internal and
external) issued by the general government divided by gross
national income’ (UN, 2001, p. 282).
IMF (2002)
‘An entity’s liability position is sustainable if it satisfies
the present value budget constraint without a major
correction in the balance of income and expenditure given
the costs of financing it faces in the market’ (IMF, 2002, p. 5).
Organisation
for Economic
Cooperation and
Development
(OECD) (2009)
Government solvency, continued stable economic growth,
stable taxes and intergenerational fairness
(Schick, 2005 in OECD, 2009, p. 86). Solvency is the ability
to pay financial obligations. Stable taxes allow programmes
to be financed without modifying the tax burden on citizens.
Fairness is the capacity to pay for current public services
with today’s revenues, rather than shifting the cost to future
generations or denying them the services available today
(OECD, 2009, p. 86).
EU (2012)
‘Ability of a government to assume the financial burden
of its debt in the future. Fiscal policy is not sustainable
if it implies an excessive accumulation of government
debt over time and ever increasing debt service’
(EU, 2012, p. 1).
Source: Malito (2014) – Note: The table summarises different definitions of
fiscal sustainability across various authors and organisations adopted over the years.
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initial public debt is equal to the value of future public surpluses. The advantage of
the IBC resides in the fact that it imposes a constraint on fiscal policy. However, the
definition still suffers from some caveats as it assumes that the government cannot
expand its indebtedness forever, while it fails to include any interactions between
budgetary variables and the economy, risking to lead to inappropriate conclusions.
The pioneering study of Hamilton & Flavin (1986) tested the long-run sustainability
of fiscal policy by applying the IBC approach. Some of the influential papers in this
stream of literature include: Kremers (1988, 1989), Trehan & Walsh (1988, 1991),
Wilcox (1989), Buiter & Patel (1992, 1995), Wickens & Uctum (1993) and Uctum &
Wickens (1996). Other papers have implemented panel data cointegration and unit
root tests, such as Afonso & Rault (2010) who tested for the sustainability of public
finances in the EU-15 over the period 1970-2006 and Byrne et al. (2008) who tried
to find evidence of a cointegration relationship between primary surplus and debt
for emerging and industrialised countries.
The intertemporal constraint adopts some of the basic concepts of the exogenous
economic growth theory of Solow (1956), which will be discussed in the next section,
as given the limited natural resources, capital accumulation cannot alone lead to
sustainable growth and, thus, a technological factor should be introduced.
3.2.2 Growth theory and standard models
Economic growth is one of the most important field in economics as it is the main
determinant of living standards. As such, a number of distinguished schools of
economic thought has been developed over the years, albeit marked by various
controversies. Macroeconomists have been historically studying short-term and long-
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Box 2: The Intertemporal Budget Constraint
IBC can be written in the following form:
Gt + (1 + rt)Debtt−1 = Rt +Debtt
where Gt is the level of government expenditure; rt is the interest rate; Rt is the
level of government revenue; and Debtt is the debt level at time t = 1, 2, ...T .
The level of debt can also be expressed as
Debtt = φt(Rt+1 −Gt+1 +Debtt+1)
where φt = (1 + rt+1)
−1.
By repeating substitutions, assuming a constant future interest rate and solving
forward, the IBC can be derived, which is equivalent to the expected present
value constraint:
Debtt =
∞∑
i=1
φiEt(Rt+i −Gt+i)
and will hold as long as the transversality condition, limn→∞ φnEt(Debtt+n) = 0,
is satisfied.
The transversality condition, or No-Ponzi-Game constraint, states that the
present value of debt in the indefinite future converges to zero, which means
that debt grows more slowly than the interest rate. The government cannot
finance interest payments on debt by continuously issuing new debt. Thus,
public debt is sustainable if the government does not engage in a Ponzi scheme.
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term growth as two separate phenomena. The former – also known as business cycles
– is generally caused by monetary or fiscal policy shocks that force output to deviate
temporarily from its long-run path. The latter includes population growth, capital
accumulation and productivity change, and the impact on the economy is permanent.
Business cycle supporters usually consider long-term growth as an exogenous trend,
whilst growth theorists use models where short-term shocks have no impact on the
long-run growth rate of the economy (Martin & Rogers, 2000).
This conceptual dichotomy decomposes aggregate output, or GDP, in two components:
the trend which accounts for long-term change and the cycle that is considered as a
short-term deviation from trend. To make that more tangible, Figures 3.6 and 3.7
use Hodrick-Prescott filter10 to depict the decomposition of the GDP growth series
of the countries in this study’s sample into a business and trend component.
Long term growth
Whilst our work focuses on the short-term deviations from the long-term trend
caused by increasing debt levels and the volatile revenue base due to the dependence
on hydrocarbons, we believe it is wise to provide some background discussion about
the main long-term growth theories that have been developed over the years.
Classical growth theory
The first theories of economic growth can be traced back to the end of the 18th
century and the beginning of the 19th century, when economic growth rates were
increasing staggeringly and could not be justified by the existing economic theories.
10We acknowledge the fact that Hodrick-Prescott filter is widely debated about the potential
weaknesses and issues it might encompass (Hamilton, 2017); however, any analysis and discussion
of them is something that goes beyond the scope of this work. The HP filter is used in this section
only as an example of the trend-cyclical decomposition discussed earlier.
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Figure 3.6: Long-Term Growth and Business Cycles
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Figure 3.7: Continued: Long-Term Growth and Business Cycles
Note: The figure depicts the decomposition of aggregate output, or real GDP, of
the sample’s series into two components after applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter:
the trend which accounts for long-term change and the cycle that is considered as a
short-term deviation from the trend. Y-axis shows the percent change.
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At that time, the first economists emerged, developing the ‘classical economic growth
theory’ as it is known today. According to it, economic growth depends equally
on land, labour, capital and technology as well as on social, economic and political
structures. Although sustainability of economic growth was a major concern of
the classical economists, their research was micro-oriented and mainly focused on
the efficient allocation of the given resources (Snowdon & Vane, 2005). They were
also supporting the view that economic growth will end because of an increasing
population and limited resources.
Adam Smith (1776), Thomas Malthus (1798), David Ricardo (1817), and, much later,
Joseph Schumpeter (1934) are considered the main thinkers of classical economics,
providing many of the basic ingredients that appear in modern theories of economic
growth.
The Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1776) is considered to mark the beginning of the
classical economics. Smith analysed the dynamics of wealth of nations and welfare of
individuals and societies. Although he did not develop any long-run growth theory,
his work still refers to the importance of increasing labour productivity and saving.
The modern economic growth theory has benefited from Smith’s views focusing on the
division of labour, education, human capital, increasing returns to scale, technological
change, externalities and institutional factors, such as global free competitive market
economy and the role of government (Ucak, 2015).
Malthus (1798) claimed that population is not easily checked and its growth can have
a negative impact on standards of living. His scenario was arguing that population
would grow exponentially, while production of food would increase until a certain
extent due to the fact that land was a limited resource and, specialisation and trade
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could not be a solution due to unstable international relations. He also predicted
that any technological advance would only increase population, with no long-run
change in the standards of living.
Ricardo (1817) modified Smith’s model of growth by including diminishing returns to
land. Ricardo assumed a two-sector economy that exhibits constant returns to scale in
the manufacturing industry, but diminishing returns in the agricultural sector because
of the fixed supply of land; as more land is used, marginal quality of land worsens.
That implies that landowner’s rents increase over time, which in turn decreases
the profits of the capitalists and, thus, disrupts the capital accumulation. Ricardo
claimed that this decline can be happily checked by technological improvements in
machinery and the specialisation brought by trade. However, he later modified his
position on that, claiming that these improvements might increase unemployment,
as machinery displaces labour, and affect negatively the demand for goods.
Schumpeter (1934) mainly stressed the role of innovations, in the form of technical
and technological progress, and less the role of capital accumulation. For him,
economic growth and development were two different concepts, with the latter being
caused by endogenous factors. One of the main points of Schumpeter’s work was that
development does not happen gradually but rather cyclical in the wake of innovations
(Sardadvar, 2011).
Keynesian economics
The Keynesian theory was developed by John Keynes, a British economist, during the
Great Depression in the 1930s. Keynes initiated a revolution in the economic thinking
that overturned the then-prevailing understanding which could not explain the reasons
behind the severe global economic depression. According to him, aggregate demand,
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measured as the sum of spending by households, businesses and government, was the
most important driving force in an economy (Jahan et al., 2014) and the government
intervention was necessary to moderate the booms and busts in economic activity
and, thus, increase growth.
Neoclassical growth theory
The neoclassical model of economic growth, constructed by Robert Solow (1956),
considers capital accumulation and saving as the important determinants of economic
growth. The model assumes a production function with capital and labour as the two
factors of output. Technology is added to the function as exogenously determined,
with the rates of saving and population growth also taken as exogenous. Given that
population growth and saving rates vary across countries, different countries reach
different steady states.
The importance of human capital to the process of growth has been long emphasised
by economists. It could be expected that ignoring human capital could lead to
incorrect conclusions (Mankiw et al., 1992). Mankiw et al. (1992) explored that by
augmenting the original Solow model to include the accumulation of human capital.
The authors focused on economies that converge to their steady states as long as
the levels of both physical and human capital per worker rise, where the latter is
incorporated in skilled workers (Sardadvar, 2011). In an empirical test, they showed
that their model can explain considerable differences of cross-country income levels,
as well as why it might not be that attractive to invest somewhere just because the
current level of physical capital is low (Sardadvar, 2011).
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Endogenous growth model
Besides the strong interest expressed in the role and importance of human capital, it
is worth mentioning that lots of attention was also given in the origins of technological
progress. Long-run growth models started being developed by explaining the case
where technological progress is set within the model by relating it to other economic
forces (Sardadvar, 2011). That was the beginning of the endogenous growth theory
era. In this context, Romer (1986) developed a model where the creation of new
knowledge by one firm has a positive external impact on the production of other
companies. Lucas (1988) built on that and further assumed that human capital
releases spillovers whereby each producer in an economy benefits from the average
level of human capital in the economy.
The interest in the endogenous growth theory was motivated by the empirical failure
of the Solow model to explain cross-country differences.
“In neoclassical growth models with diminishing returns, such as Solow (1956),
Koopmans (1963) and Cass (1965), a country’s per capita growth rate tends to be
inversely related to its starting level of income per person. Therefore, in the absence
of shocks, poor and rich countries would tend to converge in terms of levels of per
capita income. However, this convergence hypothesis seems to be inconsistent with
the cross-country evidence, which indicates that per capita growth rates are
uncorrelated with the starting level of per capita product.” (Barro, 1989, p. 1)
Hence, in contrast to the Solow model, the endogenous-growth models assume non-
decreasing returns to the set of reproducible factors of production, implying that
there is no steady-state level of income and that differences among countries in
income per capita can persist indefinitely even if they have the same preferences and
technology (Mankiw et al., 1992).
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Business cycle models
Economic growth and business cycles were initially considered to be strongly
interrelated, but after World War II most economists started treating the two
concepts as separate research fields. Their interconnection is, though, still widely
debated. On the one hand, growth theory is considered as analysing the natural path
of aggregate activity, and on the other hand, business cycle models are regarded to
explain de-trended data movements from this path. In particular, business cycles can
be characterised as actual real output fluctuations around potential output of the
economy (i.e. the trend). The aggregate activity is either accelerating or decelerating,
while economic cycle means alternating periods of growth and decline in real output.
Business cycles analysis resurfaced with the emergence of “oil shocks” during the
1970s and the inability of the then dominant approaches to propose an efficient
economic policy (Assous et al., 2016). Dissatisfaction with the demand-oriented
Keynesian model to explain the 1970s stagflation – rising unemployment accompanied
by increasing inflation – had as a result lots of research effort to be turned to the
development of theories based on microfoundations. The similar importance of
supply-side factors in explaining the macroeconomic instability at that time was
highlighted (Blinder, 1979).
A number of theories has been developed to understand the concept of business cycles.
Some of the most influencial have been: monetary theory; monetary over-investment
theory; Schumpeter’s theory of innovation; Keynes theory; and Samuelson’s model
of multiplier accelerator interaction. A brief description of each of these theories is
given in Box 3.
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Box 3: Business Cycle Theories
Pure Monetary Theory
The monetary theory asserts that the business cycle is a result of changes
in monetary and credit market conditions. In particular, business cycles are
the continuous phases of inflation and deflation, and, as such, changes in an
economy take place due to changes in the flow of money. For example, when
there is increase in money supply, that will increase prices, profits and total
output, which in turn will result in the growth of the economy. The principle
factor behind the supply of money is the credit created by the banking system.
Monetary Over-Investment Theory
Monetary over-investment theory focuses mainly on the imbalance between
actual and desired investments. According to this theory, the actual investment
is much higher than the desired one, so for the economy to be in equilibrium
is required that investment and consumption patterns match with each other.
Further, for stabilising this equilibrium, the voluntary savings should be equal
to actual investment.
Schumpeter’s Theory of Innovation
Schumpeter’s theory of innovation states that the change in investment,
accompanied by monetary expansion, is the major factor behind the business
fluctuations. Further, Schumpeter’s theory posits that innovation in business
is the major reason for increased investments. By innovation, he refers to the
application of a new technique of production or a new machinery or a new
concept to reduce cost and increase profit.
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Keynes Theory
Keynes theory is based on changes in aggregate demand under the influence
of fluctuations in investment and consumption expenditures (employment is
determined by the aggregate demand in the short-run). These variations may
be caused by pessimistic expectations of businesses and households, or by
fluctuations in wealth. That was contravening against classical economists
who were supporting that if there is a high unemployment condition in the
economy, then economic forces, such as demand and supply, would act in a
manner to bring back full employment condition.
Samuelson’s Model of Multiplier Accelerator Interaction
The multiplier-accelerator interaction theory was developed following a debate
over the role of multiplier and acceleration processes in explaining the business
fluctuations. Paul Samuelson proposed the Multiplier-Accelerator Model
after supporting that neither the multiplier theory nor acceleration alone was
adequate to analyse these changes.
The model is based on the Keynesian multiplier, which assumes that the level
of economic activity decides the consumption intentions, as well as on the
accelerator theory of investment, which implies that the investment intentions
depend on the pace with which the economic activities grow. The Samuelson’s
model was the first step towards integrating the theory of multiplier and
principle of acceleration, and showed how well these two tools can be integrated
to generate income.
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While business cycles theory was first explored by the American economist John Muth
in 1961, it has been more closely associated with Robert Lucas, another American
economist. Lucas (1972) developed an equilibrium business cycle theory in which
the trend was given and where cycles were always equilibrium positions. However,
his model did not include any growth-cycle interactions, and it was criticised for
two main reasons: first, it was difficult to support that fluctuations could only be
caused by monetary shocks, and second, the dynamics of this model could not mimic
the persistence effect of shocks observed at that time (Assous et al., 2016). The
seminal works of Nelson & Plosser (1982), as well as Kydland & Prescott (1982)
both suggested that real shocks may be far more important than monetary shocks in
explaining the path of aggregate output over time (Gazda, 2010).
The real business cycle (RBC) theory tried to remedy the above deficiencies. The
basic RBC model assumes an economy featuring perfectly functioning competitive
markets and rational expectations, where fluctuations are studied as the optimal
responses of economic agents to exogenous real shocks. RBC models belong to
a class of models called ‘Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium’ models. They
are dynamic because investment is a key endogenous variable and, also, stochastic
because they largely account for business cycle variations with real (rather than
nominal) shocks – defined as unexpected or unpredictable events that affect the
economy – to trigger fluctuations in the endogenous variables around their balanced
growth paths. Technology shocks could be a source of such economic fluctuations,
as well as shocks in government spending. The RBC approach typically exhibits
complete monetary neutrality. The basic RBC model is outlined in Appendix A.1 as
described by Cooley (1995).
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3.3 Debt-natural resources-growth nexus: What
we know so far
Natural resources, especially minerals and hydrocarbons, have always been the main
economic engine and government revenue source of resource-rich countries. In some
occasions, government dependence on hydrocarbon revenues can reach as high as
85 and 80 percent in countries like Iraq and Qatar, respectively. Oil has been
contributing more than half of government revenues for a number of other countries,
such as Azerbaijan (52 percent), Bahrain (68 percent), Brunei (70 percent), Congo
(59 percent), Kuwait (66 percent), Oman (68 percent) and Saudi Arabia (59 percent).
That has, as a result, stimulated an extensive body of literature looking at the
relationship between economic growth and natural resources, with many papers
backing that the economic performance of a country can be adversely affected by
natural resources. Whilst these resource-wealthy countries typically build large
buffers and experience low debt levels during boom cycles, they see their public
finances deteriorating during oil bust cycles. Although not much focus had been
given to the empirical analysis of debt in relation to economic growth, the latter has
started gaining importance.
3.3.1 Public debt and economic growth: Theory and empirics
The conventional view of public debt – as held by most economists and policymakers
– is that having higher public debt can stimulate aggregate demand and output in the
short-run (Mankiw & Elmendorf, 1999), thus implying a positive relationship between
debt and economic growth. In other words, the conventional analysis supports that
the economy is Keynesian in the short-run, so the increase in aggregate demand
raises national income. In the long-run, though, higher debt crowds out private
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capital spending and reduces output, depicting a negative effect on long-run growth.
According to Panizza & Presbitero (2013), back-of-the-envelope estimates suggest
that the standard crowding out channel is unlikely to be quantitatively important.
However, public debt could have a larger negative impact on economic outcomes if
it affects the productivity of public expenditures (Teles & Cesar Mussolini, 2014),
increases uncertainty or creates expectations of future financial repression (Cochrane,
2011) and rises sovereign risk (Codogno et al., 2003), leading to higher real interest
rates and lower private investment (Laubach, 2009). Moreover, there are possible
non-linear effects in the debt-growth relationship, where the buildup of debt can
harm economic growth, especially when the level of debt exceeds a certain threshold
(Chudik et al., 2017).
The empirical literature on the relationship between government debt and economic
growth remains limited, but gaining importance. A well-known influential example
has been the seminal work of Reinhart & Rogoff (2010), who supported the existence
of a non-linear relationship (defined as threshold effect) between public debt and
growth in a panel of 44 advanced and emerging market economies. The authors
showed that, whilst the link between growth and debt seemed relatively weak at
normal levels, median growth rates for countries with public debt over 90 percent
of GDP were proven to be one percent lower than median growth of countries with
debt-to-GDP ratio below 90 percent.11
Along those lines, Schclarek (2004) explored the debt-growth nexus for a number of
developing and industrial economies. For developing countries, the author proved
that lower total external debt levels are associated with higher growth rates, with
11The findings of Reinhart and Rogoff came under strong criticism for exclusion of available data
and coding errors and, thus, giving an inaccurate representation of the relationship between public
debt and GDP growth. (Herndon et al., 2014)
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this negative correlation being driven by the incidence of public external debt and
not by private external debt. He found no evidence, though, for an inverted U-
shape relationship. For industrial countries, no significant relationship between
gross government debt and economic growth was supported. Woo & Kumar (2014)
examined empirically the effects of initial public debt on subsequent growth of real
per capita GDP in a large panel of advanced and emerging market economies. Their
evidence also suggested an inverse relationship between the two variables, showing
that a 10 percentage point increase in the initial debt-to-GDP ratio is associated
with a slowdown in real per capita GDP growth of around 0.2 percentage points per
year, with the impact being somewhat smaller in advanced economies. Eberhardt &
Presbitero (2015) studied the long-run relationship between public debt and growth
in a large panel of advanced, developing and emerging countries. They found a
negative relationship between public debt and long-run growth across countries, but
no evidence for a similar debt threshold within countries. In contrast, Muye et al.
(2017) studied the debt-growth nexus for Saudi Arabia, a highly resource-dependent
economy, using an autoregressive distributed lags approach and showed that public
debt affects economic growth in a positive and statistically significant manner.
Caner et al. (2010) employed the two-regime model developed by Hansen (1999,
2000) on data for a large set of developing and developed countries, and estimated
the critical level after which debt becomes damaging to growth at 77 percent, with
the effect being more pronounced in developing economies. Pattillo et al. (2002)
and Pattillo et al. (2004), who empirically examined the relationship between total
external debt and GDP growth rate in developing countries, also concluded that
there is a non-linear relationship, in the form of an inverted-U shape, between debt
and growth. At low levels, total external debt affects positively growth, whereas
the relationship turns negative at higher levels of it. In particular, they estimated
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the specific turning points at 35-40 percent for the debt-to-GDP ratio and 160-170
percent for the debt-to-exports ratio. Further, Pattillo et al. (2004) supported that
total factor productivity and capital accumulation are the channels through which
total external debt affects economic performance.
A plethora of papers studied the relationship between debt and growth focusing on
OECD and EU countries especially after the 2007/08 global financial crisis. Using
data for OECD countries, Greiner (2011) found that the optimal level of public debt
ranges between 43 percent and 63 percent of GDP. Cecchetti et al. (2011) studied
the effects of public debt on growth using a dataset on debt levels in 18 OECD
countries from 1980 to 2010. Using the multiple regime panel threshold model of
Hansen (2000), they found that government debt is bad for growth when it is above
the threshold value of 85 percent of GDP. Chang & Chiang (2018) also analysed a
sample of 15 OECD countries using a generalisation of the Hansen model, and they
supported the presence of two threshold values in a regression of GDP per capita
growth and debt-to-GDP ratio. In particular, the threshold values were estimated at
32 and 66 percent. However, they could not support the crowding-out effect as the
impact of the debt ratio was positive and significant in all three regimes – higher in
the middle and lower in the two outer regimes.
Checherita-Westphal & Rother (2012) expressed growth as a quadratic functional
form of debt in a sample of 12 euro area countries, and found significant evidence for
an inverted U-shaped relationship. The debt turning point, beyond which debt starts
having a negative impact on growth, was reckoned at around 90 to 100 percent of
GDP. They also showed that public debt has a non-linear impact on economic growth
through private saving, public investment and total factor productivity. Baum et al.
(2013) also investigated the non-linear relationship between public debt and economic
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growth in 12 euro area countries. They applied a dynamic threshold panel model and
found that the short-run impact of debt on GDP growth is positive and statistically
significant, but decreases to around zero and loses significance if debt-to-GDP ratio
exceeds 67 percent.
On a slightly different approach, Go´mez-Puig & Sosvilla-Rivero (2017) implemented
time-series analysis, instead of panel estimation techniques, for each of the 11
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries and suggested that the
harmful impact of a debt change on growth does not occur beyond the same threshold
and with the same intensity in all EMU countries. They concluded that a focus on
average ratios and impacts may be unsuitable for defining policies.
Whilst the above papers predominantly predicted an inverted U-shaped relationship
between public debt and economic growth, a number of papers challenge those
findings on various grounds (Ghosh et al., 2013; Pescatori et al., 2014; Eberhardt
& Presbitero, 2015; Chudik et al., 2017). In particular, many of these results have
been obtained under strong homogeneity assumptions across countries and without
adequate attention to dynamics and error cross-sectional dependencies that exist
across countries due to global factors (including world commodity prices and the
stance of global financial cycle) and/or spillover effects from one country to another
which tend to magnify at times of financial crises, and are either unobserved or
difficult to capture in the empirical set-up (Chudik et al., 2017).
Also, they support that the presence of a tipping point on the debt-growth relationship
does not necessarily mean that it has to be common across countries. In particular,
the paper of Panizza & Andrea (2014) triggered a new wave of studies analysing the
reasons for the heterogeneous growth effects of public debt.
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“There is no simple relationship between debt and growth [...] There are many
factors that matter for a country’s growth and debt performance. Moreover, there is
no single threshold for debt ratios that can delineate the “bad” from the “good”.”
(Simon et al., 2012, p. 9)
Ghosh et al. (2013) showed that the threshold level may be subject to countries’
structural characteristics. Ahlborn & Schweickert (2016) pointed out that economies
entail different degrees of fiscal uncertainty due to specific institutional characteristics
concerning fiscal flexibility and effectiveness. The latter shapes the investment climate
at comparable levels of public debt and, thus, constitute a source of heterogeneity in
the relationship between high public debt levels and long-run economic growth. In
the same context, Asiedu (2003) and Dessy & Vencatachellum (2007) showed that a
certain level of institutional quality is necessary in order to encourage investment,
stimulate growth and benefit from the policy of debt relief. Kourtellos et al. (2013)
took into consideration heterogeneity using the structural threshold regression model
and found that there is very little evidence for non-linearities in the growth-debt
nexus. Instead, they showed that the relationship is mitigated by the quality of a
country’s institutions; when a country’s institutions are below a particular level, then
more public debt leads to lower growth.
Caner et al. (2010) supported that debt may play out differently in low-income
countries, because of less developed domestic financial markets and a different degree
of openness (Levine & Renelt, 1992; Frankel & Romer, 1999), while debt levels in
low-income countries may also have different implications for growth through the
inflation channel.
Eberhardt & Presbitero (2015) outlined all the potential reasons for the different
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correlation between public debt and economic growth across countries, naming,
among others: different production technology; disparate capacity to tolerate high
levels of debt, depending on country-specific characteristics related to past crises or
the macro framework; and varying vulnerability to public debt, depending on debt’s
composition for each country.
Reinhart & Rogoff (2010) also argued that peacetime debt buildups may be more
problematic for future growth since they tend to be persistent for longer periods of
time compared to war-time debt explosions. Economic and financial crises are also
likely to contribute to the buildup of government debt.
Pescatori et al. (2014) and Chudik et al. (2017) identified debt as a source of
heterogeneity in the debt-growth nexus, proposing that high but falling public debt
levels are growth-neutral, while high and rising debt levels can harm economic activity.
Further, Panizza & Andrea (2014) challenged that correlation between debt and
economic growth does not necessarily imply causation, and that the link could
actually be driven by the fact that it is low economic growth that leads to high levels
of debt (Reinhart et al., 2012). In addition, the observed correlation between debt
and growth could be due to a third factor that has a joint effect on the two variables.
For example, a banking crisis could jointly cause a growth slowdown and a sudden
debt explosion (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2011). According to the authors, establishing the
presence of a causal link going from debt to growth requires finding an instrumental
variable that has a direct effect on debt but no direct effect on economic growth, and
concluded that such a causal link may not exist.
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3.3.2 Natural resources and economic growth
In contrast to the limited bibliography studying the debt-growth nexus in resource-
rich economies, an extensive body of literature has been empirically investigating
the relationship between economic performance and natural resources, particularly
minerals and hydrocarbons. A large stream of it shows that many countries have
been trapped in their resource wealth and have mischievously failed to translate it
into economic development (known as the ‘resource curse’). A number of papers has
further added to the equation parameters such as the role of the financial sector, the
industry composition, the institutional quality as well as the human capital factor.
So far, there seems to be no clear consensus.
After the seminal works of Gelb & Associates (1988), Auty (1993) and Sachs &
Warner (1995), a frenzy of academic papers has been looking into this phenomenon.
According to the meta-analysis work of Havranek et al. (2016), more than 300
journal articles and working papers, including 43 econometric studies, have examined
the effect of natural resources on economic growth. The authors also identified
the main parameters that could explain the widely-spread results across studies,
citing as the main ones: differentiating between resource dependence and resource
abundance; distinguishing between different types of natural resources; controlling
for institutional quality and investment activity.
Satti et al. (2014) found the presence of the resource curse hypothesis in the case of the
Venezuelan economy after investigating the long- and short-run relationship between
natural resource abundance and economic growth. Based on the work of Haouas
& Soto (2012), the UAE was not immune to the oil curse either, with a number
of symptoms being identified, including very low growth in labour productivity,
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government policies unable to counteract economic cycles induced by oil price
volatility, and inefficient public sector (massive over-employment and declining
productivity). However, their results suggested that the country managed to make
the benefits outweigh the negative outcomes of oil exporting. James & Aadland (2011)
also supported that resource-dependent countries exhibit more anemic economic
growth. Ogunleye (2008) looked at the long-run impact of huge oil wealth accruing
to Nigeria on its economic development and found that, while there is a significant
positive long-run impact of per capita oil revenue on per capita household consumption
and electricity generation, a negative relationship is established for GDP. However,
he supported that if oil revenue was properly managed and invested, it could be
effectively used to induce oil-led development in Nigeria provided that the current
inhibitions of corruption, lack of transparency, accountability and fairness in its use
and distribution were removed. De Medeiros Costa & dos Santos (2013) examined the
resource curse hypothesis in developing countries and showed that evidence of legal
violations on institutions and the lack of tools in resource-rich developing countries
to uphold basic social and economic rights are associated with the resource curse.
Similarly, Alexeev & Conrad (2011) found that institutional quality is negatively
affected by oil wealth.
Gerelmaa & Kotani (2016) revisited the issues of the natural resource curse and
‘Dutch disease’12 by examining whether natural resource-rich countries tend to have
slower economic growth than resource-poor nations. Their analysis concluded that
both hypotheses held in the period from 1970 to 1990, but they did not hold from
1990 till 2010 because manufacturing sectors had grown sufficiently even in resource-
12The term Dutch disease originated in the Netherlands in the 1960s. The country was
experiencing high revenues thanks to its natural wealth in gas, but that led to a sharp decline in
the competitiveness of its other tradable sector, which in turn had as a result a drastic decrease in
economic growth. This economic paradox has since been recognised as the situation in which a
growing sector harms the performance of other sectors of an economy. (Hernandez, 2006)
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rich economies. James (2015) examined the resource dependence-growth nexus,
and showed that resource-dependent countries grow slowly during certain periods,
but relatively quickly during others. These results were largely explained when
considering industry composition. Horva´th & Zeynalov (2016) looked at the effect
of natural resource exports on the economic performance of the five independent
countries formerly comprising the Soviet Union, which had started to demonstrate
substantial differences from one another with respect to economic development and
institutions since the fall of communism. The authors’ results suggested that natural
resource exports did not crowd out the manufacturing sector in those post-Soviet
countries that possessed sufficiently high institutional capacity. In contrast, the
countries lacking such quality suffered from the resource curse.
On a slightly different approach, Parcero & Papyrakis (2016) looked at the relationship
between mineral wealth and income inequality on cross-country panel regressions
and they found that mineral abundant economies appear to suffer from lower rather
than higher levels of income inequality. Smith (2015) evaluated the impact of major
natural resource discoveries on GDP per capita and proved a positive effect on GDP
per capita levels following resource exploitation that persists in the long-term for
developing countries, whilst it has no effect on developed countries. Apergis & Payne
(2014) also explored the impact of oil abundance on the economic progress in a
number of Middle East and North Africa countries and their results suggested that
these nations have managed to use oil wealth for the benefit of their economies
by allowing for the improvement in the quality of their institutions. Ouoba (2016)
re-examined the existence of natural resource curse hypothesis for 28 countries rich
in resources and found that resource funds have a negative and significant impact on
economic performance, although the result should be treated with caution as the
paper didn’t differentiate among fund types.
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Emery & Boyce (2011) questioned whether a negative correlation between resource
abundance and growth can be sufficient evidence for concluding that natural resources
are a curse. The authors supported that whether resources can be a blessing or a
curse for an economy can only be determined by an investigation between resource
abundance and income levels, concluding that resources are a blessing as output per
capita is higher all along the equilibrium path.
Further, Sepehrdoust & Zamani Shabkhaneh (2015) used a panel regression model
to examine the possible role of knowledge-based components, such as social, financial
and technological factors, in motivating economic growth of developing oil-based
economies. The findings showed that a one percent change in social development,
technological improvement and financial indices of oil exporting developing OPEC
countries could significantly affect the growth of those economies in a positive way.
3.3.3 Taking stock
So far, we discussed the concept of sustainability and how it evolved over the years.
Sustainability has now been re-defined as ‘sustainable development’, including the
three parameterisations of economic, social and environmental. Although this term
was rarely related to the concept of fiscal sustainability, the latter is still considered
to indirectly affect sustainable development through its impact on economic growth.
Fiscal sustainability has always been a primary objective of governments across the
world as a prudent fiscal position can promote economic growth. It is regarded even
more important for resource-wealth countries which face a quite volatile revenue base.
In addition, such nations usually have limited flexibility in their monetary policy,
constraining their tools to that of fiscal policy only. After the oil price crash in July
2014, the increasing government debt levels seen in resource-intensive economies have
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raised concerns over sovereign debt sustainability, making it an interesting research
area.
The current chapter expands the existing literature on the debt-growth nexus by
focusing on developing resource-rich countries, for whom limited work has been
conducted so far. The analysis explores the relationship between debt and economic
growth in these countries, as well as it investigates whether a common threshold
debt level and any differential impact of debt on GDP growth below and above such
a tipping point exist. The resource wealth parameter, that these countries present,
is also brought in so we can further examine the impact it has on growth.
Building on the business cycle analysis, the short-term effect of both debt and
hydrocarbons on the economic performance of these countries is investigated. Public
debt can have an important influence on economy in both short- and long-run as it
has earlier been discussed. However, the short-term impact, looking at de-trended
movements from the long-term path, is considered in this work as the shorter period is
less prone to structural changes and more comparable with the economic environment
of those economies following the oil price shocks that have taken place since 1990.13
3.4 Methodology
The paper’s econometric estimation will be based on the following model:
Yit+k = θYit +
n∑
λ=1
δiλXit + β1Dit + β2D
2
it + µi + νt + εit (3.1)
where Y is the dependent variable; X(i = 1, .., n) is a set of explanatory regressors
13The oil price shocks that have occurred since 1990 include the Gulf War in 1990/91, the Asian
Financial Crisis in 1998, the Venezuelan Crisis and the Iraqi War in 2002/03, the Global Financial
Crisis in 2008, the Arab Uprisings in 2010/11 and the 2014 oil price shock.
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lagged by k years; D is the public debt-to-GDP ratio, also lagged by k years; D2
is a quadratic term of debt as we check for the existence of a non-linear impact of
government debt on growth; µi is country-fixed effects; νt is time-fixed effects; and εit
is the error term. The equation contains country- and time-dummies to capture the
economic and social characteristics specific for each country, as well as any common
shocks across countries.
3.4.1 Unit root tests
Ahead of any estimation work, we test for the order of integration of the variables by
applying unit root tests. This step is important to check whether the parameters in
the equation have the same order of integration as macroeconomic data might show
non-stationarity. The most well known and widely used unit root tests for panel data
analysis are considered to be the Levin-Lin-Chu (Levin et al., 2002), Harris-Tzavalis
(Harris & Tzavalis, 1999), Breitung (2000), Im-Pesaran-Shin (Im et al., 2003), the
Hadri (2000) Lagrange Multiplier (LM) and Fisher-type tests (Maddala & Wu, 1999;
Choi, 2001). All the tests have as the null hypothesis that all panels contain a unit
root, apart from the Hadri LM test that assumes that all panels are trend stationary.
In this paper, we apply the Fisher-type unit root tests – based on both augmented
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests – as they are the only ones that allow for
unbalanced panels, which is the case in this study. The panel unit root tests based
on a heterogeneous model consist of testing the significance of the results from N
independent individual tests. In this context, the Fisher (1932) panel unit root tests
use p-values of the individual statistics.
In other words, the idea of the Fisher-type test can be described by considering
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pure time series unit root test statistics (such as ADF), where if these statistics are
continuous, then the corresponding p-values, denoted ρi, are uniform (0, 1) variables
under the null hypothesis. Consequently, the combined statistics test is defined as:
PMW = −2
N∑
i=1
log(ρi)
where ρi is the p-value from ith cross-section. The test statistics has a chi-square
distribution with 2N degrees of freedom, when T tends to infinity and N is fixed.14
As noted by Banerjee (1999), the obvious simplicity of this test and its robustness to
statistic choice, lag length and sample size make it quite attractive. However, the
test has the downside of assuming that panel units are cross-sectionally independent.
3.4.2 Economic growth estimation
The techniques utilised for the econometric estimation are pooled OLS, panel fixed-
effects and instrumental variable estimation. The former is a simple OLS technique
run on panel data, which ignores the panel structure of the data, and thus any
individual specific effects. Panel fixed-effects estimation is also employed. In panel
fixed-effects the individual-specific effect is taken into account and is defined as a
random variable that is allowed to be correlated with the explanatory variables.
Given the strong potential for endogeneity of the debt variable (Frankel & Romer,
14For large N samples, Choi (2001) proposed a similar standardised statistic:
ZMW =
√
N [N−1PMW − E[−2log(ρi)]]√
V ar[−2log(ρi)]
= −
∑N
i=1 log(ρi) +N√
N
which corresponds to the standardised cross-sectional average of individual p-values.
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1999; Checherita-Westphal & Rother, 2012; Panizza & Andrea, 2014), especially
reverse causation, we also apply instrumental variable estimation techniques. This
involves replacing the endogenous variable (say debti), which is correlated with
the error term, Cov(debti, ei) = 0, by a ‘proxy’ variable known as an instrumental
variable (say zi=lags of debt), that is independent of the error term, Cov(zi, ei) 6= 0,
but correlated with the endogenous variable, Cov(zi, debti) = 0. The latter implies
that it does not suffer from measurement error. Many studies have been examining
growth regressions by using the instrumental variable approach to deal with the
simultaneity bias issue (Hiebert et al., 2002). The estimators used in this paper are
two-stage least squares (2-SLS ) and generalised method of moments (GMM ).
We apply all the above methods to check for robustness as each of the estimators
involves some tradeoff; estimators that seem to be attractive in terms of a specific
econometric problem can lead to a different type of bias. For example, the consistency
of pooled OLS could be affected by the omitted-variable bias or heterogeneity bias
resulting from possible correlation between country-specific fixed-effects and the
regressors. The fixed-effects technique addresses the problem of the omitted-variable
bias via controlling for fixed-effects, but tends to exacerbate the measurement error
problem. The other important issue, that of endogeneity caused by the correlation
between regressors and error term could affect the consistency of both pooled OLS
and fixed-effects. Instrumental variables, such as the GMM estimator, address the
above problems – measurement errors, omitted-variable bias and endogeneity – but
they might be subject to the weak instruments’ problem.
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3.4.3 Threshold estimation
Besides the identification of the impact of both debt and resource wealth on the
economic growth of developing countries, the paper also investigates whether a
common threshold debt level exists.
Threshold models have wide applications in economics and have gained significant
popularity in applied econometric studies. In early 1990s and 2000s, quite a few
theories of estimation and inference were well developed for linear, non-dynamic
models with exogenous variables, including Chan (1993), Hansen (1996), Hansen
(1999), Hansen (2000) and Caner (2002).
The natural starting point for the empirical analysis of thresholds is the panel
threshold model introduced by Hansen (1999), briefly described in Box 4. While the
advantage of Hansen’s threshold model lies in estimating threshold values instead
of imposing them (Kremer et al., 2013), it presents a number of caveats. The most
important limitation is that all regressors are required to be exogenous. In growth
regressions with panel data, the exogeneity assumption is particularly severe (Kremer
et al., 2013). Also, this specific threshold approach is designed for balanced and
non-dynamic panels, making it non-applicable to studies that encase these properties,
such is our work.
An alternative approach is fitting a spline regression, allowing for one or more knots
(Marsh & Cormier, 2002). Woo & Kumar (2010) followed that technique to explore
the presence of non-linearities by using a dummy (D30) that took a value of one when
Debt < 30, another dummy, (D30−90), that took the value one when 30 < Debt < 90,
and (D90) that took the value one when Debt > 90. However, these methods tend to
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Box 4: Hansen’s Threshold Model
The subscript i indexes the individual and the subscript t indexes time. The
dependent variable yit and the threshold variable qit are scalar, and the regressor
xit is a k vector. I(·) is the indicator function. The equation becomes:
yit = µi + β
′
1xitI(qit ≤ γ) + β
′
2xitI(qit > γ) + εit
which can also be written as:
yit =

µi + β
′
1xit + εit, qit ≤ γ
µi + β
′
2xit + εit, qit > γ
The observations are divided into two regimes, depending on whether
the threshold variable qit is larger or smaller than the threshold γ. The
regimes are distinguished by different regression slopes, β1 and β2. The
threshold variable, qit, is assumed to be non-time invariant and the
error eit independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) with mean zero
and finite variance σ2. The i.i.d assumption excludes lagged dependent
variables from xit and the analysis becomes asymptotic with fixed T as n→∞.
In case of multiple thresholds, the double threshold model takes the form:
yit = µi+β
′
1xitI(qit ≤ γ1)+β
′
2xitI(γ1 < qit ≤ γ2)+β
′
3xitI(qit > γ2)+εit (3.2)
where γ1 < γ2. For given (γ1, γ2), equation 3.2 is linear in the slopes (β1, β2, β3),
allowing OLS estimation to be also used in applications of multiple thresholds.
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be sensitive to extreme values and a hump-shaped relationship may be driven by few
observations (Panizza & Presbitero, 2013).
Checherita-Westphal & Rother (2012) tested for non-linearities by including a
quadratic term of debt in the growth regression. The threshold analysis followed in
this paper builds on this approach and adopts the same formula of calculating the
turning point. That is shown in regression (3.1) as the debt ratio that optimises the
quadratic equation and is computed by:
Debt turning point = −1
2
∗ coefficient of debt
coefficient of debt2
A few ‘sophisticated’ techniques have begun being developed over the last few years,
addressing panel frameworks, endogeneity issues and being suited for dynamic models.
The application of them, though, remains an important direction of future work due
to current time constraints.
3.5 Data and empirical findings
3.5.1 Data
Data on macroeconomic series were collected from IMF and World Bank.15 In
particular, data were gathered on real GDP growth rate; debt-to-GDP ratio; gross
fixed capital formation as a share of GDP; trade for the economy’s openness and
external competitiveness16; account balance as a share of GDP; natural resources
rents17 as a percent of GDP; and inflation calculated as percentage change of average
15Mnemonics of the variables used are displayed in Appendix A.2.
16Trade is defined as imports plus exports as a percent of GDP.
17Total natural resources rents are defined as the total revenues that can be generated from the
extraction of natural resources less the cost of extracting the resources.
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consumer prices. Debt refers to gross general government debt18. The aforementioned
series are those that have been widely used in the empirical literature, after being
identified as the main parameters of a short-term growth analysis (Caner et al., 2010;
Checherita-Westphal & Rother, 2012; Baharumshah et al., 2017).
Obtaining comprehensive data on public debt has been challenging, preventing us
from separating between gross and net debt, and between foreign- and domestic-
currency dominated. The latter could be particularly relevant in developing countries
as the presence of foreign-currency debt increases fragility and leads to less optimal
macroeconomic policies (Hausmann & Panizza, 2011; Dell’Erba et al., 2013; Eberhardt
& Presbitero, 2015). In addition, the exclusion of private debt could be problematic
as private debt is a potential source of financial instability and crisis (Gourinchas &
Obstfeld, 2011; Schularick & Taylor, 2012; Eberhardt & Presbitero, 2015). However,
our analysis is expected not to be significantly affected as debt in our sample is
largely domestic and public (IMF, 2018e).19 For robustness check, though, we use
as an additional control variable the total domestic credit to the private sector 20
indicator, which is available for our time span and country selection and can be
used as a proxy of the private debt. Finally, net debt could be a better measure of
government indebtedness, but it is hard to calculate, requiring a precise evaluation
of the government’s assets and liabilities (Panizza & Presbitero, 2013). Despite the
above limitations, which if not present would have allowed to get better insights on
the debt-growth relationship, the total public debt can still be a great indicator and
18Gross general government debt consists of all liabilities that require payment or payments of
interest and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the future. This includes
debt liabilities in the form of Special Drawing Rights, currency and deposits, debt securities, loans,
insurance, pensions and standardised guarantee schemes, and other accounts payable (IMF, 2018e).
19Schclarek (2004) looked at the relationship between debt and growth in developing countries by
distinguishing between public and private external debt. He found a negative relationship between
public debt and growth, but no significant correlation when only considering private debt.
20Data was collected by World Bank (2018a).
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shed light on the impact of debt on the economic performance of those economies.
Indeed, an association between public debt accumulation and lower growth has been
identified by the literature. Besides, the gross government debt can be broadly
comparable across countries compared to other indicators, such as net debt which is
rarely comparable.
The availability of public debt data dictated the sample size, which spanned the years
1990-2017 for a total number of 23 developing resource-rich economies21, including:
Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bolivia, Brunei, Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Iran,
Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela (Table 3.2). That
contains 644 observations.
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Brunei are in the high-
income category and they are the only ones from our sample at that level (6 out of
23 countries in total). These countries managed to turn their resource wealth into
financial wealth and be equally compared to high-income developed countries when
considering aggregate and per capita output levels. The majority of the countries
falls under the upper-middle income category, with a few only being in the lower level.
Our panel is unbalanced.
21A country is defined as resource-intensive if its natural resource exports exceed 25 percent
of total merchandised exports, and fiscally dependent on natural resources if natural resource
revenues exceed 20 percent of budgetary revenue (Lundgren et al., 2013). The Oxford Policy
Management and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) both use a similar threshold,
while the Natural Resource Governance Institute, based on the IMF definition, considers a country
as resource-rich if i) an average share of hydrocarbon and/or mineral fiscal revenues in total is of at
least 25 percent, and ii) an average share of hydrocarbon and/or mineral export proceeds in total
export proceeds is of at least 25 percent.
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Table 3.2: Developing Resource-Rich Countries Classification
Country
Income
Group
Hydrocarbon
Revenues
(% total revenues)
as of 2016
Hydrocarbon
Exports
(% total exports)
as of 2016
Status
(as of 2017)
Algeria Upper-Middle 35.3 95.2
Net Oil & Gas
Exporter
Angola*** Lower-Middle 48.7 95.4 Net Oil Exporter
Azerbaijan Upper-Middle 51.5 90.0 Net Oil Exporter
Bahrain High 68.4 52.3 Net Oil Exporter
Bolivia Lower-Middle 16.6 24.9 Net Gas Exporter
Brunei*** High 69.8 86.7
Net Oil & Gas
Exporter
Congo*** Lower-Middle 59.3 80.5 Net Oil Exporter
Ecuador*** Upper-Middle 20.6 35.1 Net Oil Exporter
Egypt Lower-Middle - 30.0 Net Gas Importer
Iran*** Upper-Middle 35.6 64.3 Net Oil Exporter
Iraq Upper-Middle 85.0 99.4 Net Oil Exporter
Kazakhstan** Upper-Middle 23.3 44.5 Net Oil Exporter
Kuwait High 66.0 89.2 Net Oil Exporter
Malaysia Upper-Middle 13.9 - Net Gas Exporter
Mexico Upper-Middle 16.1 5.0 Net Oil Exporter
Nigeria Lower-Middle 39.0 92.2
Net Oil & Gas
Exporter
Oman High 68.2 57.9 Net Gas Exporter
Qatar High 80.3 80.6
Net Oil & Gas
Exporter
Russia* Upper-Middle 35.9 42.5
Net Oil & Gas
Exporter
Saudi Arabia High 59.4 74.7 Net Oil Exporter
Turkmenistan Upper-Middle - 86.8
Net Oil & Gas
Exporter
UAE** High 38.2 17.5 Net Oil Exporter
Venezuela@ Upper-Middle - 98.1 Net Oil Exporter
Data Sources: World Bank (2018c); BP (2018); EIA (2018); IEA (2017);
OPEC (2018); IMF (2016, 2018a,d, 2017c,b, 2018c,b, 2017a) – Notes: *Federal
government. **General government. ***Central government. @Hydrocarbon exports
as of 2017 (OPEC, 2018). According to the World Bank, income groups are based on
GNI per capita (U.S. dollars), classified as: High: $12,236 or more; Upper-middle:
$3,956 to $12,235; Lower-middle: $1,006 to $3,955. The selection of the countries in
the panel is based on the definition of a resource-rich economy adopted by IMF (see
footnote 21, p. 112). Countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Kazakhstan, Malaysia and
Mexico were experiencing higher hydrocarbon revenues before the 2014 oil price crash,
with shares at 31.8, 28, 47.7, 30.2 and 30.7 percent of total revenues, respectively,
which justifies their inclusion in the sample. Similarly, hydrocarbon exports of the
UAE were at 29.7 percent of the country’s total exports in 2014.
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Hydrocarbons wealth
The countries in the sample account for around 80 percent of world proven oil and
gas reserves and collectively produce about 60 and 50 percent of global oil and gas,
respectively (Table 3.3).
The hydrocarbon resources are not distributed evenly, though. High income countries
represent 29 and 22 percent of global oil and gas reserves, respectively, compared
to upper-middle income economies that make up 46 and 55 percent. Lower-middle
income nations account for just 3 and 4 percent, respectively. Venezuela is the
country with the largest oil reserves (18 percent) and Russia with the largest gas
reserves (18 percent) in the world.
In terms of oil and gas production, the picture looks fairly the same. Saudi Arabia
is the world’s second largest oil producer, after the U.S., with a global share of 13
percent. With respect to gas production, though, Russia is the largest gas producer
at 17 percent of global output. High income economies make up approximately 24
and 12 percent of global oil and gas output, respectively, compared to 33 percent of
oil and gas produced by upper-middle countries. Lower-middle income economies
account for just 5 and 3 percent, respectively.
Public debt trends
Oil and gas dependency is the main factor that drives the debt dynamics of our
sample. Debt levels averaged 37 percent of GDP over 1990-2017, although episodes
of much higher debt ratios were common. Respectively, the average GDP growth rate
was 4.4 percent over the same period. Separating the sample countries into high-,
upper-middle- and lower-middle-income, we find a quite intuitive pattern (Figure 3.8).
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Figure 3.8: Debt-to-GDP Ratios across Country Groups
Data Sources: World Bank (2018c,d); IMF (2018e) – Notes: The figure shows the
historical trend of debt across country groups, in conjuction with oil prices between
1990 and 2017. Oil price depicts the average price of WTI, Brent and Dubai crudes
in real terms. Average debt levels are not shown for upper-middle and lower-middle
income groups between 1990 and 2000 as most of the data are not available for those
countries.
Resource-rich economies experienced a quite similar pattern for most of the period
between 1990 and 2017; that of a gradual debt decrease till 2008 and a buildup
since.22 Debt levels increased at a slower rate in the aftermath of the global financial
crisis of 2007/08, while the rate became sharper after 2014. High-income nations
exhibited lower average debt ratios of slightly above 20 percent over the sample
period, while upper-middle-income nations experienced an average ratio of about 40
percent. Lower-middle-income countries carried the highest debts for much of the
sample period at an average of around 50 percent.
22The debt spike shown in the upper-middle-income average in year 2004 was due to the Iraq
War.
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Increasing oil prices, especially after 2000, led in 2008 to the lowest average debt levels
since 1990, based on the data available. A debt sustainability analysis conducted by
IMF and World Bank in 2011 for 20 low-income countries showed that only 25 percent
of resource-rich countries were in debt distress or at a high risk of debt distress,
compared to 35 percent across other countries assessed. In contrast, in the 2016
debt report, the share of low-income resource-rich countries being in debt distress
increased to 33 percent, compared to 28 percent across resource-poor countries. That
was the result of the 2014 oil price crash. The Republic of the Congo shows the
largest debt ratio at 120 percent, followed by Egypt at 100 percent, while the country
with the lowest average ratio is Brunei at just three percent, followed by the UAE at
20 percent. The largest single-year debt increase occurred in Kuwait in 1991, where
debt-to-GDP ratio jumped from one percent to slightly more than 150 percent due
to large military expenditures during the first Gulf War, while the largest single-year
decline occurred in Congo in 2010, with debt levels dropping from 63 percent to 22
percent of GDP. That was a result of the debt relief approved by IMF and World
Bank in January 2010 after the country met a series of rigorous conditions under
which it was asked to tackle corruption and improve transparency in its mining and
oil sectors (Reuters, 2010). Saudi Arabia and Russia, the second and third largest
oil producers of global output, had managed to reduce their debt to levels below 10
percent of GDP during 2006-2009 and 2010-2015, respectively. Both countries had
faced debt ratios of around 100 percent before. Kuwait was the only country whose
debt levels recorded a distinct downward trend for much of the sample period.
In addition to hydrocarbons dependence, some more common structural characteristics
of the economies in the sample have been propitious to accumulating debt. In
particular, a volatile revenue base dependent on oil prices, weak fiscal institutions
and increased public expenditures have made a prompt fiscal response to shocks
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difficult (So¨derling et al., 2010).
Table 3.4 depicts the relationship between debt and growth, as well as debt and oil
prices. Debt ratios were mainly inversely correlated with oil prices over 1990-2017,
confirming that countries usually do better in terms of their public finances during
boom cycles. Similarly, a negative correlation was evident between growth and debt
for most countries. In contrast, correlation was, on average, positive between oil
prices and government spending. That is quite common in resource-rich countries,
where structural fiscal reforms are introduced when money is tight, but are often
cancelled when government revenues go up again. Two characteristic examples of the
latter relationship include Ghana and Mozambique. Both countries seeked financial
assistance from IMF amid hopes of imminent resource wealth. Despite the fact
that Ghana managed to start production in just three years after its first major oil
discovery in 2007, it failed to accumulate the revenue levels required to keep up with
government spending and pay back its debt. Similarly, Mozambique, after major
gas discoveries, still accumulated enormous debt, as money kept on being spent in
purchasing military hardware.
3.5.2 Empirical findings
Descriptive statistics
Table 3.5 provides the descriptive statistics. The series are shown as a ratio of GDP,
unless otherwise stated. Debt, inflation and trade openness seem to be the least
concentrated relative to the other parameters, as shown by the higher standard error.
In contrast, GDP growth, as well as capital show the least variability in the sample.
The average debt-to-GDP ratio of the rest countries of the sample for each country is
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Table 3.4: Correlation Analysis
Country
Oil Price
& Debt
Government
Spending &
Oil Price
Government
Spending &
Lagged Oil Price
GDP
& Debt
Growth
& Debt
Algeria -0.88* 0.61* 0.79* -0.88* -0.23
Angola -0.80* -0.05 -0.18 -0.38 -0.51**
Azerbaijan -0.33 0.75* 0.85* 0.17 -0.40***
Bahrain 0.33*** -0.02 0.20 0.81* -0.22
Bolivia -0.72* 0.66* 0.78* -0.63* -0.56**
Brunei 0.66* -0.75* -0.64* 0.65* -0.52*
Congo 0.12 0.15 0.41** 0.18 0.13
Ecuador -0.90* 0.73* 0.80* -0.59* -0.17
Egypt -0.23 0.00 0.12 0.21 -0.30
Iran -0.37*** -0.41** -0.44** 0.28 0.30
Iraq -0.53** -0.35 -0.47*** -0.69* 0.69*
Kazakhstan -0.53** 0.09 0.05 0.44*** -0.48***
Kuwait -0.74* -0.37*** -0.26 -0.88* 0.15
Malaysia 0.21 0.12 0.29 0.17 0.20
Mexico 0.00 0.71* 0.86* 0.64* -0.06
Nigeria -0.74* -0.50** -0.59* -0.74* -0.33***
Oman -0.83* -0.20 0.06 -0.32*** -0.21
Qatar -0.48* -0.76* -0.56* -0.01 -0.13
Russia -0.73* -0.10 0.21 -0.80* 0.32
Saudi Arabia -0.83* -0.25 0.08 -0.83* -0.25
Turkmenistan -0.70* -0.74* -0.69* -0.24 -0.26
UAE 0.54** 0.03 0.26 0.80* -0.55*
Venezuela 0.32 0.62* 0.67* 0.21 -0.10
Data Sources: IMF (2018e); World Bank (2018d,b) – Notes: The first column of
the table depicts correlation coefficients of general government gross debt-to-GDP
ratio and average real oil price of Brent, WTI and Dubai between 1990-2017. The
second and third column show correlation coefficients of government expenditure
and average real oil price of Brent, WTI and Dubai between 1990-2017, as well
as expenditure and oil price lagged by one period. The last two columns display
correlation coefficients of general government gross debt-to-GDP ratio and real GDP
in 2010 U.S. dollar terms between 1990-2017, as well as debt and real GDP growth.
*, **, *** show significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.
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studied along the other parameters as the indicator will be used in the instrumental
variable estimations carried out in the next section. Results are also shown for the
‘domestic credit to private sector’ variable which is used as a proxy of private debt for
further robustness check. Next, we examine the variables’ persistence by conducting
unit root tests.
Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Median Min Max SE
Real GDP (percent change) 4.34 3.99 -41.01 82.81 8.10
General Government Debt 36.63 28.41 0.00 342.67 35.52
Natural Resources Rents 22.83 19.46 1.24 82.53 15.61
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 22.09 21.30 0.00 57.71 8.05
Trade Openness 85.62 76.84 0.02 220.41 40.74
Account Balance 3.41 2.19 -242.19 60.27 17.30
Inflation (percent change) 52.70 5.04 -8.53 4146.01 291.29
Domestic Credit to Private Sector 34.53 28.81 1.17 158.51 26.62
Average Debt Sample 37.16 39.59 18.39 57.12 9.67
Notes: The table gives the descriptive statistics for our series, which are
shown in percentage of GDP, unless otherwise stated. The sample covers 1990-2017
for 23 resource-rich countries. SE denotes standard error.
Unit root test results
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 show the Fisher-type unit root test results for the variables
examined in this work.23 Looking at the statistics in the tables, the null hypothesis
of a unit root is rejected for all series for all the three specifications – when a time
trend is included, a drift term is included or neither a time trend nor a drift term is
included – except debt and domestic credit to private sector.
23Many empirical studies looking at the growth-debt relationsip ignore investigating unit root
tests of the series, assuming arbitrarily the order of integration of the variables used (De Vita et al.,
2018).
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In particular, real GDP growth, natural resources rents, account balance and inflation
are all level stationary at one percent significance level. Gross fixed capital formation
is stationary at five percent significance level and trade openness at 10 percent.
De Vita et al. (2018) confirm our findings of level stationarity of the growth series.
As per the debt series, looking at the results based on the augmented Dickey-Fuller
test, the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at one percent significance level
across all type tests when neither a time nor a drift trend is included. Adding the
time trend to the debt series, P and Pm reject the null hypothesis of a unit root,
while Z and L* support non-stationarity at level. Finally, considering only the drift
term, all tests suggest stationarity at level at one percent significance level. Similarly,
the Fisher-type unit root test results based on Phillips-Perron support those findings.
Concluding, the results of the different Fisher-type tests for the debt-to-GDP ratio
might not be in harmonious alignment, however, in balance the findings seem to
be in favour of the level stationarity. The findings for the average debt of the rest
countries of the sample show mixed results. Unit root test results for the debt series
seem to differ across the various empirical studies, depending on the country or the
panel countries under investigation (Eberhardt & Presbitero, 2015; De Vita et al.,
2018).
Unit root test figures support non-stationarity at level for the domestic credit to
private sector when neither a time trend nor a drift term is included. However,
when considering the drift term, the tests suggest level stationarity at one percent
significance level.
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Table 3.7: Fisher-Type Unit Root Test Results Based on Phillips-Perron
Time Trend
Not Included
Time Trend
Included
P Z L* Pm P Z L* Pm
Real GDP
Growth
270.26
(0.000)
-11.88
(0.000)
-15.44
(0.000)
23.38
(0.000)
196.54
(0.000)
-8.36
(0.000)
-10.60
(0.000)
15.69
(0.000)
General
Government Debt
212.56
(0.000)
-2.31
(0.010)
-8.29
(0.000)
17.37
(0.000)
81.96
(0.001)
1.13
(0.870)
-0.31
(0.377)
3.75
(0.000)
Natural
Resources Rents
102.79
(0.000)
-5.15
(0.000)
-5.23
(0.000)
5.92
(0.000)
88.49
(0.000)
-3.74
(0.000)
-3.86
(0.000)
4.43
(0.000)
Gross Fixed
Capital Formation
78.44
(0.001)
-3.02
(0.001)
-3.21
(0.001)
3.67
(0.000)
63.15
(0.031)
-1.92
(0.027)
-1.96
(0.026)
2.04
(0.021)
Trade
Openness
101.72
(0.000)
-3.79
(0.000)
-4.43
(0.000)
5.81
(0.000)
75.42
(0.004)
-1.33
(0.091)
-1.81
(0.036)
3.07
(0.001)
Account Balance
185.49
(0.000)
-6.89
(0.000)
-9.87
(0.000)
14.54
(0.000)
155.12
(0.000)
-4.20
(0.000)
-7.03
(0.000)
11.38
(0.000)
Inflation
345.70
(0.000)
-12.44
(0.000)
-20.10
(0.000)
31.25
(0.000)
277.39
(0.000)
-9.97
(0.000)
-15.75
(0.000)
24.12
(0.000)
Domestic Credit
to Private Sector
40.73
(0.613)
2.30
(0.989)
2.11
(0.981)
-0.35
(0.636)
41.25
(0.590)
1.78
(0.962)
1.55
(0.938)
-0.29
(0.615)
Average Debt
Sample
50.62
(0.296)
-1.99
(0.023)
-1.79
(0.038)
0.48
(0.315)
32.76
(0.929)
0.10
(0.538)
0.09
(0.535)
-1.38
(0.916)
Notes: The table depicts the unit root test results after applying the Fisher-
type tests based on the Phillips-Perron test. The statistic value of the tests is shown,
as well as the p-value in brackets. P, Z, L* and Pm denote the inverse chi-squared,
inverse normal, inverse logit and the modified inverse chi-squared tests. The average
debt sample denotes the average debt ratio of the rest countries in the sample for
each country.
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Economic growth estimation and outcomes
We now proceed to the econometric estimation of the model. The impact of resource
wealth on the economic growth of those countries is also examined. A quadratic
element of debt is further used to explore the existence of a non-linear impact of
government debt on growth. The equation contains country- and year-dummies to
capture the economic and social characteristics specific for each country, as well as
any common shocks across these economies.
We follow the same approach as Checherita-Westphal & Rother (2012), with the
regression taking the following form:
GDPit+k = β0GDPit + β1Debtit + β2Debt
2
it + β3Rentsit+
+ β4Capitalit + β5Tradeit + β6Balanceit+
+ β7Inflationit + µi + νt + εit
(3.3)
where GDP is the real growth rate of GDP; Debt is gross government debt-to-GDP
ratio; Rents is the total natural resources rents; Capital is investment proxied by
gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP; Trade is trade openness of the
economy as percent of GDP; Balance stands for the account balance of the country
as a share of GDP; Inflation is the percentage change of average consumer prices;
µi is country-fixed effects; νt is time-fixed effects; and εit is the error term.
The econometric estimation is carried out using pooled OLS, panel fixed-effects and
panel fixed-effects including a time dummy in the specification. Panel random-effects
are also applied but the Hausman Specification Test (Hausman, 1978) results are in
favour of the fixed-effects model for our sample.
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As explained before, given the strong potential for endogeneity of the debt variable,
we apply 2-SLS and GMM instrumental variable techniques.
In particular, we mitigate the endogeneity problem in this work by applying four
different approaches in equation 3.3: i) contemporaneous reaction of all variables is
examined, where k = 0; ii) all explanatory variables are lagged by one year, where
k = 1; iii) all explanatory variables are lagged by three years and the dependent
variable shows the cumulative overlapping growth rate, where k = 3 and overlapping;
iv) all the independent parameters are lagged by three years and the dependent
variable shows the 3-year cumulative non-overlapping growth rate, where k = 3
and non-overlapping. However, we call the second approach the ‘benchmark’ model
for this study as the impact of the lagged debt by one year on growth has always
been identified by the empirical literature (Panizza & Andrea, 2014; Eberhardt &
Presbitero, 2015).
While using lagged terms of regressors as instruments is relatively common practice
with macroeconomic data, Checherita-Westphal & Rother (2012) supported that
this can be problematic due to the high persistence of the debt stock variable. For
robustness check, we follow the same approach and we include for every country and
year the average public debt-to-GDP ratio of the rest countries in the sample, which
allows us to use it as an additional instrument. However, we do not expect it to
have any impact on our results, as it is unlikely that the debt level of a hydrocarbon-
wealthy developing country can be affected by the average debt level of all the other
resource-rich developing countries. Indeed, the results confirm our expectations. The
parameter remains insignificant across all specifications in this work and, hence, we
exclude it from the estimation.
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Further, we test for the instruments’ exogeneity and debt’s endogeneity. All
estimation techniques use cluster robust standard errors, which control for both
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. The findings are presented in Tables 3.8,
3.9 and 3.10.
The results across all models suggest, on average, a significant linear and non-
linear impact of debt on the economic growth of developing resource-rich countries,
indicating the existence of a concave relationship between the two parameters.
That becomes more obvious when instrumental variable techniques are applied. In
particular, the effect of public debt seems to be insignificant in the case of pooled
OLS and fixed-effects specifications. The impact, though, becomes significant when
accounting for debt endogeneity, where it is positively correlated with economic
activity in the linear case, and turns negative under non-linearity. This is in line
with the findings of Caner et al. (2010); Checherita-Westphal & Rother (2012); Woo
& Kumar (2014). However, the impact of debt is greater in the former case (linear)
than in the latter (non-linear). On average, an one percentage point increase in
debt-to-GDP ratio can cause a 0.08 percentage point rise in GDP growth in the
linear case. In contrast, debt is associated with a slowdown in GDP growth of around
0.001 percentage points under non-linearity.
Natural resources dependence seems to have, on average, a positive impact on growth,
as indicated by all different specifications. The results are consistent with those
of Alexeev & Conrad (2011); Havranek et al. (2016); Ouoba (2016). Whilst the
relationship might differ across the sample countries when they are studied separately,
overall the findings for this panel suggest that hydrocarbons are a source for growth.
Assuming that natural resources rents increase by 1 percentage point of GDP, growth
will rise by 0.10 percentage points.
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The investment’s effect, proxied by the fixed gross capital formation indicator, seems
to be positively significant when all variables are considered reacting simultaneously.
Trade openness does not have any substantial impact on growth, while account
balance shows mixed results. The influence on growth is negative when it shows
significance. Similarly, when inflation turns significant, it has a negative effect on
the economic performance.
We do not report results of the impact of debt on the three-year cumulative non-
overlapping growth rates as they are all insignificant across the various specifications.
Using total domestic credit to private sector indicator as a proxy to private debt
does not yield any significant results, either. The findings show that there is not such
a substantial impact of private debt on the economic performance of those countries.
Debt threshold estimation outcome
The debt-to-GDP turning point24 of the concave relationship lies between 80 and 120
percent across the specifications. The benchmark model indicates a lower tipping
point of between 80 and 90 percent, compared to the cumulative 3-year overlapping
approach that intimates a higher theshold level between 105 and 120 percent. The
approach of the contemporaneous reaction of all variables in the model also confirms
the benchmark’s results.
While we appreciate the limitations of a panel threshold analysis and the fact that
any detrimental impact of debt on growth does not necessarily occur beyond the same
tipping point, we can still draw some useful conclusions. The findings, confirmed
by the existing empirical evidence, suggest that debt can stimulate growth, but its
24As explained in chapter 3.5.3, the turning point is the debt ratio that optimises the quadratic
equation. It is calculated using the formula −1/2 ∗ [coefficient(debt)/coefficient(debt2)], where
coefficient denotes the regression coefficient.
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impact can turn negative, threatening the fiscal sustainability of the country if a
certain tipping point is crossed.
In particular, looking at the case of the Republic of the Congo, the country experienced
debt levels above the threshold point between 2000 and 2007 and, more recently,
between 2015 and 2017, following the oil price crash in 2014. Respectively, growth
during those years was affected, with rates averaging lower compared to those when
debt was below threshold. Similarly, debt increased significantly in Saudi Arabia
in 1998, exceeding the threshold level and staying above it for the next consecutive
years. During those years, growth rates turned negative for the country.
Especially after the 2014 oil price shock, many countries have been experiencing
increasing debt levels, menacingly approaching the threshold level estimated in this
paper. Angola’s debt increased from 40 percent of its GDP in 2014 to 65 percent
in 2017. Although its debt is considered still sustainable, the country is highly
vulnerable to shocks, including the exchange rate and the oil price (IMF, 2018a). A
subsequent budget deficit and sharp devaluations of the currency following the oil
price crash contributed to an increase in Azerbaijan’s public debt. Between 2014
and 2017, debt-to-GDP ratio climbed from 14 percent to 55 percent. Although the
majority of Azerbaijan’s debt has long maturities, which can mitigate part of the
financing pressure, such increases still make the country susceptible to further macro
and financial shocks (IMF, 2016). Similarly, the sharp fall in oil prices resulted
in a substantial increase of Iraq’s public debt, from 30 percent of GDP in 2014 to
60 percent in 2017, with the economy expected to remain responsive to further oil
price prospects and macro shocks. Qatar’s debt ratio also increased significantly
over the same period, from 25 percent to about 55 percent, with IMF authorities
estimating that the country’s debt remains sustainable thanks to the size of its
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Figure 3.9: Historical Debt-to-GDP Ratios against Estimated Threshold Level
Note: The figure shows the historical trend of debt levels across countries, in
conjuction with the average threshold level estimated in the benchmark model.
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sovereign wealth fund. In contrast, Congo suffers from unsustainable debt – also
shown in Figure 3.9 – after its levels of debt jumped from 45 percent in 2014 to
around 120 percent by 2017. A low oil price environment, in tandem with a prolonged
slowdown of the non-oil economy and significant governance weaknesses exacerbated
the country’s public finances (IMF, 2018d). Egypt also exhibits limited fiscal space,
but that has been a result of chronic sizeable debt stock and high gross financing needs.
Other countries, such as Oman, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Kuwait and Russia, face debt
levels below the threshold range estimated – as they started from a very low base –
but their debt trend since 2014 has also been a warning. Oman’s debt jumped from
5 percent of its GDP to more than 45 percent by 2017 as account deficits remained
large, with the country increasingly resorting to external borrowing to finance its
deficits. Kuwait saw its debt rising from three percent to 20 percent over the same
period. The country, though, managed to adopt a smoother fiscal consolidation
thanks to its large financial buffers. Similarly, both Saudi Arabia and Russia were
able to adjust some of their financing pressure during those years by drawing down
part of their assets. However, downside risks still exist for both countries. For the
former, lower oil prices, slippages in the structural reform agenda, tighter global
financial conditions and further escalation of regional tensions could pose risks to the
economy (IMF, 2017c). For the latter, continued geopolitical tensions, a significant
slowdown in China, and a drop in investment due to lack of structural reforms could
negatively affect its economic prospects (IMF, 2017b).
Resource-rich countries seem to have stronger fiscal endurance compared to other
developing countries. Reinhart & Rogoff (2010) calculated the threshold debt level for
developing countries at 60 percent. Similarly, the debt turning point was estimated
at 64 percent by Caner et al. (2010) for a subsample of developing countries. Imbs
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& Ranciere (2005) provided non-parametric evidence supporting a debt overhang
among 87 developing economies when the face value of debt reaches 60 percent of
GDP. Our findings for developing hydrocarbon-wealthy economies show the threshold
level hovering slightly higher. That could be explained by the countries’ natural
endowment, which is translated into substantial financial wealth for them, as well as
by the fact that most of these countries have built substantial financial buffers that
can help them to manage the financing pressure during busts and, thus, mitigate
some of the risks to their public debt sustainability.
3.6 Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to conduct a preliminary analysis of the relationship
between public debt and economic growth in developing resource-rich countries,
where limited research has existed for such a sample so far. We apply threshold
analysis to examine the existence of a tipping point beyond which increasing debt
levels can have a detrimental effect on the economy. The impact of natural resources
wealth, that these countries encompass, is also studied.
Resource-rich economies are typically addicted to revenues generated by the wealth
of their natural endowment. That could pose, though, significant risks to their
fiscal sustainability, especially during bust cycles of the commodity’s industry. In
particular, the lower price environment the oil industry entered in the summer of 2014
has caused serious concerns about the growth of developing hydrocarbon-dependent
economies, which have been struggling to accomodate declining oil revenues since.
Increasing fiscal deficits, financed by debt issuance and asset drawndown, has been a
natural outcome.
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Our findings confirm the existing empirical evidence that debt can stimulate growth,
with the impact turning negative when debt crosses a certain tipping point, thus
threatening the fiscal sustainability of the country. Such a conclusion can be useful
for governments as their public finances can be vulnerable to increasing debt levels
beyond a threshold point. In contrast, natural resources seem to have a significant
and positive effect on growth.
CHAPTER 4
Resource Wealth and Economic Development: The Case of
Saudi Arabia
4.1 Introduction
Many would argue that the wealth sourced from natural resources could be a blessing
for a country that is endowed with them. Indeed, Rostow (1961) stressed the
importance of natural resource abundance as a preconditional element for the ‘take
off’ from a state of underdevelopment to that of an industrial development, as it was
in the cases of Britain, Australia, Canada, the U.S. and Sweden. However, many
more advocate that such a wealth can hinder the economic development and the
social progress of resource-rich nations, and especially that of developing ones. “Not
only may resource-rich countries fail to benefit from a favourable endowment, they
may actually perform worse than less well-endowed countries” (Tsui, 2010, p. 1).
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These economies are usually considered more ‘richer than developed’1.
Hence, are natural resources a blessing or a curse for an economy? This question
has triggered a debate on whether hydrocarbons wealth can have a beneficial impact
on the economic and social development of a resource-rich country. An extensive
body of literature, as discussed in chapter 3, has been investigating the impact of
resources on the economic growth – a nexus that is typically associated with the
resource curse.
Saudi Arabia, a country endowed with vast deposits of oil and gas, could be no
exception. The country is the second largest crude oil producer, after the U.S.,
and the largest crude oil exporter. It also maintains the world’s largest crude oil
production capacity.2 It is unsurprising that oil revenues have been the country’s
main engine of growth, placing it among the strongest economies in the world. In
particular, Saudi Arabia’s gross domestic output recorded an outstanding increase
of 300 billion U.S. dollars (in 2010 terms) between 2003 and 2015 after reaping
the benefits of a high oil price environment that prevailed for most of that period,
ranking the Kingdom’s economy to the 19th largest in the world (see Figure 4.1).
However, when considering the broader picture of a nation’s development that takes
into account indicators beyond GDP, one can realise that the country is lagging
behind other economies with similar oil-sourced incomes.
The objective of this chapter is to provide insights into what Saudi Arabia’s economy
1The particular expression was made popular by the United Nations’ 2002 report on the region’s
human development index (HDI) (Nakhle, 2017).
2Saudi Arabia is known as the world’s ‘swing producer’ as the country can adjust its crude oil
production levels during supply interruptions or demand surges, which helps balance the global oil
market during volatile times. Following the 2014 oil price crash, though, many argue that the U.S.
is gradually developing into the new swing producer.
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Figure 4.1: Real GDP and Oil Price Trends in Saudi Arabia
Data Sources: World Bank (2018d,a) – Notes: Real GDP is shown in U.S. dollars
in 2010 terms, and oil price is the average price of WTI, Brent and Dubai crudes in
real terms.
looks like today and whether the country has utilised its oil and gas rents to achieve
economic development, as well as provide higher welfare for the local population. The
macroeconomic analysis is conducted on a comparative level, where the performance
of similarly structured economies and other high-income resource-intensive nations
is paralleled. For the former, GCC countries – including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman,
Qatar and the UAE – are considered since these nations share similar political,
cultural and economic structures with Saudi Arabia.3 For the latter, the Kingdom is
compared against other high-income resource-rich economies – albeit developed ones
– such as Canada, Norway and the U.S.4 The paper also explores issues related to
Vision 2030, the nation’s long-term strategy to be transformed from an oil-reliant
3Key common features include a high reliance on oil and gas, a speedily growing young national
labour force, and the heavy dependency on foreign labour in the private sector.
4These countries show the highest global shares among developed nations in terms of oil
production, at 5, 2 and 14 percent, respectively (BP, 2018).
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economy to one that depends less on oil.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 describes how Saudi
Arabia evolved over the years from an agricultural economy to become, what is today,
the 19th largest economy in the world. Section 4.3 outlines the issues behind the
usage of GDP as a measure of development and welfare, providing the theoretical
background of the difference among the three concepts, while section 4.4 discusses
the slow social and economic development progress the country has been experiencing
so far. Section 4.5 describes the various development plans the Kingdom has issued
over the years, all aiming to diversify the economy away from oil and improve the
welfare of its population. Section 4.6 presents the challenges Saudi Arabia faces as
the country implements the latest national strategy, Vision 2030, and section 4.7
concludes.
4.2 The historical evolution of Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia in its present form was created in 1932. Until then, its population was
largely nomadic, while it also consisted of some farmers, traders, fishermen and pearl
divers. The economy was mainly based on subsistence agriculture, with tourism also
having a small share as the country was important for pilgrimage for Muslims who
were visiting the “Land of the Two Holy Mosques”5.
The country’s oil epoch can be regarded as long as its history itself. Detection
of oil was first made in the 1920s near the Persian Gulf, but it took more than a
decade for the first concession to be awarded. The discovery of oil in neighbouring
Bahrain in 1932 helped towards that direction. The first commercial amounts of
5Saudi Arabia is home to the holy places of Mecca and Medina.
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oil were recovered in 1938, with Aramco company – a syndicate of four American
oil companies – providing the exploitation. Initially, the agreements signed with
investors were granted with very generous terms, but soon the Saudi government
began becoming more protective over its natural wealth. That resulted in the full
nationalisation of the company in 1980, which was renamed Saudi Aramco in 1988.
The arrival of oil transformed Saudi Arabia from a poor agricultural and basic-trade
economy into a powerful oil-based one. The country is the second largest oil producer
after the U.S., producing around 12 million barrels per day6, and the second largest
holder of proved oil reserves with a global share of about 16 percent, ranking second
only to Venezuela (BP, 2018). Saudi Arabia also maintains the world’s largest crude
oil production capacity at roughly 12 million barrels per day (EIA, 2018). In terms
of natural gas, the country might not rank at the top five producer-countries, but
still accounts for four percent of world’s gas reserves and three percent of global gas
production (BP, 2018). Table 4.1 gives a comparative summary of the country’s
ranking in oil and gas production and reserves levels.
The petroleum industry has been the main engine of income for Saudi Arabia’s
economy, with about 70 percent of its revenues coming from the oil sector (IMF,
2017c). The vast deposits of oil with which the country is endowed have helped it to
be ranked the largest economy in the Arab world and the 19th largest in the world
based on its real GDP (IMF, 2018e) (Table 4.2). The country is also classified as
a high-income nation and is the only Arab member participating in the Group of
Twenty (G20)7 – the world’s leading industrialised and emerging economies.
6Includes crude oil, shale oil, oil sands and natural gas liquids (BP, 2018).
7The members of the G20 (by alphabetical order) are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada,
China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union.
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In particular, the rapid expansion of oil production in the 1970s (180 percent between
1968 and 1974) contributed to an increase of its gross domestic product by an
outstanding 200 billion U.S. dollars (in real terms), taking the country from ‘poverty
to riches’ (Figure 4.1). That was equivalent to one third of the Kingdom’s 2017
nominal aggregate output. Although growth rates were quite volatile and weak
between 1980 and 2002, averaging at 0.8 percent per annum, the economy grew at a
tremendous average pace of five percent per annum between 2003 and 2015, reaping
the benefits of a high oil price environment that prevailed for most of that period.
Real gross domestic output recorded an increase of more than 300 billion U.S. dollars
over the same period (Figure 4.1), with international foreign reserves also jumping
from 25 billion U.S. dollars in 2003 to 750 billion U.S. dollars in 2014. Before 2003,
reserves had never exceeded the $U.S. 35 billion threshold. That can be translated
to an economy the size of one third of Germany’s 2017 nominal output being added
to Saudi Arabia over that period. Thanks to its natural wealth and the favourable
oil price environment, the country also managed to reduce its debt levels from more
than 80 percent of its GDP in 2003 to just 1.6 percent by 2014.
Despite the economic prosperity, though, the country has failed to successfully
fully translate its oil wealth into levels of economic and social development that
are equivalent to those of countries with similar oil-sourced incomes. Considering
the broader picture that takes into account indicators beyond GDP, Saudi Arabia
seems to be lagging significantly behind those economies as analysed in section
4.4. The misinterpretation of output growth as a measure of economic welfare (as
explained in the following section), assuming that if the economy is growing so must
its development, has always been a common delusion.
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4.3 Economic growth, development and welfare:
Theoretical framework
The critique against GDP as a measure of development and welfare is as old as GDP
itself (Stockhammer et al., 1997). GDP is defined as the monetary value of the total
output of goods and services in an economy during a specific period (Coyle, 2017).
In other words, it measures the economic output of a nation. Although the early
pioneers of ‘National Accounting’, Simon Kuznets and Colin Clark, would have liked
to develop an economic welfare indicator, GDP prevailed as the principal one as
there was an immediate need to track the pace of goods and services flow, as well
as capital formation, especially following World War II (Dos Santos Gaspar et al.,
2017).
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, though, development of social indicators aiming
at measuring quality of life spread rapidly, especially after the post-war prosperity
recorded in highly industrialised western societies. The appropriateness of GDP
being used as a measurement of economic welfare started becoming subject of much
discussion. The criticism reached an intense point in the report of the Club of Rome
(Van Dieren, 1995), which called for a redirection of the economy and presented new
measures of economic welfare and quality of environment (Stockhammer et al., 1997).
Several studies attempted since to test the GDP’s adequacy, while others tried to
develop an one-dimensional welfare measure.
First, Nordhaus & Tobin (1972) stressed the importance of evaluating the leisure
time, but they concluded that GDP could be reasonably construed as an indicator of
economic welfare trends. They reached that conclusion after developing the Measure
of Economic Welfare (MEW), which they compared to GDP and found sufficient
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correlation. In contrast, the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), developed by the
Center for Redefining Progress in 1995, showed a widening gap between the two
indicators. Further, Zolotas (1981) was the first attempt to develop an alternative
measure of welfare, taking pollution, among others, into consideration. Daly & Cobb
(1989), building on both works of Zolotas and Nordhaus & Tobin, developed the index
of sustainable economic welfare (ISEW) for the U.S. The ISEW index incorporates
GDP, household labour that remains unpaid, social and environmental costs, as
well as income distribution. Whilst it has undergone various transformations since
its creation, it has always been intending to measure the extent to which countries
are improving their social welfare without compromising the future. Goossens
et al. (2007) divided indicators into three groups – replacing, supplementing and
adjusting GDP – placing ISEW into the latter category. Much later, Jones & Klenow
(2016) proposed a new index that incorporated consumption, leisure, mortality
and inequality, and calculated expected lifetime economic benefits across countries.
Their analysis showed that this approach closes much of the apparent gap in living
standards among countries when this is assessed on the basis of GDP per capita.
Their paper focused on the U.S. and other OECD countries.
A number of other measures has also been developed. For example, the adjusted net
savings which is a measure of the true saving rate in an economy after incorporating
investments in human capital, depletion of natural resources and damages caused by
pollution; the capability index, which defines quality of life based on what countries do
with their resources; the environmentally sustainable national income that identifies
the number of years an economy is lagging behind the sustainable benchmark; HDI
which is a measure of longevity, healthy life, education and decent living; and the
happy planet index that is the ratio of the product of experienced well-being and life
expectancy to the ecological footprint.
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However, one can easily notice that all the above measures focus on a very specific
dimension of the well-being and none of them is all-inclusive. Hence, it comes as
no surprise that GDP’s output measure per head or its rate change (otherwise
economic growth rate) has long become a benchmark for social performance, despite
all criticism and attempts to establish a different point of reference for welfare.
Although economists have long known that GDP tells little about how the economic
returns are distributed among society, it is still used as the key indicator for economic
policy. Its advantages, apparently, lie to the lack of a single established method of
measuring welfare within the field of economics (Sen, 1976) as practical difficulties
in such an exercise are numerous, thus making the use of GDP attractive to both
economists and non- (Islam & Clarke, 2001). In particular for politicians, ‘the historic
Olympic feat’ of GDP (faster, higher, stronger) provides the much-wanted story to
share with their voters of an ever increasing welfare (Islam & Clarke, 2002). Besides,
GDP is easily compared across countries.
As well summarised by Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson and his coauthor William
Nordhaus in the 15th edition of their textbook Economics (Samuelson & Nordhaus,
1995), “Much like a satellite in space can survey the weather across an entire continent
so can the GDP give an overall picture of the state of the economy”. As a result,
the limitations of GDP as a measure of welfare seem to be less important, with
Samuelson and Nordhaus further expressing that “While GDP and the rest of the
national income accounts may seem to be arcane concepts, they are truly among the
great inventions of the twentieth century”.
GDP’s caveats have mainly been accruing from the fact that it leaves out major factors
that affect living standards within a country, such as leisure, inequality, mortality,
crime. It also excludes unpaid work by households, environmental externalities
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(pollution or damage to species) and it does not include changes in the assets’
value, such as depletion of natural resources. For example, a highly industrialised
country might produce too much pollution, contribute to family disintegration due
to unhealthy working conditions (too many working hours, anxiety, etc.), whilst
a less developed country might consist of happier people as they enjoy a cleaner
environment and a less family breakdown (Menegaki & Tugcu, 2018). Hence, it is
important to include the depreciation of human and natural capital, as the growth
of GDP after a certain point increases income inequality and can reach a threshold
point (Max-Neef, 1995; Stockhammer et al., 1997; Costanza et al., 2009).
Economic development is a broader concept of economic growth, reflecting both social
and economic progress. Development economics tends to set itself apart from the
rest of the economics field (Islam & Clarke, 2001), while its primary goal has always
been to achieve economic growth. A compelling definition of economic development
was given by Sen (1999) who claimed that “development is about creating freedom
for people and removing obstacles to greater freedom”. He defined obstacles as those
that include poverty, corruption, poor governance, lack of education and health, and
lack of economic opportunities.
Further, the application of welfare economic tools to development economics ensures
that “development is not only a matter of long-run growth” (Sen, 1999, p. 45),
but it can also allow those opportunities of people that can guarantee their human
development to occur in both good and bad times (Sen, 1984).
In this paper, we investigate to what extent economic development and social
progress has been feasible for Saudi Arabia and we analyse the macroeconomic trends
that have formed the Saudi economy. The analysis incorporates indicators beyond
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GDP, including output per capita, life expectancy, labour productivity, poverty,
unemployment, corruption, governance ranking, education and competitiveness,
among others. Economists usually attribute slow economic development of resource
abundance countries to inefficiency and underdevelopment of knowledge-based
components, such as social, financial and technological factors (Levine, 1997).
4.4 The slow development progress
The Kingdom’s population is about 33 million people, compared to just 6 million
in the 1970s. The population not only has been growing rapidly since – at an
average of 15 percent per annum – but it also consists of young people, with half of
the population being under the age of 30. Government policies encouraging larger
families and an increasing expatriate population have both contributed to the increase.
Saudi Arabia has been chronically experiencing high unemployment rates, especially
for youth. The job market in the Kingdom has always been divided between a private
sector, staffed by expatriates, and a public sector, occupied by Saudi nationals.
About two-third of Saudis are employed in the public sector (Ministry of Labor
and Social Development, 2016). Nationals view public-sector as more prestigious
than private employment, a place where they can enjoy better starting salaries,
working hours and conditions. Family and community role models also factor into
public-versus-private career decisions (Ministry of Labor and Social Development,
2016). A survey conducted by ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey (2016)
showed that young people prefer a government job against a private one, with this
preference rising up to 70 percent across GCC countries. The mismatch between job
skills and needs of the job market further justifies the low participation of labour
in the private sector. The Saudi education system lacks quality science teaching as
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it puts lots of weight on Islamic studies. As a result, Saudi universities are at the
lowest international education rankings, making Saudis facing a tougher competition.
Unemployment in the country, overall, stood at 5.7 percent in 2017 (World Bank,
2018b), slightly more than the world average of 5.2 percent. Among Saudi nationals,
though, the rate was even higher at 12.3 percent (IMF, 2017c), indicating that the
low overall unemployment figure is the result of non-Saudi labour.8 Only Oman and
Canada showed higher rates compared to the Kingdom. The country also scored
the 25th highest youth unemployment rate in the world, at 35 percent of total
labour force. Saudi youth unemployment was the second highest in the GCC region,
after Oman. The country’s overall labour force participation rate was 56 percent,
compared with a 60 percent average among G20 nations. One of the reasons that
Saudi Arabia lags other countries in this category is that only about 20 percent of
women participate in the workforce, compared with 80 percent for men, which is
high by international standards.
The high unemployment rates have contributed to the lower output per capita levels
seen in the economy. The significant population growth is also blamed for it as it has
drained the government’s finances addressed for further improvements in the welfare
of its population. GDP per capita improved substantially in the 1970s following
the rapid expansion of crude oil production, increasing to as high as $U.S. 40,000
(in 2010 terms) in 1974. That placed the country among the top five economies
experiencing the highest per capita levels in the world. However, output per capita
never exceeded even half of those levels since. In 2017, it stood at around $U.S.
20,000 (World Bank, 2018a), placing the Kingdom this time at the 42nd position,
8Unemployment among expatriates is expected to be negligible as staying in the country is
generally linked to having a job.
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Table 4.3: Comparative Economic Indicators
Real GDP per Capita Labour Productivity
constant 2010 US$
GDP person
employed
(constant 2011 PPP $)
1980 2000 2017 1991* 2000 2017
Saudi Arabia 36,518 18,263 20,796 166,264 146,354 120,484
Bahrain 21,185 22,955 22,111 94,301 104,948 72,523
Kuwait n/a 35,793 33,546 53,845 146,356 120,438
Oman 9,907 18,698 16,144 136,655 158,246 78,585
Qatar n/a 60,858 65,696 120,456 199,131 152,831
UAE 113,682 62,833 41,197 210,590 188,028 48,808
Canada 31,770 43,638 51,316 64,397 76,227 83,950
Norway 48,538 81,710 91,219 92,364 112,061 126,666
US 28,734 45,056 53,129 76,496 92,141 111,056
Unemployment Youth Unemployment
% of total labour force % of total labour force ages 15-24
1991 2000 2017 1990 2000 2017
Saudi Arabia 7.9% 4.6% 5.7% 29.6% 24.3% 34.7%
Bahrain 6.3% 5.6% 1.3% 24.8% 20.6% 5.8%
Kuwait 0.7% 0.8% 2.1% 3.0% 4.2% 15.5%
Oman 18.5% 19.8% 16.0% 48.0% 48.9% 48.2%
Qatar 3.9% 4.9% 0.2% 20.2% 24.5% 0.5%
UAE 1.8% 2.3% 1.7% 4.6% 6.0% 5.1%
Canada 10.3% 6.8% 6.4% 15.9% 12.7% 12.3%
Norway 5.4% 3.5% 4.2% 12.6% 10.9% 10.0%
US 6.8% 4.0% 4.4% 13.3% 9.2% 9.5%
Population Youth Population
million share of total
1980 2000 2017 1980 2015
Saudi Arabia 9.7 20.8 32.9 70% 50%
Bahrain 0.4 0.7 1.5 69% 47%
Kuwait 1.4 2.1 4.1 69% 41%
Oman 1.2 2.3 4.6 71% 53%
Qatar 0.2 0.6 2.6 66% 46%
UAE 1.0 3.2 9.4 63% 38%
Canada 24.6 30.8 36.7 51% 36%
Norway 4.1 4.5 5.3 45% 38%
US 227.2 282.2 325.7 50% 40%
Data Sources: World Bank (2018a); United Nations (2018)
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whilst its Gulf counterparts – with the exception of Oman – scored at much higher
positions. Qatar ($U.S. 65,000) was among the top five economies in the world, with
per capita levels of the UAE and Kuwait being at around $U.S. 40,000 and $U.S.
35,000, respectively. Norway ranked second in the world, after Luxembourg, with
$U.S. 90,000.
At the same time, looking at the consumer price index9, cost of living in Saudi
Arabia has been particularly high (see Figure 4.2). Especially after 2010, the index
increased markedly. That was partly due to higher government spending, in the form
of grants (housing grant funds and unemployment benefits) and subsidies (electricity
and water). Also, a significant amount of money was spent on infrastructure projects
for the development of new industrial and economic cities – such as the cities of
Tabouk, Hail, Madinah, Jazan and Rabigh – as well as on defense. The latter made
up 35 percent of government spending in 2013 (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency,
2014). Increased demand in the real estate sector further explains the higher inflation
rates. Real estate loans moved up by 25 percent, on average, per annum from 2009
till 2013 (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 2014).10 Inflationary pressures have
emerged, generally, across GCC countries in response to strong domestic demand,
monetary and credit growth.
While Balassa (1980) had emphasised that a country’s endowment of natural resources
can benefit its industrial development by providing the necessary funds for investment
and creating domestic markets, that doesn’t seem to be the case for Saudi Arabia.
Oil exports account for more than 75 percent of the country’s total exports (IMF,
9The consumer price index (CPI) is a measurement of the average price change paid by consumers
for a specific basket of goods and services.
10The real estate growth in Saudi Arabia was mainly driven by changes in demographic factors.
Also, following the global financial crisis in 2007-2008, this particular sector was considered a much
safer investment decision.
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Figure 4.2: Consumer Price Index Trends
Data Source: World Bank (2018a) – Note: Consumer price index reflects changes in
the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may
be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly.
2017c), while the share of manufactured exports is recorded at a much lower ratio
of just 18 percent based on the latest available data from World Bank (2018a).
Despite the notable increase seen over the years, as shown in Table 4.4, the share
of manufactured exports is still substantially low when compared to the sample’s
developed countries. That could be explained by the fact that firms produce goods
and services to meet the needs of the domestic market only, relying on low-wage
foreign labour, rather than trying to develop export-oriented activities that will
require more skilled and trained labour. Similarly, oil revenues account for a large
share of GDP, which stands at 17.5 percent of GDP, compared to non-oil11 at 7.5
11Government services, hotel, restaurants, retail, non-oil manufacturing, transport and
communication are among the main non-oil activities in the Kingdom.
Resource Wealth and Economic Development: The case of Saudi Arabia 153
percent (IMF, 2017c).
Table 4.4: Manufactured Exports (% of merchandise exports)
1989 2000 2008 2016
Saudi Arabia 10.8 7.1 7.6 17.8
Bahrain 39.0 9.8 11.8 18.5
Kuwait 87.7 4.5 3.2 8.6
Oman 6.0 8.9 7.3 18.0
Qatar 17.6 8.6 2.2 0.4
UAE 18.3 2.3 4.0 8.2
Canada 60.7 65.3 47.0 54.5
Norway 33.4 18.5 16.6 22.7
US 68.8 82.7 74.0 63.5
Data Source: World Bank (2018a) – Note: Manufactures comprise commodities in
chemicals, basic manufactures, machinery and transport equipment, miscellaneous
manufactured goods, excluding non-ferrous metals.
However, the higher oil contribution to the Saudi economy has helped the country
maintain a trade surplus. As shown in Figure 4.3, the Kingdom had been experiencing
the highest value of net trade, compared to the rest GCC countries. Only after the
free fall of oil prices which began in 2014 the country moved into a trade deficit. Net
trade value had showed a similar fall after the global financial crisis in 2009 which
drifted oil prices from a peak of 145 U.S. dollars per barrel in July 2008 to about 35
in February 2009.
Looking from a social perspective, the Kingdom seems to have not successfully
gripped the maximum of its human capital potential either, despite the fact that
the latter is considered a key component for a country to become a ‘knowledge’
economy. Saudi Arabia ranked 87th out of 130 countries in the World Economic
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Figure 4.3: Net Trade in Goods and Services
Data Source: World Bank (2018a) – Notes: Net trade in goods and services is derived
by offsetting imports of goods and services against exports of goods and services.
Exports and imports of goods and services comprise all transactions involving a
change of ownership of goods and services between residents of one country and
the rest of the world. Data are in current U.S. dollars. BoP stands for balance of
payments. No data are available for Oman and Saudi Arabia for 2017.
Forum’s 2017 Human Capital Index12, below the G20’s average position of 73. In
particular, as characteristically stated in the report (World Economic Forum, 2017b,
pp. 9-10), Saudi Arabia, whose GDP per capita is almost five times higher, performs
at a level which is comparable to that of Egypt, emphasising that economic factors
alone are an inadequate measure of a country’s ability to successfully leverage its
human capital potential. Other GCC countries, such as Bahrain, Qatar and the
UAE, outperformed, scoring in the mid-range of countries ranked in the index, a fact
12The human capital index measures a country’s ability to maximise and leverage its human
capital endowment.
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that implies that these countries make a better use of their human capital potential.
In terms of the UN’s HDI13 index, the Kingdom fared better, ranking 38th out of 188
countries and territories in 2015 (latest available data), scoring at 0.85 (Table 4.5).
Although the figure positions Saudi Arabia in the very high human development
category – coming second only to Qatar in the GCC region – the country is still
not ranked very high. The Kingdom’s 2015 score is below the average of 0.89 for
countries in the very high human development group (UNDP, 2016). In particular,
looking at life expectancy rates, Saudi Arabia shows the lowest rate in the GCC,
which is also marginally higher than the world average. The country did better in
the knowledgeable dimension of the index, but as it will be discussed in chapter 4.6,
the education system in the country presents its own challenges. The HDI levels of
the Kingdom are far less than the economies of Canada, Norway and the U.S.
Busse & Gro¨ning (2011) showed that when a country uses the natural resource as its
dominant export commodity, that in combination with a less educated population
leads to an increase in corruption and to a deterioration of the institutional quality
of the economy. Saudi Arabia seems to be no exception, with the country being
positioned at the 57th place out of 180 countries according to the 2017 Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI) published by the Transparency International (Table 4.7).
The score is far below that of the U.S., Norway and Canada, while it places Saudi
Arabia in the middle of the GCC average scores.
13HDI is a summary measure of human development, incorporating health, education and
standards of living. The health dimension is approached by life expectancy at birth, the education
is measured by mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years or more and expected years of
schooling for children of school entering age. The standard of living dimension is assessed by the
gross national income per capita. The scores of the three separate HDI indices are then aggregated
into a composite index using geometric mean. (UNDP, 2018)
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Table 4.5: Saudi Arabia’s HDI and Component Indicators for 2015 Relative to
Selected Countries
HDI
Value
HDI
Rank
Life Expectancy
(at birth years)
Expected
Years of
Schooling
GNI per
Capita
(2011 PPP$)
Saudi Arabia 0.85 38 74.4 16.1 51,320
Bahrain 0.82 47 76.7 14.5 37,236
Kuwait 0.8 51 74.5 13.3 76,075
Oman 0.8 52 77 13.7 34,402
Qatar 0.86 33 78.3 13.4 129,916
UAE 0.84 42 77.1 13.3 66,203
Canada 0.92 10 82.2 16.3 42,582
Norway 0.95 1 81.7 17.7 67,614
US 0.92 10 79.2 16.5 53,245
Data Source: UNDP (2018) – Note: Footnote 13 (p. 155) defines HDI and describes
the way the index is calculated. HDI rank shows the rank of the sample countries out
of 188 countries in 2015, the year the latest data are available for.
Similarly, looking at the World Bank’s Governance Indicators (Table 4.6), the
Kingdom performs poor across almost all governance groups. The country scores
particularly low in the categories of voice and accountability, political stability, rule
of law and regulatory quality, while it shows a slightly better position, outperforming
only few of its Gulf counterparts, in the groups of control of corruption and government
effectiveness. Saudi Arabia performs extremely poor when compared to Canada,
Norway and the U.S.
According to the Global Competitiveness Index 2017-201814, the Kingdom’s position
has deteriorated over the last few years, moving from the 18th position out of 144
countries in 2012-2013 to the 30th most competitive economy worldwide among 137
14The global competitiveness index is a measure of the national competitiveness, which is assessed
by those institutions, policies and factors that designate the level of productivity.
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countries (Table 4.7). It has relatively stable institutions (27th), good quality of
infrastructure (29th) and the largest market in the world (15th), placing it third
in the GCC region after the UAE and Qatar, but the macroeconomic environment
remains volatile, with financial markets also struggling (World Economic Forum,
2017a). The most problematic factors for doing business in the Kingdom are usually
the restrictive labour regulations, with the labour market being divided among
different groups and women remaining largely on the side, the lack of adequately
educated workers and the access to financing, among others.
Table 4.7: Corruption Perceptions and Global Competitiveness Indices, 2017
Corruption Perceptions
Index
Global Competitiveness
Index
Score Rank Score Rank
Saudi Arabia 49 57 4.83 30
Bahrain 36 103 4.54 44
Kuwait 39 85 4.43 52
Oman 44 68 4.31 62
Qatar 63 29 5.11 25
UAE 71 21 5.30 17
Canada 82 8 5.35 14
Norway 85 3 5.40 11
US 75 16 5.85 2
Data Sources: Transparency International (2017); World Economic Forum (2017a)
– Notes: Transparency International ranks countries on an annual basis by their
perceived levels of corruption, as assigned by expert assessments and opinion surveys.
The index defines corruption as the misuse of public power for private benefit and
uses a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean. The
global competitiveness index 2017–2018 is a measure of the national competitiveness,
which is assessed by those institutions, policies and factors that designate the level of
productivity. Corruption and competitiveness ranks depict the global position of the
sample countries out of 180 and 137 countries, respectively.
Corruption, weak government institutions and high unemployment have been usually
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responsible for the low level of economic diversification in an economy. Studies
document that less diversified economies face a higher risk of external shocks, as low
levels of diversification are associated with higher volatility (Acemoglu & Zilibotti,
1997; Di Giovanni & Levchenko, 2009; Papageorgiou & Spatafora, 2012; Haddad
et al., 2013). Relying on one source of revenues means the economy is seized of the
fluctuations of that commodity’s price in the global market (Mahran, 2012; Gallarotti,
2013). Further, Malik & Temple (2009) supported that resource-rich countries tend
to have greater export concentration which itself is strongly correlated with higher
output volatility.
A number of papers have been studying the benefits that diversification can bring to
an economy. As Albassam (2015) put it, “economic diversification is connected to
stability and sustainability in economic growth”. Economies with a broader range
of exports are healthier and more productive than economies that depend on a sole
commodity (Treisman, 2000; Herb, 2005). Resources are allocated to their most
efficient uses in the economy and the Dutch disease is prevented from affecting the
manufacturing and other non-tradable sectors. Diversification also contributes to
creating jobs as more sectors are active (Kayed & Hassan, 2011; Devaux, 2013). In
particular, (Devaux, 2013, pp. 20-21) argued that “uncertainty over future prospects
for oil income” and the “need to create jobs” both urge the enhancement of structural
reforms in the GCC economies. Further, the papers of Busse & Gro¨ning (2011) and
Bjorvatn et al. (2012) supported that economic diversification influences positively
political stability, social development and institutional quality. In particular, a large
body of literature argues that structural changes of the economy shapes political
interests and outcomes (Lipset, 1959; Sokoloff & Engerman, 2000; Cimoli & Rovira,
2008), reducing patronage activities and, thus, the economic power of the state and
elites. It could even have a significant effect on democracy (Ross, 2001; Kolstad &
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Wiig, 2017).
4.5 Saudi Arabia’s diversification plans
Saudi Arabia has historically been trying to diversify its economy. A volatile revenue
base, in tandem with high unemployment rates and rising government expenditure
to meet increasing demand due to population growth and higher standards of living,
all have always been underscoring the importance of accelerating structural reforms
and, more importantly, the country’s need to diversify its economy away from oil as
the existing policy could not be sustainable for much longer. Fiscal policy has been
a key element of Saudi Arabia’s macroeconomic policy15 through which the country
distributes the oil receipts for the benefit of the population.
The Saudi government has published 10 development plans since 1970 – each covering
five years – where economic diversification has been a policy priority. However, the
country remains an economy of low diversification as its share of oil to GDP bespeaks,
with price of oil also largely directing the country’s non-oil economic growth (Figure
4.4).
The first development plan covered the period 1970-1975 and aimed to “Diversif[y]
sources of national income and reduc[e] dependence on oil by increasing the share
of other productive sectors in gross domestic product” (Ministry of Economy and
Planning, 2014, p. 23). Nine plans have followed since. The first two five-year
plans (1970-1975 and 1976-1980) had as a primary objective the establishment of the
country’s basic transportation and communication facilities, while the subsequent
plans sought to improve education, health and social services, and promote training
15Saudi Arabia has limited flexibility in its monetary policy. The Saudi riyal has been pegged to
the U.S. dollar for nearly three decades.
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Figure 4.4: Non-Oil GDP Growth and Oil Prices in Saudi Arabia
Data Sources: World Bank (2018d,a) – Notes: The figure depicts the oil price trend
in association with non-oil GDP growth rates for Saudi Arabia between 2013 and
2017. Oil price is the average price of WTI, Brent and Dubai crudes in nominal
terms. Non-oil GDP is in nominal terms.
programs. A rising population led to a decrease in GDP per capita in the late 1990s
and an ever increasing youth unemployment. That made the following five-year
plans turning towards the ‘Saudisation’ of the labour force by increasing the share of
private undertaking in an attempt to create more jobs in the economy.
So far, the efforts of the Saudi government have shown little success in meeting the
development plans’ objectives. Among those strategies, only the fourth development
plan was considered as a model of success (Albassam, 2015) where all measures
of economic diversification showed improvement. The rest, despite some of their
successes, still fell short of the ambitious targets that had been set. For example,
non-oil sectors were developed but were still largely related to energy-based industries,
such as plastics and petrochemicals. The high dependence on oil, in tandem with the
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public sector’s dominance in the economy have both left little room for the private
sector to be developed. Its share in GDP has shown significant instability across the
development plans, while its reliance on government spending has adversely affected
the role that this particular sector, which is considered a cornestone in an economy’s
diversification process (Radetzki, 2012), can play. However, that doesn’t apply to
GCC countries, and Saudi Arabia in particular. As Hertog (2013) mentioned, private
sector contributions to economic growth are at levels lower than these countries
would desire and planned, and much less than other countries with similar economic
structures, such as Norway.
Vision 2030
Vision 2030 is the latest initiative promoted by the Kingdom and another very
ambitious plan which is designed to reduce Saudi Arabia’s traditional dependency
on oil revenues by creating a more dynamic and diverse economy. The Vision is
often acclaimed as the ‘one-man ambition’, since King Salman’s son Mohammed bin
Salman16, known as “MBS”, is prominently associated with it.
In other words, Vision 2030 is a continuation of the policies that have been in place
over the past decades, but it is wider in the sense that covers all the sectors of the
economy, from agriculture to tourism and entertainment17 to education and health
to transport and manufacturing. Indeed, MBS pledged that his country will return
to that of a ‘moderate’ Islam being open to all religions and to the whole world.
Vision 2030 also contains elements that refer to relations between citizens and the
16His political career began as governor of Riyadh, and he later served as his father’s special
advisor. He became Chief of the Court in 2012, assuming the rank of Minister. When his father
became King, Mohammed bin Salman was appointed Defense Minister, the youngest in the world
and a position he still holds. In June 2017, he was promoted to Crown Prince.
17Vision 2030 calls for an entertainment economy to be developed in the Kingdom, where cinemas
and live music were prohibited for decades.
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Table 4.8: Saudi Vision 2030: Programme Goals
1
To move from Saudi Arabia’s current position as the 19th largest economy
in the world into the top 15.
2
To rise from the current position of 25 to the top 10 countries on the
Global Competitiveness Index.
3
To increase non-oil government revenue from SAR 163 billion to SAR 1
trillion.
4 To raise the share of non-oil exports in non-oil GDP from 16% to 50%.
5 To increase the private sector’s contribution from 40% to 65% of GDP.
6 To raise Saudi Arabia’s position from 26 to 10 in the Social Capital Index.
7 To lower the rate of national unemployment from 11.6% to 7%.
8 To increase women’s participation in the workforce from 22% to 30%.
9 To increase the average life expectancy from 74 years to 80 years.
10
To increase the ratio of individuals exercising at least once a week from
13% of population to 40%.
11
To increase household spending on cultural and entertainment activities
inside the Kingdom from the current level of 2.9% to 6%.
12
To have at least 5 Saudi universities among the top 200 universities in
international rankings.
13
To raise Saudi Arabia’s ranking in the Government Effectiveness Index,
from 80 to 20.
14
To raise Saudi Arabia’s ranking on the E-Government Survey Index from
the current position of 36 to be among top 5 nations.
Data Source: Vision 2030 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (2016)
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state, targeting transparency, communication and consultation with the public, as
well as more social freedoms (from entertainment to exercise). In September 2017,
the Saudi government issued a decree that overturned a previous ban on women
driving and as such, since June 2018, women are legally allowed to drive in the
country. The announcement of the privatisation of five percent of the state-owned oil
company Saudi Aramco, the world’s largest oil company, added another dimension
to these transformational economic policies, which are seen as a broader national
modernisation project. Indeed, in April 2016, the plans of the selling off of the
Kingdom’s energy giant via a local and an international listing were made public.
At the time of the announcement, the listing was billed as the biggest stock flotation
in history after being predicted that the sale would value the company at $U.S. 2
trillion or more, and raise more than $U.S. 100 billion for the country’s sovereign
wealth fund, known as the Public Investment Fund. Table 4.8 summarises the main
goals of Vision 2030.
However, Saudi Arabia has not been a pioneer on this aspect. Bahrain had set its
Vision 2030 a decade before Saudi Arabia announced its own, while Oman is working
on its Vision 2040. Qatar has a National Vision 2020, and Kuwait and Abu Dhabi
each have a Vision 2030 in place.
4.6 The challenges lying ahead
The road ahead seems to be a long and bumpy one for Saudi Arabia. It requires lots
of discipline and concentration and given the long record of diversification plans being
diluted or partly implemented, there is lots of distrust on Saudi’s latest undertaking.
Possible political repercussions, oil price cycles that enable the government to return
to its old habits, all pose high risks on the complete success of Vision 2030.
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Box 5: Economic Diversification Experiences Across Countries
Scholarly studies show that despite the efforts of the GCC countries
to diversify, they are still highly concentrated (Gelb, 2011). Despite
all good reasons for diversification, it remains a difficult task. Political
interests are mainly blamed for hindering the process. Dunning (2005)
argued that any reliance on resources is the result of strategic decisions by
elites to limit the extent to which political opponents can challenge their power.
However, there are some examples where successful diversification patterns
were adopted. In particular, the UAE succedeed in some of its diversification
plans over the last three decades (Flamos et al., 2013) thanks to the
development of non-oil services – mainly that of tourism, finance and
transportation services. Gelb (2011) observed that Dubai’s strategy was to
become an investment center in real estates, infrastructure and a range of
other services while maintaining a free trade zone. An efficient bureaucracy,
establishment of a tax haven, no capital control, near zero tariff, e-governance
and a liberal visa regime for businesses and tourists helped towards the
development of the above. Also, Bahrain has established itself as a financial
hub for the Arab world, particularly in banking, with tourism, transport and
related services being also well developed in the country. Further, Bahrain is a
significant producer of aluminium. (Sturm et al., 2009b)
Norway is often regarded as a model example of natural resources management.
The country adopted certain policies and strategies regarding the develpment
of its oil industry, compared to the Gulf countries that rushed to exploit oil
revenues in consumption. That could be partly explained by the fact that
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Norway was already enjoying a relatively strong and advanced economy at the
time of the oil discovery, with a highly educated population and standard of
living; unlike GCC countries which were suffering from poverty. However, the
Norwegian government remained committed to its principles. A good example
of that was the establishment of an administrative body, the Norwegian
Petroleum Directorate, just three years after the first discovery, with the
objective of “creating the greatest possible values for society from the oil
and gas activities by means of prudent resource management”. Norway also
decided not to rely on oil to finance its budget, with the exception of only three
percent of the value of the wealth fund supporting annually the general budget
(OECD, 2016). The government further allowed people’s representatives to
get involved in decisions about the country’s oil industry development.
Other examples of countries that successfully diversified away from oil, include
Indonesia, Malaysia and Mexico. While each of them followed its own path
and diversified their economies to a different degree, it seems that their policies
moved along some common themes taking advantage of a favourable geography
and the ability to enter production networks through trade deals (Alsharif et al.,
2017). The development of export markets was one of the main incentives
which was followed. Both Indonesia and Mexico set up free zones and reduced
barriers to trade. A great achievement of Mexico’s diversification process
was its accession to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Malaysia and Indonesia probably benefited from their proximity to a China led
production network. Another incentive was the human capital development.
All of them supported workers in acquiring those skills and knowledge that
would give them the ability to adapt to these new expanding areas.
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A sound example of the above was when the government reinstated allowances and
bonuses for public sector employees and military personnel in April 2017 after being
cut in September 2016 as part of austerity measures following lower oil prices. That
was a result of a classic pattern of pro-cyclical fiscal policy in the country, where
structural fiscal reforms are introduced when money is tight, but then cancelled when
government revenues go up again. Also, Saudi Arabia’s economy is projected to grow
by 1.7 percent in 2018, but that is expected to come at the expense of increased
government finances (IMF, 2018e), reaffirming that the old model of an economy
driven by government spending and financed by oil hasn’t really changed.
The much discussed initial public offering (IPO) of the state-owned Saudi Aramco
seems to be stalled for the time being. Saudi officials initially planned to take Aramco
public the second half of 2018, then pushed the date back to 2019, with the actual
date of materialisation still being unknown. Whilst lots of speculation and rumours
exist about the reasons behind this postponement and whether IPO will ever go
ahead, what is important is the fact that the government will need to find other
sources to raise the cash needed to finance the massive economic reform programme,
if it wants it to succeed.
As discussed before, high unemployment, especially among young people, remains
another thorn and an unresolved issue for Saudi Arabia. Vision 2030 pledges for
creation of job positions through the expansion of the private sector. However, that
might require a number of years to happen. The private sector accounts for a small
share of the current gross domestic output and it is heavily dependent on government
project-spending and, thus, highly correlated with the oil price cycles (Kinninmont,
2017). Also, for private-sector growth to take place, investors need legal guarantees
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to feel that their capital is safe18.
The skills mismatch brings to the surface another critical issue, that of the education
system in Saudi Arabia. Education in the Kingdom places a heavy emphasis
on religion, often to the exclusion of scientific education and critical thinking
(Kinninmont, 2017). In particular, the study of Islam dominates. Taught religion is
also a compulsory subject for university students (Sedgwick, 2018). As a consequence,
Saudi universities are placed at the lowest international education rankings, failing
to provide better employment opportunities as Saudis lack the technical skills and a
capacity for innovation and entrepreneurship that the private sector needs.
So far, the government has been cautious in changing the role of religion in the state
and society. While the Kingdom’s new leader tries to intensify and accelerate
the reform process, it is important to acknowlegde that the ultraconservative
establishment that has historically been the pillar of stability is not going to change
overnight (Bokhari, 2017). That also brings to the surface the difficulty around
the interpretation of a ‘moderate, open’ Islam that has been repeatedly proclaimed.
It is questionable whether there is a clear definition and understanding of what
‘moderate Islam’ means, and how the transition from the current state of affairs to
more moderation will happen.
The social contract should also be effectively renegotiated. The government needs to
convince people that this is for their long-term good. It needs to go beyond simply
communicating the strategy and make people understand “what’s in it for them” in
following this particular strategy. But the government still lacks the right channels
18A recent diplomatic dispute between Canada and Saudi Arabia, taking place in summer 2018,
raised the risk awareness in the Saudi investment climate.
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and representatives to do so. For example, the government imposed a number of
austerity measures in 2014, including hikes to water prices and cuts to public sector
salaries with little advance communication or consultation with the public.
Another important dimension that misses from Vision 2030 is the fact that the
economic reform strategy should be accompanied by political reforms (Kinninmont,
2017). A government should also be looking forward in terms of the political
perspective, if it wants to be ahead of the curve. Further, promises of transparency
laid out in Vision 2030 have not been matched by a step change in press freedom or
freedom of information (Al Wasmi, 2017).
Despite all challenges faced by Vision and the negative sentiment created by the
current slow growth rates, the need for increasing government spending levels and the
volatile investment climate, there are still developments that could potentially reverse
the flow. A new bankruptcy law and a privatization draft law are already in process
in Saudi Arabia (Al Tamimi & Company, 2018; National Center for Privatization
and Public-Private Partnerships, 2018). Foreigners are eligible to buy shares on the
local stock exchange and become 100 percent owners of businesses in key sectors like
engineering (pwc, 2017). Further, as the entertainment market opens, there is clearly
room for investment opportunities (Young, 2018).
In any case, the goals presented in Vision 2030 should not be taken in a literal manner
as there is a long tradition of optimism bias in the development plans adopted in
GCC countries, which typically set ambitious ‘stretch targets’ (Kinninmont, 2017;
Al-Sarihi, 2018). Such plans usually indicate the ‘direction of the travel’ rather than
a forecast.
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4.7 Conclusions
This essay provides insights into what the Saudi economy looks like today and whether
the country has utilised its natural wealth, sourced by oil and gas revenues, to achieve
substantial economic development and social progress. The macroeconomic analysis
is pursued on a comparative level, where the performance of similarly structured and
other high-income developed resource-rich economies is presented. Issues related to
the country’s new long-term strategy, Vision 2030, are also discussed.
The findings of this study show that Saudi Arabia has failed to fully convert its oil
wealth into levels of economic and social development equivalent to those of countries
with similar oil-sourced incomes. Whilst the country has been well endowed with
oil resources, which placed it among the strongest economies in the world in terms
of its aggregate output, it seems to be lagging behind in other important economic
and social indicators. The country faces a rapid population growth, lower per capita
levels, a deteriorating competitive position and high unemployment rates. The latter
is partly justified by a mismatch between job skills and needs of the job market
as the education system has been mainly focusing on religious study, often to the
exclusion of scientific education. Further, Saudi Arabia has not either successfully
gripped the maximum of its human capital potential, ranking low in various human
indices.
The Kingdom has historically been trying to diversify its economy and become less
dependent on oil through its development plans, with the ultimate goal of an ever
improving economic progress and social welfare. However, the Saudi government
has shown little success in meeting the development plans’ objectives so far. Vision
2030, the latest long-term strategy of the Kingdom, appears to be another effort in
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diversifying the Saudi economy. This transformation programme is a continuation
of the previous policies, albeit wider in the sense that covers all the sectors of
the economy. However, it still presents a number of challenges across all fronts –
economic, political and social. This transition will be undoubtedly a difficult one,
creating winners and losers, but the opportunities offered by the process – even if
partly implemented – for substance economic development and welfare might be
compelling.
CHAPTER 5
Concluding Remarks
5.1 Motivation and contribution of the thesis
The aim of this thesis was to explore distinct but topical issues pertaining to the
oil market. These have included the role of financialisation in the oil market, the
financing decisions of countries reliant on high oil prices and a case study of one of
the most important oil exporters, Saudi Arabia.
One of the research areas that has attracted lots of attention in academic, industrial
and regulatory circles has been the impact of traders’ participation in the crude oil
futures markets. Especially after the increased inflow of investors into the futures
market of crude oil which started taking place in 2003, many have been advocating
that oil prices do not convey information only about the fundamental forces of
supply and demand. Instead, they are also a result of speculative effects. The
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importance of this study lied in the fact that oil prices are of particular significance
for the whole economy as their informational content constitutes a key input in a
variety of decisions, from business investments to government regulations. Indeed,
the repercussions of this public debate were seen in tighter constraints imposed on
commodity trading futures, with many European banks also forced to cease selling
commodity related products.
The motivation behind the second essay was based on growing concerns about
the fiscal sustainability of economies that are heavily reliant on hydrocarbons. In
particular, many of these countries have been struggling to accomodate declining
oil revenues after the oil price crash in 2014, with increasing public debt levels,
asset drawdowns and credit-rating downgrades being quite common since. A sound
example has been Saudi Arabia, the second largest oil producer in the world. The
country saw its foreign reserves being reduced by 250 billion U.S. dollars – slightly
more than one third of its current aggregate output – within just a couple of years.
At the same time, its debt increased by 1,000 percent. As a result, the latest market
developments have become a source of worry to whether debt can adversely affect
the economic performance of these economies.
Finally, the third essay consisted of a case study of Saudi Arabia. The country has
always been heavily dependent on hydrocarbons, with oil revenues being the main
engine of its economy. Thanks to the natural resource endowment the country enjoys,
Saudi Arabia has managed to turn this natural wealth into financial wealth. Indeed,
the Kingdom is the 19th largest economy in the world in terms of aggregate output.
However, the country has been dominating the headlines over the last couple of
years about its latest long-term strategy that aims to transform the economy to be
less dependent on oil. The understanding of what the Saudi economy looks today,
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whether the country has used its resource wealth for substantial development and
social welfare, as well as the challenges lying ahead as the country implements its
national strategy motivated the work presented in this chapter.
This thesis adds value to the existing literature in several aspects. The first chapter,
addressing the financialisation issue, enriches the current debate by offering a unique
bidirectional study on the interrelation between futures positions and oil price through
the application of linear and Markov-switching vector autoregressions. We believe
that there is a high possibility of regime changes in the process over time, so we
consider the application of these techniques a useful contribution to the examination
of the said relationship.
The second chapter explores the relationship between debt and economic growth for
developing resource-rich economies, where very limited research has been conducted
so far for such a sample. A number of papers has been investigating the debt-growth
nexus, but most of them have been focusing on developed countries, with few others
also including developing ones. We believe that developing resource-rich countries
can be a particularly interesting area for research. These economies have been heavily
reliant on hydrocarbons, which implies a volatile revenue base. Hence, it is worth
exploring whether increasing debt levels during bust cycles can negatively affect the
economic growth of such countries. This study also consists of a preliminary analysis,
where further work, as it will be suggested in the next section, can build on.
The third study touches on a very timely topic. Saudi Arabia has been in the
center of attention after the launch of its ambitious diversification plan, Vision
2030. The work presented in this chapter provides a comprehensive and comparative
macroeconomic analysis on Saudi Arabia’s economic and social development, and
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discusses challenges that lie ahead as the country implements its national strategy for
economic diversification away from hydrocarbons. The internal economic and social
conditions of the Kingdom are important not only for itself, but also, indirectly, for
the world as Saudi Arabia can affect global oil prices through its ability to adjust its
crude oil production levels by large amounts.
We derive some significant conclusions from the three separate essays. After applying
vector autoregression systems to quantify the effects of oil price shocks on traders’
positions, as well as the impact of the latter on the former, we find that Markov-
switching model with two regimes is a good description of the behaviour for the
majority of the futures market participants. So, employing impulse responses
techniques after taking into consideration the switching-regime condition shows that
traders react to oil price changes, with the evidence that prices are distorted by
trading behaviour interference being weaker. That can be of importance for both
investors and regulators.
Further, the findings on fiscal sustainability issue confirm the existing literature that
debt can adversely affect the economic performance. Following the application of a
threshold analysis on developing resource-rich countries, where very limited research
has been conducted so far, we found the existence of a turning point beyond which
increasing debt levels can have a negative impact on the economic growth of these
economies. Such a conclusion can be useful for governments as their public finances
can be particularly vulnerable to increasing debt levels beyond a threshold point.
While Saudi Arabia’s economy grew substantially over the years, being placed to
the 19th position of the largest economies in the world thanks to the exploitation
of its resource wealth, the country seems to have not used its financial wealth for
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concrete economic development and social progress. The Kingdom lags behind in
both economic and social indicators when compared with other similar oil-sourced
economies. The government has aimed to make the economy less dependent on
oil, through its Vision 2030, whilst at the same time focusing on its industrial
development and the promotion of welfare for its population. However, a number of
challenges on all fonts – economical, political and social – lie ahead, making the full
implementation of the strategy questionable.
5.2 Limitations and future plans
As it happens with every research, our work has its limitations. Data availability
remains the main one. The first chapter, which untangles the issue of financialisation
in the oil futures market, uses public data of traders’ futures positions that are
published in the COT reports. Although these reports contain useful information and
give a good understanding of futures markets, they still lack along some dimensions.
For instance, the classification of traders and their strategic objectives are less clear-
cut. Participants of futures markets are mainly self-classified into the various trading
categories and they are not classified based on their trading activity. Also, data
is released on a weekly basis, giving a snapshot of the market based on one day’s
only trading behaviour. Daily data on traders’ positions is available, but is kept for
internal only use.
Similarly, data availability on the chapter of debt sustainability is limited along the
dimensions of time, country coverage and debt completeness. A separation between
gross and net debt, as well as between foreign- and domestic-currency dominated is
not feasible, making it harder to dig deeper on the debt-growth analysis and get a
better understanding of the particular aspects of debt that can affect economic growth
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in developing resource-rich economies. Further, although existing empirical literature
supports the presence of a common threshold (Woo & Kumar, 2010; Cecchetti et al.,
2011; Checherita-Westphal & Rother, 2012), the findings of this study should be
taken cautiously as the debt-growth nexus is complex and the identification of a
certain threshold should take into account debt decomposition and country-specific
characteristics.
Despite the limitations, the work of this thesis can be extended in a number of useful
directions. The analysis of the first chapter could be prolonged, by applying the same
regime-switching methodology, to explore the relationship of oil prices and futures
positions traded on NYMEX, another very liquid oil futures market. A comparative
study of the two markets can then be performed, which could indicate whether any
of them favours a particular trading activity. Following the analysis of the ICE oil
futures market in this study, it seems that producers are the largest category in
the BCF contract. That could imply that the ICE BCF market has mainly been
preferred as a hedging tool, which explains the findings in this chapter.
Further, the relationship between debt and economic growth could be studied through
the application of the more ‘sophisticated’ techniques, which have been recently
developed and can address panel and dynamic frameworks, as well as endogeneity
issues. A characteristic econometrical work, which meets all the above and, thus,
could be used as an additional layer of robustness check for our work, was introduced
by Kremer et al. (2013). In addition to that, it would be useful to examine each
economy separately and check whether the threshold levels vary significantly between
the different countries of the sample. As Ahlborn & Schweickert (2016) stated in
their paper, different economies might entail different degrees of fiscal uncertainty
and, thus, sustainability. Caner et al. (2010) had also supported that debt may play
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out differently in low-income countries, compared to high- or middle- ones.
Finally, further work could be conducted on the third chapter, providing an analysis
on the governance of the oil and gas sector in Saudi Arabia in comparison with
the rest GCC countries, as well as Norway. Norway is often regarded as a model
example of natural resources management. Such a work could reveal fundamental
weaknesses at the sector level of the Kingdom, which have prevented the country
from translating its financial wealth into sustainable development.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix
A.1 The Baseline Real Business Cycle Model
Consumers
The consumer supplies labour ht ∈ [0, 1] in period t and receives utility from his
leisure. The consumer also has uncertainty over future prices, so he maximises
expected utility:
Eo
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, 1− ht)
subject to the constraints:
xt + ct + bt+1 ≤ wtht + rtkt +Rtbt + pit
kt+1 ≤ (1− δ)kt + xt
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kt ≥ 0
where k0 given
It is assumed that the consumer is making all time-t choices (xt, ct, kt+1, bt+1, ht)
conditional on time t information.
The firm
The firm’s production function is subject to random productivity shocks, with the
firm’s problem becoming:
maxKtHte
ztF (Kt, Ht)− wtHt − rtKt
where F is a neoclassical production function and zt follows an AR(1) process:
zt = pzt−1 + et
where t is white noise.
Solving the model
The consumer’s Lagrangian is:
Eo
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, 1− ht) + λt((1− δ)kt + wtht + rtkt + pit − ct − kt+1)
We take the first order conditions for ct, ht, kt+1 and bt+1 plus the capital accumulation
equation and the transversality condition. The appropriate expectations operator is
Et because each of these variables is chosen with the information available at time t.
By eliminating the expectations operator, we get:
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λt = β
tuc(ct, ht)
as in the basic equilibrium growth model, and:
ul(ct, 1− ht) = uc(ct, 1− ht)wt
This equation shows that the worker equates the marginal utility from a little more
leisure to the utility from working an equal amount and getting more consumption.
Also, we have:
uc(ct, 1− ht) = βEt[uc(ct+1, 1− ht+1)(rt+1 + 1− δ)]
which is the same as Euler equation for the basic growth model, but with the
expectations operator.
The bond price is given by:
Rt+1 = Et(rt+1 + 1− δ)
The solution to the firm’s problem implies:
wt = e
ztFH(Kt, Ht)
rt = e
ztFK(Kt, Ht)
Once the model has been set up, it should then be identified whether the model can
explain business cycles by applying the method of calibration suggested by Kydland
& Prescott (1982). Finally, the model is simulated on a computer so the numerical
solution to it can be identified.
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A.2 Indicator Code of Variables
Variable Code Source
Real GDP Growth
Gross domestic product,
constant prices
(percent change)
IMF
General Government Debt
General government
gross debt
(percent of GDP)
IMF
Natural Resources Rents NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS World Bank
Gross Fixed Capital Formation NE.GDI.TOTL.ZS World Bank
Trade Openness NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS World Bank
Account Balance
Current account balance
(percent of GDP)
IMF
Domestic Credit to Private Sector
(% of GDP)
FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS World Bank
